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SUMMARY 
 
 The federal government is often criticized for performance that fails to meet the 
public’s expectations.  Its traditional pay system receives much of the blame for 
rewarding seniority instead of performance.  While everyone agrees that performance 
matters, they don’t always agree on the best way to improve it.  My research investigates 
human resource management strategies designed to motivate better performance and 
productivity.  Specifically, I examine the credibility and feasibility of implementing pay 
for performance throughout the federal government and identify ways that managers can 
promote greater productivity through human capital investment.  I conduct an extensive 
review of work motivation theories and synthesize findings from previous academic and 
government studies in order to develop models that are tailored to the federal workplace.  
I test these models using federal survey data from the Merit Principles Surveys of 2000 
and 2005.  A variety of attitudes, perceptions, expectations, and work environment 
factors are expected to influence job performance.  Findings reveal that pay for 
performance belief and success are greatly affected by performance management, fair 
treatment in all personnel matters, supervisory fairness in decision-making, and 
organizational culture.  Further results indicate that managers can markedly improve 
productivity by ensuring employees are highly engaged in their work, delivering effective 
performance management, providing a supportive organizational culture, and giving 
employees adequate resources and training.  With federal agencies constantly striving to 
improve performance and productivity, these findings have practical implications for 
 xi
government as they suggest ways that public managers can achieve better performance 
and greater productivity through increased work motivation.   
 
 xii
 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Effective management of human resources is necessary for any organization to 
achieve high performance.  This is especially true in government where performance is 
constantly scrutinized by a variety of stakeholders.  In an atmosphere of fiscal constraint, 
it’s imperative that government agencies accomplish their missions as efficiently and 
effectively as possible.  Motivation represents a key element of employee performance 
and productivity, making it a central part of human resource management (Berman, 
Bowman, West, & Van Wart, 2010).  Motivation and ability together determine 
individual performance (Miner, 2005; Pinder, 1998; Rainey, 2001).  Fortunately, both can 
be influenced externally by managers. 
 Work motivation is an important topic for scholars and managers alike because of 
its effect on performance in the workplace.  Research on work motivation has many 
practical applications pertaining to specific work-related behaviors such as: accepting a 
job with a particular organization (entry decision); showing up for work each day 
(attendance or absenteeism); being on-time or late for work (punctuality or tardiness); 
following supervisory orders (obedience); working hard or goofing off (level of work 
effort); inventing new ways to perform on the job (creativity); staying with an 
organization (commitment); and deciding to retire or resign (exit decision).  The study of 
work motivation helps scholars identify and understand factors that motivate individual 
performance, while simultaneously providing managers with practical ways of 
influencing employee performance in order to achieve organizational goals.  Despite 
1 
years of study, no single, unifying theory of work motivation can account for the wide 
range of behavior found in the workplace.  Since people are motivated by a variety of 
needs (Berman, 2006; Pinder, 2008), work motivation theories are multifaceted – 
encompassing factors that are inherent to individuals (intrinsic), related to external 
circumstances (extrinsic), and pertaining to social interactions (interpersonal) (Berman et 
al., 2010).   
 While motivation is widely recognized as important, few studies have focused on 
the motivational aspects of public sector performance, and fewer still have examined the 
topic from the perspective of public employees.  The main purpose of this research is to 
advance our understanding of work motivation by identifying factors that affect 
employee performance and productivity.  My research investigates human resource 
management strategies designed to motivate better performance and productivity, with 
emphasis on things that managers can do to improve overall performance.  Survey data is 
used to evaluate the condition of the federal workplace.  If you listen closely to the data, 
you will hear the voices of several thousand federal employees identifying what’s wrong 
with the government and suggesting ways to improve it. 
 My dissertation utilizes a three paper format which focuses attention on current 
federal strategies for improving employee performance and productivity.   
Specifically, I examine the credibility and feasibility of implementing pay for 
performance throughout the federal government and identify ways that managers can 
promote greater productivity through human capital investment.  I conduct an extensive 
review of work motivation theories and synthesize findings from previous academic and 
government studies in order to develop models that are tailored to the federal workplace.  
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I test these models using federal survey data from the Merit Principles Surveys of 2000 
and 2005, which are administered by the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB).  
My findings have practical applications in government as they emphasize the importance 
of employee perceptions regarding their work environment and suggest ways that 
managers can achieve better performance and greater productivity through improved 
work motivation.   
 Chapter Two introduces pay for performance as a popular strategy for improving 
performance in both the private and public sectors.  The federal government is often 
criticized for performance that fails to meet the public’s expectations.  Much of the blame 
is placed on traditional compensation systems that reward seniority instead of 
performance.  Adopting pay for performance is one attractive solution to government 
performance problems.  Unfortunately, merely adopting pay for performance won’t solve 
performance problems.  In order to motivate better job performance, employees must 
believe that better performance will lead to promised rewards.  Without this fundamental 
belief, pay for performance loses its motivational power.  Therefore, this study asks the 
question: What causes people to believe in pay for performance?  To answer this 
question, I conduct an extensive literature review covering the motivational power of 
rewards, theoretical and empirical support for pay for performance, and the importance of 
perceptions.  Based on the literature, I identify factors expected to influence pay for 
performance belief.  Using data from the Merit Principles Survey of 2005, I analyze 
employee perceptions of the link between performance and rewards in the federal 
government.  My study tests five hypotheses with a logistic regression model to see 
whether positive perceptions of (1) the performance evaluation system, (2) fair treatment 
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regarding personnel matters, (3) supervisory fairness in pay for performance decisions, 
(4) trust in decision-makers, and (5) the organizational culture influence the belief that 
better performance leads to more pay in the federal workplace.  My findings reveal the 
importance of workplace perceptions and their potential impact on the use of pay for 
performance throughout the federal government.   
 Chapter Three examines the feasibility of implementing pay for performance 
throughout the federal government.  After 30 years of pay for performance 
experimentation, the federal government has delivered more promises than results.  
Speculation continues about whether pay for performance programs have failed due to 
poor implementation or flawed motivational theory, but the problem may lie elsewhere.  
Many experts believe that successful implementation of organizational change depends 
on readiness for change as indicated by employee attitudes and the organizational context 
supporting the change.  Until now, no one has attempted to measure the federal 
government’s level of readiness for implementing change.  This study poses the question: 
Is the federal government ready for pay for performance?  To answer this question, I 
review academic and government literature to reveal factors expected to influence 
successful organizational change and identify pay for performance criteria for success.  
Using data from the Merit Principles Survey of 2005, I develop and apply a scorecard 
assessment that evaluates federal agency readiness for successfully implementing pay for 
performance.  This study highlights the importance of assessing readiness prior to 
introducing change initiatives.  Results indicate substantial variation in levels of readiness 
across federal agencies and identify problem areas needing improvement before 
proceeding with pay for performance implementation. 
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 Chapter Four examines federal productivity from a human capital perspective.  
Historically, capital investment in better equipment, facilities, and technology has been 
the greatest source of productivity improvements.  Consequently, the human side of 
productivity has been largely ignored.  This study proposes a different type of capital 
investment – one that focuses on investing in human capital to increase productivity.   
My research asks the question: How can federal managers promote greater productivity?  
I answer this question by reviewing government studies and academic literature in order 
to identify factors expected to motivate greater employee productivity.  Responses from 
the Merit Principles Survey of 2000 are analyzed to see what federal employees receive 
from their work environment that either helps or hinders productivity.  Using multiple 
regression analysis, I investigate six hypotheses to determine whether positive 
perceptions of resources and training, employee engagement, rewards and quality of 
work life, performance management, fair treatment on the job, and organizational culture, 
will promote greater productivity.  Findings show that by giving employees adequate 
resources and training, engaging employees in their work, delivering effective 
performance management, and providing a positive organizational culture, managers can 
markedly improve federal productivity. 
 At the conclusion of this dissertation, our knowledge and understanding of work 
motivation and human resource management should be expanded to include new ways of 
thinking about pay for performance, factors related to a belief in the promise of pay for 
performance, increased awareness of the need for pay for performance readiness prior to 
implementation, and practical suggestions for improving productivity in the federal 
workplace.  Chapter Two evaluates the credibility of pay for performance among federal 
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employees.  Descriptive statistics indicate whether the federal government has been able 
to convince employees that better performance leads to more pay, while logit results 
determine which factors have the greatest impact on pay for performance belief.  In 
Chapter Three, I measure pay for performance readiness throughout the federal 
government by developing and applying a scorecard technique that can be used as a 
template for organizations considering the use of pay for performance.  Results show how 
readiness for organizational change can impact the success of pay for performance 
reforms.  Chapter Four uses multiple regression analysis to identify which factors 
significantly affect federal productivity, determine the relative importance of each factor, 
and highlight areas needing the most attention to improve federal productivity.  Overall 
findings demonstrate the usefulness of survey data in identifying problem areas which 
should be addressed before making major organizational changes, as well as the 
importance of employee perceptions and work motivation techniques in successfully 
implementing pay for performance, achieving better performance, and promoting greater 
productivity throughout the federal government.   
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CHAPTER 2 
PAY FOR PERFORMANCE CREDIBILITY 
 
 Public demands for improved government performance and increased 
accountability for results have launched several national reforms over the last 40 years.  
Prominent examples include the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) of 1978, the 
Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993, the National Performance 
Review (NPR) of 1993, and the President’s Management Agenda (PMA) issued in 2001.  
Although differing in their approach to performance improvement, particularly in the 
relative emphasis placed on individual and organizational performance, they were all 
driven by the critical need to improve federal performance.  The current trend towards 
pay for performance represents the latest in a long line of government improvement 
efforts. 
 Pay for performance is a popular strategy for improving performance among both 
private sector companies and government agencies (Halachmi & Holzer, 1987).  The 
concept was introduced in the private sector and spread throughout American 
government during the 1980s (Condrey & Kellough, 1993; Ingraham, 1993; U.S. General 
Accounting Office [GAO1], 1990a).  Adopting a pay for performance system is one way 
for organizations to demonstrate their commitment to high performance (Heneman & 
Werner, 2005).  Currently, national policymakers appear ready and willing to overhaul 
                                                 
 
 
1 On July 7, 2004, under Public Law 108-271, U.S. GAO changed its legal name from the U.S. General 
Accounting Office to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (see Report No: GAO-04-976T).   
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the government’s traditional tenure-based compensation systems in favor of 
performance-based pay.  The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) received authorization to develop their own performance-
based pay systems under the Homeland Security Act of 2002.  This event represents a 
significant shift in federal compensation “from recognizing tenure to focusing on 
performance” that may spread throughout the entire federal community (U.S. MSPB, 
2006, p. ix).  Needless to say, enacting a new policy is much easier than successfully 
implementing one (Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984).  Trying to make pay for performance 
work in a government setting is no exception to that rule.  Although progress is 
proceeding more slowly at Homeland Security, the Department of Defense has 
transitioned over 182,000 civilian employees into their pay for performance system called 
the National Security Personnel System (NSPS) as of May 2008 (U.S. GAO, 2008).   
 While the success of pay for performance depends on many factors, the most 
important motivational element is the fundamental belief among employees that better 
performance will lead to promised rewards.  Without this instrumental belief, pay for 
performance loses its motivational power.  Considering the federal government’s history 
of rewarding employees for tenure more than performance (U.S. Office of Personnel 
Management [OPM], 2002) and the difficulty in establishing a link between performance 
and monetary rewards with limited funding and an abundance of personnel regulations, 
an even bigger challenge lies ahead:  Once government agencies promise to reward 
employees for improved performance, how will they make believers out of federal 
employees? 
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 Although the impact of pay for performance strategies has been widely studied, 
few have examined the topic from the perspective of employees or tried to determine 
what causes employees to believe that performance is linked to rewards.  My research 
attempts to fill this gap by developing a causal model to explain why some employees 
believe that better performance will lead to more pay and others don’t.  Drawing from 
theoretical and empirical evidence, I identify factors that should influence the belief that 
performance is tied to rewards.  Using data from the Merit Principles Survey of 2005, I 
begin by analyzing the perceptions, values, and attitudes of federal employees to confirm 
my motivational hypotheses.  Next, I test my model to see if a belief that better 
performance leads to more pay is significantly related to employee perceptions of the 
performance evaluation system, fair treatment regarding personnel decisions, supervisory 
fairness of pay for performance decisions, trust in decision-makers, and organizational 
culture.  Finally, I discuss the implications of my findings regarding the potential for 
successfully implementing pay for performance throughout the federal government. 
 This study makes three contributions to the pay for performance literature.  First, 
it focuses on the perceived relationship between pay and performance which is valuable 
because perceptions influence employee motivation and behavior.  As Kellough and Kim 
(2008) point out: “Whether perceptions are grounded in objective reality or not … they 
are grounded in truth from the individual employee’s perspective, and consequently, they 
impact employee behavior” (p. 1).  Despite their importance, scholars note that little 
research has focused on perceptions (Heneman & Werner, 2005).  Second, prior research 
on pay for performance beliefs only considered a few explanatory variables.  To the best 
of my knowledge, this study is the first to construct and test a more comprehensive, 
 9
theory-based model to explain what influences employee belief in the promise of pay for 
performance.  Third, this study’s results have many practical applications.  Improving our 
understanding of pay for performance perceptions can provide valuable insights into 
work motivation, behaviors, and performance.  Identifying what causes employees to 
believe in pay for performance may help organizations to design and implement better 
pay for performance programs with increased chances for success.   
Literature Review 
The Motivational Power of Rewards 
 The workplace offers many different types of rewards.  Intrinsic rewards are 
related to the content of the work itself (job content), while extrinsic rewards are related 
to job context (Herzberg, 1956, 1966; Herzberg, Mausner, & Snyderman, 1959).  
Intrinsic motivation comes from within the individual and emphasizes rewards derived 
directly from the work itself, thereby satisfying needs for achievement, self-esteem, 
competence, and self-actualization (Pinder, 1998).  By contrast, extrinsic motivators are 
drawn from external sources and consist of rewards that are more easily controlled by 
employers, such as pay, monetary rewards, fringe benefits, flexible workplace, 
supervisory relations, job security, and opportunities for advancement (Kaufman & 
Fetters, 1980; Pinder, 1998; Walker, Tausky, & Oliver, 1982).   
 Compensation represents the most powerful extrinsic reward in the workplace and 
is considered one of the strongest determinants of employee attitudes, motivation, and 
behaviors (Gerhart & Milkovich, 1992).  Findings from Lawler’s research suggest that 
pay can satisfy both lower-order and higher-order needs (Lawler, 1971, 1981, 1983).   
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Pay can also have symbolic meaning when viewed as recognition for achievement 
(Lawler, 1990).  Research conducted by Locke and associates has shown pay to be an 
effective method of motivating employee performance (Bartol & Locke, 2000; Locke, 
Feren, McCaleb, Shaw, & Denny, 1980).  However, the power of money as a 
performance incentive depends on availability of funds, which is usually problematic for 
public agencies.  Financial incentives can only influence behavior if adequate funding is 
available to deliver meaningful rewards.  Employees will only be motivated if pay raises 
are large enough to make a difference (Lawler, 1981b).   
 Although money can be a powerful motivator, research warns against the use of 
monetary incentives under the wrong organizational circumstances.  Lawler’s (1971) 
findings suggest that money should not be used as a motivational incentive in 
organizations with low trust levels, where performance is hard to measure or measured 
subjectively, and where top performers cannot receive sufficiently large pay rewards.  
Organizational theory and extensive private sector experience predict the failure of 
financial incentive systems if employees do not see a link between pay and performance 
(Perry, 1995).  One of the most significant barriers to using money as a performance 
incentive is the limited pool of funds available to federal agencies which often renders the 
number and size of awards too few and too small to make a difference.  Financial 
incentive reforms involving monetary bonuses and performance awards have a very high 
failure rate in public organizations (Ingraham, 2003).  Insufficient funding has been cited 
as one of the leading causes of failure among pay for performance programs in 
government (Pearce, 1989; Perry, 1988-89, 2003; Milkovich & Wigdor, 1991; Rainey & 
Kellough, 2000; U.S. GAO, 1990a).   
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 Of equal importance are the opportunities for intrinsic rewards that can be derived 
from public service.  Public service motivation (PSM) theory contends that public 
employees are motivated differently than private sector employees (Perry, 1997; Perry & 
Porter, 1982; Perry & Wise, 1990; Wittmer, 1991).  One major motivational distinction is 
that public sector employees appear to be more intrinsically motivated.  Individuals 
motivated by public service share several common characteristics, including compassion 
and self-sacrifice (Perry, 1996), a desire to participate in the formulation of good public 
policy (Kelman, 1987), and a commitment to serve the public interest (Perry, 1996; Perry 
& Wise, 1990; Rainey, 1982).  Public sector employees also appear to value intrinsic 
rewards more than private sector employees do (Boyne, 2002; Crewson, 1997; Karl & 
Sutton, 1998; Kilpatrick, Cummings, & Jennings, 1964; Perry & Porter, 1982; Rainey, 
1982; Wittmer, 1991; Wright, 2001).  Individuals who place greater value on intrinsic 
rewards tend to be more motivated by work that is interesting, challenging, useful to 
society, and self-directive, as well as work providing opportunities for service, decision 
making, personal growth, creativity, and collegial recognition (Herzberg et al., 1959; 
Kaufman & Fetters, 1980; Nord, Brief, Atieh, & Doherty, 1988; Pinder, 1998; Walker et 
al., 1982).  The motivating power of financial incentives could be seriously diminished in 
the public sector if employees prefer intrinsic over extrinsic rewards.   
 While the combined effects of intrinsic and extrinsic incentives have been widely 
studied, critics argue against placing too much emphasis on extrinsic rewards in the 
workplace.  Originally, scholars assumed that the effects of intrinsic and extrinsic 
rewards on performance were additive (Porter & Lawler, 1968).  However, research by 
Deci (1972) and associates (Deci & Ryan, 1985) suggested that extrinsic rewards reduced 
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intrinsic motivation by decreasing feelings of choice and self-determination normally 
derived from performing a task.  Deci’s work (known as cognitive evaluation theory) 
recommended that effective rewards provide at least an illusion of choice and focus 
attention more on task performance than on the mere attainment of rewards.  So far, 
research on whether extrinsic rewards have a detrimental effect on intrinsic motivation 
does not support Deci’s theory.  Several empirical studies found that performance-based 
pay does not reduce intrinsic motivation (Eisenberger & Cameron, 1996), and one study 
found it may actually increase intrinsic motivation (Scott, Farh, & Podsakoff, 1988).  
Despite this evidence, some continue to argue that rewards decrease intrinsic motivation 
(Pfeffer, 1998), while others find little evidence to support it (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003; 
Heneman & Werner, 2005).  After a great deal of study, the debate over whether extrinsic 
rewards reduce intrinsic motivation continues (Rynes, Gerhart, & Parks, 2005).  
  It’s important for organizations to recognize that employees are motivated by 
more than just money.  A fatal flaw of any reward program is to rely solely on a single 
type of reward.  Lawler (1981b) noted that intrinsic and extrinsic rewards satisfy different 
needs and that most employees are motivated by both.  Organizations utilizing monetary 
rewards need to take advantage of other motivational factors such as personal pride or 
satisfaction in work (U.S. MSPB, 2006).  Traditional reward programs have historically 
centered on extrinsic rewards in the form of salary, bonus pay, and benefits (Heneman, 
2002; Rynes & Gerhart, 2000).  While scholars acknowledge the importance of both 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in the workplace, government reform efforts have spent 
the last twenty years focusing primarily on extrinsic incentives (Rainey, 2003).   
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 Changes in the nature of work during the 21st century have prompted some to 
question this emphasis on extrinsic rewards.  Heneman and Schutt (2002) propose 
moving away from traditional reward systems towards a total rewards philosophy that 
includes providing learning opportunities to help employees broaden their skill sets, 
designing more meaningful jobs, and offering flexibility of choice to match individual 
employees with the kind of rewards they value the most.  When developing motivational 
pay strategies, Lawler (2000b) believes that any reward can motivate behavior as long as 
it is valued by the employee.  Because decisions regarding rewards are not mutually 
exclusive, organizations don’t need to choose between intrinsic and extrinsic rewards.  
What’s most important is that organizations meet both intrinsic and extrinsic needs in 
order to maximize work motivation.  The greatest challenge for management today lies in 
identifying which rewards are most important to their employees and customizing reward 
systems to motivate each individual.   
Pay for Performance: Theoretical and Empirical Support 
 The concept of pay for performance offers a deceptively simple solution to 
complex performance problems.  The logic behind pay for performance suggests that 
poor performance is more likely to occur when people are paid the same amount 
regardless of their performance; conversely, performance improvement is more likely to 
result when pay and performance are effectively linked (Lawler, 1990, 2000b).  The 
National Commission on the Public Service (Volcker, 2003) cited ineffective incentive 
systems as a major cause of government performance problems.  In addition, several 
meta-analyses support the conclusion that strengthening the connection between pay and 
performance can be an effective method of improving performance (Jenkins, Mitra, 
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Gupta, & Shaw, 1998; Locke et al., 1980).  Hence, making pay and rewards contingent 
upon performance should motivate employees to perform at higher levels. 
 Several psychological theories support the premise that linking rewards to 
performance can stimulate performance improvement by increasing employee 
motivation.  Expectancy theory offers the strongest support for linking pay to 
performance as a motivational incentive.  First proposed by Victor H. Vroom (1964) and 
refined by others (e.g., Porter & Lawler, 1968), expectancy theory states that work 
motivation is determined by a perceived probability between effort, performance, and 
outcomes (e.g., rewards).  Motivation to perform is maximized when an individual 
believes that personal effort will lead to better performance (effort-performance 
expectancy) resulting in rewards (performance-outcome expectancy) that are highly 
valued (valence).  Motivating better performance with pay also requires that performance 
standards be achievable and accurately measured, the relationship between pay and 
performance be clearly defined, and employees have opportunities to demonstrate and 
improve their performance (Heneman & Werner, 2005).  Over the years, expectancy 
theory has received empirical support from a large body of research (see reviews 
conducted by Ambrose & Kulik, 1999; Van Eerde & Thierry, 1996) and gained 
acceptance among scholars (Bartol & Locke, 2000; Lawler, 2000b; Miner, 2005; Pinder, 
1998).     
 Reinforcement theory also supports the pay for performance concept (Heneman & 
Werner, 2005; Kellough, 2006; Perry, 1991).  Derived from B.F. Skinner’s (1953) work 
on operant conditioning and later tested in the workplace by several researchers (Luthans 
& Kreitner, 1975, 1985; Luthans & Stajkovic, 1999), reinforcement theory posits that 
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behavior is determined by its consequences.  Behavior tends to be repeated if it leads to a 
positive outcome and avoided if it leads to a negative outcome (Skinner, 1953, 1969).  
The reinforcement effect is strengthened when the desired performance is clearly defined, 
when a valued reward is made contingent upon performance, when the timing of rewards 
is immediate and directly linked to performance, and when the size of rewards matches 
the magnitude of increased performance.  Current research on behavioral management 
and organizational behavior modification support the use of reinforcement theory as a 
method of improving performance in the workplace (Luthans & Stajkovic, 1999; 
Stajkovic & Luthans, 1997, 2001, 2003).   
 Equity theory directly addresses the issue of money in the workplace and plays a 
key role in determining the impact of pay for performance programs.  Equity theory 
states that individuals assess their work contributions and rewards relative to other 
employees and alter their behavior according to their perception of equitable treatment 
(Adams, 1965).  To have a positive impact on work motivation, reward systems must be 
perceived as fair by employees.  Perceived equity exists when employees feel they and 
those around them get the rewards they deserve for their contributions to the 
organization.  Inequity is perceived whenever employees feel themselves or others to be 
overcompensated or undercompensated for their work.  Such perceived inequity prompts 
employees to adjust their work behavior to reduce the inequity or avoid it altogether by 
leaving the organization.  If employees see top performers receiving the same pay and 
rewards as poor performers, this creates a sense of inequity which tends to have a 
demoralizing and demotivating effect on the best performers (Thompson & Rainey, 
2003).  In order to achieve its maximum motivational potential, employees must believe 
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they will receive the rewards they think they deserve under a pay for performance 
system. 
 Several reviews of equity research indicate strong support for the theory 
(Ambrose & Kulik, 1999; Greenberg, 1990; Miner, 2005; Mowday, 1996), but it’s not 
without limitations.  Research consistently supports equity theory predictions regarding 
the impact of undercompensation and underreward leading to reduced effort, diminished 
performance, increased absenteeism and turnover (Bartol & Durham, 2000; Greenberg, 
1982; Summers & Hendrix, 1991), but findings on the effects of overcompensation have 
been less consistent (Mowday, 1991).  Equity theory is also criticized for being vague as 
to which type of behavior is most likely to occur within a particular context (Greenberg, 
1990).  Because of these limitations, the theory fell out of favor for a while in the 
organizational behavior literature (Ambrose & Kulik, 1999). 
 A resurgence of equity theory research has occurred over the past 20 years due to 
its expansion into the area of organizational justice (see Greenberg, 1986, 1987a, 1987b, 
1990, 2001; Greenberg & Colquitt, 2005).  Current organizational behavior research on 
equity theory utilizes a justice framework which suggests that both process (procedural 
justice) and outcomes (distributive justice) influence employee behavior in the workplace 
(Greenberg, 1990).  Further research investigates whether some employees are more 
sensitive to equity or justice issues than others (Huseman, Hatfield, & Miles, 1987; 
Miles, Hatfield, & Huseman, 1994; Sauley & Bedein, 2000).  Overall, equity theory 
highlights the importance of fairness perceptions and social comparisons in motivating 
work-related behavior (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003; Heneman & Werner, 2005).  If the 
 17
volume of research on equity theory in an organizational justice context is any indication, 
the usefulness of this theory has yet to reach its full potential.   
The Importance of Perceptions 
 Even with the help of theoretical principles for guidance, effectively linking 
performance to rewards in a way that motivates better performance remains a challenge 
for any organization.  Merely adopting a performance-based pay plan does not guarantee 
the desired result of improved performance.  In their book, Merit Pay: Linking Pay to 
Performance in a Changing World, Heneman and Werner (2005) emphasize that “the 
perceived relationship between pay and performance is as important as the actual 
relationship” (p. 16).  It’s not enough to tell employees that performance matters.  
Employees must see that the relationship between performance and rewards is real for it 
to have any motivating power (Eskew & Heneman, 1996).  Many pay for performance 
plans have failed because employees failed to see a connection between performance and 
rewards (Heneman & Werner, 2005).   
 Evidence from the public sector suggests that employee expectations and 
perceptions of the relationship between performance and rewards do not support a pay for 
performance philosophy.  Previous research consistently shows that public employees 
perceive weaker relationships between performance and pay, promotion, and disciplinary 
action than private workers do (Coursey & Rainey, 1990; Lachman, 1985; Porter & 
Lawler, 1968; Rainey 1979, 1983; Rainey, Traut & Blunt 1986; Solomon, 1986).  Recent 
government surveys illustrate that poor performance isn’t being dealt with effectively. 
According to the 2002 and 2004 Federal Human Capital Surveys conducted by the U.S. 
Office of Personnel Management, only one quarter of federal employees agreed that steps 
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were taken to deal with poor performers, while nearly half disagreed with the statement 
(U.S. GAO, 2005a).  The Merit Principles Surveys conducted in 2000 and 2005 revealed 
similar results with few employees agreeing that their supervisor deals effectively with 
poor performers (17 percent agreed in 2000, 35 percent agreed in 2005).  In 2002,  
U.S. OPM described the current General Schedule (GS) pay system as “performance 
insensitive,” commenting that: “The Federal white-collar pay system sends and reinforces 
the message that performance does not matter” (p. 17).  Over 75 percent of federal pay 
increases consist of time-based within-grade increases (WGI), cost of living adjustments 
(COLA), and locality pay – none of which are tied to performance (U.S. OPM, 2002).  
With a pay system like that, it’s no wonder that few federal workers in the past have 
expected any rewards for good performance or punishment for poor performance  
(U.S. MSPB, 1982, 1995, 1999).  Such a long history of low expectations will not be easy 
to change.   
 The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 introduced pay for performance into the 
federal government in the form of merit pay.  While pay for performance comes in a 
variety of forms, merit pay is the most common type of incentive plan that uses 
individual performance evaluations as the basis for merit pay increases (Heneman, 1992).  
Federal merit pay linked annual pay increases to individual performance appraisals for 
federal managers (grades 13 to 15).  The federal government’s experiment with merit pay 
lasted 12 years from 1981 to 1993 and featured overwhelming problems and 
underwhelming results.  The Merit Pay System began in 1981 with great expectations.  
Problems quickly led to its demise and creation of the Performance Management and 
Recognition System (PMRS) in 1984.  Although PMRS improved upon the original plan, 
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it was eventually discontinued due to several serious problems including: a failure to 
establish an actual or perceived relationship between pay and performance; a lack of 
adequate funding for rewards; employee perceptions that performance appraisals were 
unfair and influenced by nonperformance factors; and managerial distaste for 
confrontation and reluctance to spend the time required to document poor performance 
(Heneman, 1992; Heneman & Werner, 2005; Milkovich & Wigdor, 1991; Perry, 1991; 
Rainey & Kellough, 2000).   
 Several studies reviewing pay for performance systems in the public sector 
concluded that they were generally unsuccessful, having little positive effect on employee 
motivation or performance and failing to show a significant link between pay and 
performance (Ingraham, 1993; Kellough & Lu, 1993; Milkovich & Wigdor, 1991; Perry, 
1988-89).  Undoubtedly, the impact of this failed attempt at merit pay left an impression 
on the federal workforce and organizational landscape.  Federal employees can be 
expected to view the latest pay for performance policies with greater skepticism the 
second time around. 
 Despite its poor track record, pay for performance has retained its popularity 
among policymakers, making it something of a paradox (Kellough & Lu, 1993).  
Undaunted by previous failures and fueled by increasing public demands for improved 
government performance, pay for performance made its way back onto the political 
agenda following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  This national crisis 
influenced American policymaking by unifying the country over national security issues 
and by opening a policy window of opportunity (Kingdon, 1995).  Major civil service 
reforms including performance-based pay policies were suddenly able to pass through 
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Congress where previous attempts had failed because personnel reforms were tied to 
national security interests (Brook & King, 2007; Moynihan, 2005).  The impact of 
September 11th on public management reform is best illustrated by the enactment of the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002.  The Act combined 22 existing federal agencies and 
170,000 federal employees to create the Department of Homeland Security, representing 
the largest and most complex reorganization of the federal government since the 
Department of Defense was established in 1947 (Brook & King, 2007).  Passage of the 
Homeland Security Act in 2002 also “marked a dramatic shift toward greater public 
personnel flexibility” (Moynihan, 2005, p. 171), granting Homeland Security and the 
Department of Defense broad new powers to overhaul their personnel rules (exempt from 
Title 5) and develop their own performance-based pay systems.   
Factors Influencing Pay for Performance Beliefs 
 Much research has focused on how pay impacts employee performance but few 
studies have examined how employees perceive the relationship between performance 
and rewards.   Although actual and perceived links between pay and performance have 
equal impact on motivation (Heneman & Werner, 2005), relatively little is known about 
the determinants of pay for performance beliefs.  Research and theory suggest that 
attitudes regarding pay and rewards, personnel decisions, performance appraisals, 
trustworthiness of decision-makers, and organizational culture are likely to influence 
employee beliefs in the connection between pay and performance.  Each factor is briefly 
presented below along with its corresponding hypothesis.   
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Performance Evaluation 
 Accurate performance evaluation is the cornerstone of any pay for performance 
system (U.S. MSPB, 2006).  To be most effective, an evaluation system should clearly 
delineate performance expectations, provide periodic feedback on how well employees 
are meeting expectations, and make meaningful distinctions between levels of 
performance (U.S. GAO, 1990a, 2005a; U.S. MSPB, 2006).  Findings from previous 
studies illustrate the importance of employee perceptions regarding performance 
evaluation.  Evidence shows that pay for performance perceptions are significantly 
affected by the perceived effectiveness (Perry & Pearce, 1983) and accuracy (Vest, Scott, 
& Tarnoff, 1995) of the performance appraisal process.  Some scholars believe that “an 
accurate and equitable system for evaluating performance is essential to increase the 
perceived probability that good performance will lead to rewards” (Kellough & Lu, 1993, 
p. 49).  It’s much easier for employees to believe in the concept of pay for performance if 
they understand what is expected of them, if they feel their performance is evaluated 
accurately, and if they have sufficient opportunities to earn a high performance rating.  
Therefore, I hypothesize that a positive assessment of the performance evaluation system 
leads employees to believe that better performance results in more pay (Hypothesis 1).    
Perceived Fairness 
 Derived from equity theory, procedural justice literature suggests that employee 
reactions to administrative decisions depend not only on the decision but also on the 
perceived fairness of the decision-making process (Folger & Greenberg, 1985; 
Greenberg, 1987a, 1987b, 1990, 1996).  St-Onge (2000) found pay for performance 
perceptions were significantly related to perceptions of fairness regarding the 
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performance evaluation system and the reward allocation process.  Perceptions of fairness 
also extend beyond performance appraisals into overall treatment on the job regarding 
personnel decisions in areas such as training, discipline, job assignments, awards, pay, 
and promotions.  Thus, from a procedural justice perspective, employees who feel they 
aren’t treated fairly on the job are less likely to believe the promise that better 
performance will lead to rewards.   
 Perceptions of fairness are also closely tied to employee attitudes towards 
supervisors.  Because of the key role that immediate supervisors play in the pay for 
performance decision-making process, it’s imperative that employees believe their 
supervisors are evaluating performance and allocating rewards fairly and accurately.  
Gabris and Ihrke (2000) found that employee perceptions of fairness in the performance 
appraisal system depend largely on how employees perceive their supervisory raters.  
Employees who perceive their evaluating supervisors as honest, objective, unbiased, and 
trustworthy are more likely to perceive the performance appraisal system as fair and 
accurate and more likely to accept a new compensation system as legitimate (Gabris & 
Ihrke, 2000).  In light of this theoretical and empirical evidence, I hypothesize that 
perceptions of fair treatment regarding personnel decisions (Hypothesis 2) and perceived 
supervisory fairness in pay for performance decisions (Hypothesis 3) will positively 
influence the belief that better performance is linked to more pay.   
Trust in Decision-Makers 
 Although trust plays a vital role in every reward system, it is especially crucial to 
the formation of a perceived link between pay and performance (Brudney & Condrey, 
1993; Heneman & Werner, 2005; Kellough & Lu, 1993; Lawler, 1971, 1981, 1990; 
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Milkovich & Wigdor, 1991; Nigro, 1982; U.S. MSPB, 2006).  Empirical studies support 
this view.  In their review of pay for performance research, the National Research 
Council reported that performance-based pay systems worked well in environments with 
a climate “characterized by shared values and high levels of trust throughout the 
organization” (Milkovich & Wigdor, 1991, p. 161).  Issues of trust are two-fold.  First, 
employees must trust their immediate supervisors to rate their performance fairly and 
accurately (Fulk, Brief, & Barr, 1985).  Next, employees must be able to trust higher 
level management to allocate sufficient funds to support performance-based pay increases 
and implement pay for performance policies fairly throughout the organization.  Several 
studies found a significant positive relationship between pay for performance perceptions 
and employee trust in supervisors (Folger & Konovsky, 1989), trust in top management 
(Vest, Scott, Vest, & Markham, 2000), and trust in all decision-makers (St-Onge, 2000).  
Ultimately, high levels of trust are required if pay for performance plans are to gain 
employee acceptance and have the desired motivational effects on the workforce (Lawler, 
1971).  Based on the empirical evidence presented above, I hypothesize that employee 
trust in decision-makers (Hypothesis 4) will impact employee belief in the connection 
between better performance and greater pay. 
Organizational Culture 
 Organizational culture and norms help shape employee beliefs, practices, and 
behavior in the workplace (Kaufman, 1960; Schein, 1992).  Schein (2004) defines culture 
as “a pattern of shared basic assumptions” (p. 17) that represents “both a dynamic 
phenomenon that surrounds us at all times … and a set of structures, routines, rules, and 
norms that guide and constrain behavior” (p. 1).  To gain acceptance among employees, 
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the pay for performance philosophy must be congruent with the organization’s existing 
culture (Heneman & Werner, 2005).  While it is possible to modify an organization’s 
culture, major changes are extremely difficult to achieve because culture is “embedded in 
the fabric of the organization” (Ott & Baksh, 2005, p. 298).  Upon examination of public 
employee attitudes towards a new merit pay system, Gabris and Ihrke (2000) discovered 
that positive employee perceptions depended more on the cultural context within the 
organization than on any particular element within the merit pay system.   
 In order to be motivated by a pay for performance system, employees must 
believe rewards will be given on the basis of merit or performance instead of being based 
on seniority, favoritism, or other nonperformance factors.  Empirical results suggest that 
establishing an actual link between performance and rewards is a significant predictor of 
the perceived link between performance and rewards (St-Onge, 2000).  Other important 
elements of organizational culture identified in the public sector include valuing 
employee opinions, treating people with respect, sharing information freely, and 
promoting a spirit of teamwork and cooperation (Brewer & Selden, 2000; DiIulio, 1994; 
Gore, 1993; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; Rainey & Steinbauer, 1999).  One study found 
organizational performance to be higher in federal agencies with cultures that empowered 
employees by valuing their input, taking their contributions seriously, and treating people 
with respect (Brewer & Selden, 2000).  Due to the significance of having a supportive 
organizational culture and its impact on employee attitudes, I hypothesize that positive 
perceptions of the organizational culture will lead employees to believe that better 
performance results in more pay (Hypothesis 5).   
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 To summarize, a variety of attitudes, perceptions, expectations, and characteristics 
of the work environment are considered determinants of the belief that pay and 
performance are connected.  My study will test five hypotheses to see whether positive 
perceptions of (1) the performance evaluation system, (2) fair treatment regarding 
personnel decisions, (3) supervisory fairness in pay for performance decisions, (4) trust in 
decision-makers, and (5) the organizational culture influence the belief that better 
performance leads to more pay in the federal workplace.  Has the federal government 
been able to convince employees that better performance leads to more pay?  What 
factors are most influential in determining pay for performance beliefs?  Can those 
factors be externally influenced by federal agencies to give pay for performance a chance 
for success?  I turn to the Merit Principles Survey of 2005 for answers.   
Data and Methods 
 The U.S. MSPB surveys federal employees periodically to determine their 
perspectives on the merit system.  This study utilizes data from their Merit Principles 
Survey conducted in the summer and fall of 2005.  This survey asked a wide variety of 
questions regarding employee perceptions of their jobs, work environment, supervisors, 
and agencies, with a special focus on pay and reward issues. 
 A random sample of 74,000 full-time permanent civilian employees was selected 
from the federal workforce across 24 executive branch agencies for the Merit Principles 
Survey of 2005.  The sample was stratified by agency to ensure sufficient numbers of 
respondents from each federal agency to permit cross-agency comparisons.  A total of 
36,926 respondents completed surveys for a 50 percent response rate.  For the purpose of 
this study, I restricted the dataset to white-collar employees within the GS pay system 
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and dropped all observations with missing values on my key variables which reduced the 
sample size to 21,826.  All statistics were weighted using U.S. MSPB’s sampling weights 
to make the data more representative of the overall white-collar federal workforce.   
Dependent Variable 
 In the Merit Principles Survey of 2005, Question 20(b) asked federal employees if 
they agreed with the statement: “If I perform well, it is likely I will receive a cash award 
or pay increase.”  This question was measured on a 5-point Likert-type scale, with 
responses ranging from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree.”  I created a dummy 
dependent variable by recoding responses as 1 for “Agree” plus “Strongly Agree,” and  
0 for others. 
Independent Variables 
 With the exception of individual attributes, most of the independent variables 
included in this study are from questions measured on a 5-point Likert-type scale, with 
responses coded as: 1 for “Strongly Disagree,” 2 for “Disagree,” 3 for “Neither Agree nor 
Disagree,” 4 for “Agree,” and 5 for “Strongly Agree.”   
 For the key independent variables, the survey asked several questions on similar 
topics, allowing for the development of more reliable measures of the concepts than 
would be possible using single questions.  To develop these measures, I grouped the 
questions that best captured my theoretical concepts and then used principal components 
factor analysis to be sure all questions were measuring similar concepts.  The Cronbach’s 
alpha, which measures scale reliability from 0 to 1, is presented for each indexed 
variable.  This study only includes variables with an alpha above .70 which is the 
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threshold suggested by Nunnally (1978).  My factor analysis results are displayed in 
Table 1.   
 To measure employee attitudes about performance evaluation (alpha = .87),  
I created a 7-item index using questions about knowledge of performance expectations, 
fairness of performance standards, participation in setting standards and goals, 
opportunities to earn a high performance rating, and satisfaction with the appraisal 
system.   
 Two separate indexes were created to measure perceived fairness in the federal 
workplace.  I created fair treatment on the job (alpha = .87) by combining employee 
perceptions of fair treatment regarding career advancement, awards, training, 
performance appraisals, discipline, job assignments, and pay.  Five questions were used 
to construct supervisory fairness (alpha = .85) which describes employee attitudes 
regarding the fairness and effectiveness of supervisory behavior when rating job 
applicants, selecting people for vacancies or promotions, determining pay increases and 
awards, establishing individual pay levels within broad pay bands, and taking adverse 
actions.   
 To determine the level of employee trust in decision-makers, the Merit Principles 
Survey of 2005 asked federal employees whether they trusted their immediate 
supervisors and upper level managers to take actions relevant to pay for performance.  
Based on theory and previous empirical research, trust was measured separately for each 
level of supervision.  At the first level, trust in immediate supervisor (alpha = .96) 
combines eight questions regarding the immediate supervisor’s ability to fairly assess 
employee performance and contributions, support employees in pay and award 
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discussions with upper management, listen fairly to employee concerns, apply discipline 
fairly, clearly communicate conduct expectations, act with integrity, refrain from 
favoritism, and keep people informed.  At the second level, trust in upper management 
(alpha = .96) was created using seven questions about clear communication of 
organizational performance expectations, fair assessment of employee performance and 
contributions, listening fairly to employee concerns, applying discipline fairly, acting 
with integrity, refraining from favoritism, and keeping the organization informed.   
 Organizational culture (alpha = .88) combines seven questions on performance-
based rewards and recognition, sharing information freely, valuing employee opinions, 
demonstrating a spirit of cooperation and teamwork, having a flexible workplace, treating 
people with respect, and ensuring employees are appropriately paid and rewarded 
throughout the organization.   
 Because a variety of individual attributes may affect pay for performance beliefs, 
I control for nine individual characteristics.  Respondent's age and length of federal 
service are measured in years.  The respondent’s annual salary was measured in dollars.  
Dummy variables were created to measure the remaining attributes.  Gender was coded 
with males as 1 and females coded as 0.  Respondent’s education level was measured as 
five dummy variables including no education, high school, associate’s degree, bachelor’s 
degree, and master’s degree, with the reference group consisting of doctorate level 
education.  Five dummy variables were created to measure racial minorities including 
African American/Black, American Indian/Alaskan Native, Asian, Hispanic or Latino, 
and Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, with the reference group consisting of whites.  
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Supervisors at all levels were coded as 1 with nonsupervisors coded as 0.  Union 
members were coded as 1 with non-union members coded as 0. 
 Last, I created a series of dichotomous variables to account for the agency in 
which the respondent works.  Surveys were sent to 24 executive branch agencies and 23 
of these were included in my study.  My reference group consists of federal employees 
who work for U.S. OPM.  A list of the agencies included in the study is provided in  
Table 2.   
Logit Model 
 When the dependent variable is ordinal or nominal, assumptions required for 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression do not hold.  Two acceptable methods of analysis 
are ordered logistic regression (or ordered logit) for ordinal dependent variables and 
logistic regression (or logit) for nominal dependent variables.  In this study, although the 
dependent variable was originally measured at the ordinal level using a 5-point Likert 
type scale, I transformed it into a dummy variable.  This transformation allowed me to 
use logistic regression where independent variables are assumed to have linear impacts 
on the log odds.  The odds are the probability of believing in the promise of pay for 
performance, divided by the probability of not believing.  The effects on the probabilities 
are nonlinear and depend on the values of all the independent variables.  Positive logit 
coefficients indicate that probabilities rose with increases in the independent variables 
after accounting for the effects of the other variables.  Using the prchange function in 
STATA software (Long & Freese, 2001), I calculate the impact of 0 to 1 increases for 
dummy variables and one-unit increases (from one half-unit below the mean to one half-
unit above the mean) for interval-level variables, holding all other variables constant at 
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their mean.  Logit was chosen over ordered logit because the ordered logit model failed 
STATA’s Brant test of the parallel regression assumption.  
Empirical Findings 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 1 presents descriptive statistics in the form of percentage response rates for 
individual questions.  Since most independent variables were measured on a 5-point 
Likert-type scale, the average scores range from 1 (very negative) to 5 (very positive).  
Also included are weighted means, factor loadings, and Cronbach’s alpha for indexed 
variables.   
 Expectations regarding pay for performance were fairly low among the white-
collar GS federal employees in my study.  Overall, 41.6 percent of respondents expected 
to receive a cash award or pay increase for good performance, while 34.7 percent 
disagreed and 23.6 percent remained neutral on the subject.  Although slightly more 
people agreed than disagreed, there is clearly much room for improvement. 
 Attitudes regarding performance evaluation were moderate with a mean score of 
3.5.  Understanding the basis for the most recent performance rating received the highest 
agreement level at 82 percent.  Around two-thirds of respondents agreed that standards 
used to appraise performance were appropriate and agreed that they understood what 
must be done to receive a high performance rating.  Some 60.5 percent felt they have 
sufficient opportunities to earn a high performance rating.  On the negative side, only 
39.8 percent expressed satisfaction with their organization’s performance appraisal 
system. 
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 Perceptions of fair treatment on the job were moderate overall with a mean score 
of 3.2.  Respondents generally felt they were treated fairly to some extent regarding all 
types of personnel decisions.  The greatest extent of perceived fairness was in the area of 
performance appraisals (56.2 percent), while the greatest degree of unfairness was 
reported in the area of career advancement (37 percent).  Two areas crucial to pay for 
performance – awards and pay – did reveal fair treatment but at lower levels and only 
among a minority of respondents.  Only 39.1 percent felt they were treated fairly 
regarding awards with 31.3 percent disagreeing, and less than half (47.3 percent) reported 
fair treatment regarding pay. 
 Employee attitudes about supervisory fairness were moderate with a total mean 
score of 3.4 which represents a slight improvement over fair treatment in general.  When 
asked to rate the extent to which supervisors exercised certain actions in a fair and 
effective manner, employee perceptions were highly favorable.  A majority of 
respondents perceived supervisory fairness to a moderate or great extent when rating job 
applicants (71.4 percent), hiring or promoting people (67.4 percent), and determining pay 
increases and awards (55.7 percent).  Slightly fewer respondents were convinced their 
supervisors would establish pay within broad bands (41.1 percent) and handle adverse 
actions (43.7 percent) fairly and effectively. 
 Perceptions of trust in decision-makers revealed some of the highest levels of 
agreement with a total mean score of 3.7 for trust in immediate supervisors and 3.4 for 
trust in upper management.  Employees clearly expressed greater trust in their immediate 
supervisors with a majority between 58.7 and 71.7 percent agreeing in all categories, 
whereas slightly less trust was placed in upper management with 42.2 to 58.5 percent 
 32
 33
agreement levels.  One interesting but rather contradictory finding was that a majority of 
respondents trusted their immediate supervisors (71.7 percent) and upper managers (58.5 
percent) the most to act with integrity, while simultaneously trusting them the least to 
refrain from favoritism.   
 Perceptions of organizational culture were mostly positive with a total mean score 
of 3.5.  Being treated with respect received the highest level of agreement at 76.7 percent.  
A majority of respondents also agreed that their work unit responds flexibly to changing 
conditions (67.6 percent), a spirit of cooperation and teamwork exists (65 percent), 
information is shared freely (60.1 percent), and their opinions seem to count (54.7 
percent).  Unfortunately, the lowest scores were in areas instrumental to pay for 
performance.  Less than half (45 percent) agreed that recognition and rewards are based 
on performance and only 37.7 percent felt their organization ensured that employees are 
appropriately paid and rewarded.  These two areas alone serve as major obstacles to pay 
for performance reforms.   
 Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics for Pay for Performance Credibility 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE:             Disagree          Neither          Agree 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Belief in Pay for Performance:     
 
If I perform well, it is likely I will receive a cash award or pay increase.    34.7  23.6  41.6 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES:             Disagree          Neither          Agree 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Performance Evaluation (weighted mean = 3.5):          
 
I understand the basis for my most recent performance rating.      8.0  10.0  82.0  
 
The standards used to appraise my performance are appropriate.     16.6  17.5  65.9 
 
I participate in setting standards and goals used to evaluate my job performance.  30.9  20.2  48.9 
 
I understand what I must do to receive a high performance rating.   15.6  15.4  69.0  
 
I have sufficient opportunities to earn a high performance rating.    19.5  20.0  60.5   
 
I know how my performance rating compares to others with similar jobs.   42.2  25.4  32.4  
 
I am satisfied with my organization’s performance appraisal system.    35.1  25.1  39.8 
 
FACTOR ANALYSIS:  Factor loadings are between .55 and .84 and Cronbach’s alpha = .87. 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 1 (continued) 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                 Little or                 Considerable or 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES:             no extent       Some extent         very great extent 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Fair Treatment on the Job (weighted mean = 3.2):    
 
In the past 2 years, to what extent do you believe you have been treated fairly  
regarding the following?  
 
a. Career advancement        39.1  23.9       37.0  
 
b. Awards          31.3  29.7       39.1 
 
c. Training         28.4  31.0       40.6 
 
d. Performance appraisals        17.8  26.0       56.2 
 
e. Job assignments        21.5  26.8       51.7 
 
f. Discipline         24.4  21.4       54.2 
 
g. Pay          22.5  30.3       47.3 
 
 
FACTOR ANALYSIS:  Factor loadings are between .68 and .79 and Cronbach’s alpha = .87. 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 1 (continued) 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                Don’t Know         Minimal       Moderate or 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES:            or no extent          extent        great extent 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Supervisory Fairness  (weighted mean = 3.4):    
 
To what extent do you think your supervisor will exercise each of the  
following authorities in a fair and effective manner? 
 
Supervisor rates qualifications of job applicants fairly and effectively.   14.7  14.0  71.4  
 
Supervisor selects people for vacancies or promotions fairly and effectively.   16.3  16.3  67.4 
 
Supervisor determines pay increases and awards  fairly and effectively.   23.2  21.0  55.7  
 
Supervisor sets employees’ pay within broad pay bands fairly and effectively.  41.6  17.3  41.1 
 
Supervisor handles adverse actions fairly and effectively.    35.4  20.9  43.7 
 
 
FACTOR ANALYSIS:  Factor loadings are between .73 and .85 and Cronbach’s alpha = .85. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 1 (continued) 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES:             Disagree          Neither          Agree 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Trust in Immediate Supervisor (weighted mean = 3.7): 
 
I trust my supervisor to do the following:  
 
a. Fairly assess my performance and contributions.     13.2  15.4  71.4 
 
b. Support me in pay and award discussions with upper management.  19.2  22.1  58.7 
 
c. Listen fairly to my concerns.       14.1  14.8  71.1 
 
d. Apply discipline fairly and only when justified.     16.3  19.7  64.1 
 
e. Clearly communicate conduct expectations.     15.8  17.5  66.7 
 
f. Act with integrity.         11.6  16.7  71.7 
 
g. Refrain from favoritism.       22.7  18.6  58.7 
 
h. Keep me informed.        21.2  18.0  60.8 
 
 
FACTOR ANALYSIS:  Factor loadings are between .87 and .92 and Cronbach’s alpha = .96. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 1 (continued) 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES:             Disagree          Neither          Agree 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Trust in Upper Management (weighted mean = 3.4): 
 
I trust managers above my immediate supervisor to:      
 
a.   Clearly communicate organizational performance expectations.   21.8  22.5  55.7 
 
b.   Fairly assess my performance and contributions.     23.6  26.6  49.8 
 
c.   Listen fairly to my concerns.       23.1  25.7  51.2 
 
d.   Apply discipline fairly and only when justified.     21.0  29.2  49.8 
 
e.   Act with integrity.        17.4  24.1  58.5 
 
f.    Refrain from favoritism.       30.7  27.1  42.2 
 
g.   Keep the organization informed.       24.1  25.0  50.9 
 
 
FACTOR ANALYSIS:  Factor loadings are between .88 and .92 and Cronbach’s alpha = .96. 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 1 (continued) 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES:             Disagree          Neither          Agree 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Organizational Culture (weighted mean = 3.5): 
 
Recognition and rewards are based on performance in my work unit.    29.9  25.1  45.0  
 
My organization takes steps to ensure that employees are appropriately   34.8  27.5  37.7  
    paid and rewarded.         
 
Information is shared freely in my work unit.        22.3  17.6  60.1  
 
At the place I work, my opinions seem to count.       21.3  24.0  54.7  
 
A spirit of cooperation and teamwork exists in my work unit.     19.2  15.8  65.0  
 
My work unit responds flexibly to changing conditions.      14.0  18.5  67.6  
 
I am treated with respect in my work unit.        11.0  12.3  76.7  
 
 
FACTOR ANALYSIS:  Factor loadings are between .66 and .83 and Cronbach’s alpha = .88. 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note.  Agreement response categories were combined as follows:  Disagree = Disagree and Strongly Disagree; Neither = Neither Agree Nor 
Disagree; and Agree = Agree and Strongly Agree.  Descriptive statistics were calculated using the U.S. MSPB sampling weight variable and 
figures are shown in percentages.  Reduced sample includes General Schedule employees only. 
 
 Logit Results 
 Table 2 presents the multivariate logit results in the form of logit coefficients,  
z-statistics, and odds-ratios.  The percent change column translates logit coefficients into 
expected percentage point impacts using the prchange function in STATA software 
(Long & Freese, 2001).  Coefficients for most key factors expected to influence pay for 
performance beliefs had the predicted sign and the majority were statistically significant 
at the .001 level.   
 Employee attitudes regarding the performance evaluation system, perceived 
fairness, and organizational culture proved to be highly influential in leading employees 
to believe that better performance results in more pay.  Logit coefficients for these key 
attitudinal variables were positive and statistically significant at .001, holding all other 
variables constant.  Employees who expressed positive perceptions of their performance 
evaluation system were 9.0 percentage points more likely to believe in pay for 
performance.  Respondents who felt they were treated fairly regarding personnel 
decisions were 16.2 percentage points more likely to believe that better performance 
leads to more pay.  Employees with positive perceptions of supervisory fairness 
regarding pay for performance decisions were 4.4 percentage points more likely to 
believe in pay for performance.  Employees who portrayed their organizational culture in 
a positive light were 13.7 percentage points more likely to believe that better performance 
leads to more pay.  Overall, positive employee attitudes in these areas significantly 
increased the likelihood of pay for performance belief among federal workers.   
 The impact of trust in decision-makers on pay for performance belief was the only 
hypothesis not supported by the data.  Although previous research found a significant 
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positive relationship between pay for performance perceptions and employee trust in 
supervisors (Folger & Konovsky, 1989), trust in top management (Vest et. al, 2000), and 
trust in all decision-makers (St-Onge, 2000), this relationship did not hold up in my 
multivariate logit model.  The logit coefficient for trust in immediate supervisors was 
negative and the coefficient for trust in upper managers was positive.  After controlling 
for other variables, trust at both levels of decision-making proved to be extremely weak 
with logit coefficients lacking any statistical significance.  Despite these disappointing 
statistical results, the importance of gaining employee trust to enable pay for performance 
strategies to succeed warrants further study of this concept in the future.   
 Although I had no expectations regarding demographic variables, a significant 
relationship was found between pay for performance belief and age, education, salary, 
and race.  Older federal workers were significantly more likely to believe that better 
performance leads to more pay (p < .05).  Employees with high school diplomas (or 
equivalent) and bachelor’s degrees were 8.8 and 11.1 percentage points more likely than 
comparable employees with doctorate degrees to believe in pay for performance 
respectively, while other levels of education lacked a significant relationship with pay for 
performance belief.  Salary was the strongest predictor of pay for performance belief: 
employees with higher salaries were significantly more likely to believe better 
performance results in greater pay (p < .001).  Whites were 9.9 percentage points more 
likely than comparable Asians to believe in pay for performance.  However, there was no 
statistically significant difference between whites and other minorities in this study.  
None of the coefficients on the remaining variables (male, federal service, supervisor, 
union) were statistically significant. 
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 A great deal of variation occurred among agency variables.  Among the 23 
agencies included in this study, the Merit Principles Survey of 2005 revealed 12 negative 
and 11 positive agency logit coefficients, with 14 achieving statistical significance.  
Employees working for Agriculture, General Services Administration (GSA), Homeland 
Security (DHS), Interior, Justice, State Department, Transportation (DOT), and Veterans 
Affairs (VA) were all significantly less likely than U.S. OPM employees to believe in the 
promise of pay for performance.  These results are especially damaging to the 
Department of Homeland Security where a pay for performance system already exists.  
Results indicate that Homeland Security employees are 15.2 percentage points less likely 
than comparable workers at U.S. OPM to believe better performance leads to more pay.  
On a more positive note, employees working for Commerce, Air Force, Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD), Labor, Social Security Administration (SSA), and Treasury 
were all significantly more likely than U.S. OPM employees to believe that better 
performance results in more pay.  The fact that three out of four logit coefficients were 
positive (with one statistically significant) suggests that the Defense Department’s new 
pay for performance program enjoyed greater success in 2005 than the program at 
Homeland Security.  In particular, Air Force employees were 16.5 percentage points 
more likely to believe in pay for performance than comparable employees at U.S. OPM.  
In view of the overall results, it is clear that the agency of employment can have a 
significant impact on whether employees believe in the promise of pay for performance.   
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Table 2.  Logit Model for Determinants of Pay for Performance Belief 
 
                   Odds     Percent 
      Coefficient     z Statistic         Ratio     Change
 
EMPLOYEE ATTITUDES: 
   Performance Evaluation 0.367*** 5.15 1.443 9.0 
   Fair Treatment on the Job 0.666*** 10.81 1.946 16.2 
   Supervisory Fairness 0.177*** 3.79 1.194 4.4 
   Trust Immediate Supervisor -0.007 0.10 0.993 -0.2 
   Trust Upper Managers 0.084 1.54 1.088 2.1 
   Organizational Culture 0.563*** 6.70 1.756 13.7 
 
DEMOGRAPHICS: 
   Age 0.011* 2.06 1.011 0.3 
   Male -0.107 1.28 0.898 -2.6 
   Federal Service -0.001 0.20 0.999 -0.0 
   Education: 
       No education -0.158 0.63 0.854 -3.8 
       High School, GED, or equivalent 0.354* 1.93 1.425 8.8 
       Associate’s degree 0.199 1.02 1.220 4.9 
       Bachelor’s degree 0.453** 2.82 1.572 11.1 
       Master’s degree 0.322 1.90 1.380 8.0 
   Salary 0.005*** 3.21 1.005 0.1 
   Race: 
       African American / Black 0.166 1.41 1.181 4.1 
       American Indian / Alaskan Native -0.352 1.89 0.703 -8.4 
       Asian -0.418* 2.23 0.658 -9.9 
       Hispanic or Latino -0.094 0.57 0.911 -2.3 
       Native Hawaiian / Pacific Islander 0.644 1.68 1.905 16.0 
   Supervisor 0.080 0.93 1.083 2.0 
   Union Member -0.060 0.56 0.942 -1.5 
 
AGENCY OF EMPLOYMENT: 
   Agriculture -0.597*** 4.14 0.550 -13.9 
   Commerce 0.862*** 5.98 2.369 21.2 
   Defense: 
       Air Force 0.667** 3.15 1.949 16.5 
       Army 0.034 0.18 1.035 0.8 
       Navy -0.171 0.83 0.843 -4.1 
       Other Defense 0.101 0.75 1.107 2.5 
   Education Department 0.175 1.14 1.191 4.3 
   Energy -0.088 0.45 0.916 -2.1 
   Environmental Protection Agency 0.046 0.24 1.047 1.1 
   Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation -0.163 0.79 0.850 -4.0 
   General Services Administration -0.544*** 3.20 0.580 -12.6 
   Health & Human Services -0.088 0.58 0.915 -2.2 
   Homeland Security -0.658*** 4.17 0.518 -15.2 
   Housing & Urban Development 1.062*** 4.68 2.893 25.6 
   Interior -0.689*** 4.53 0.502 -15.8 
   Justice -0.692*** 4.67 0.500 -15.9 
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Table 2 (continued) 
 
                   Odds     Percent 
      Coefficient     z Statistic         Ratio     Change
 
AGENCY OF EMPLOYMENT:  
 
   Labor 0.504** 2.80 1.656 12.5 
   National Aeronautics & Space Administration 0.338 1.84 1.403 8.4 
   Social Security Administration 0.707*** 4.11 2.029 17.5 
   State Department -1.341*** 4.29 0.262 -26.7 
   Transportation -0.470* 2.31 0.625 -11.0 
   Treasury 0.644*** 3.75 1.904 16.0 
   Veterans Affairs -0.977*** 4.94 0.376 -21.3 
 
Observations         21826 
 
McFadden’s Pseudo R2   0.2558 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note.  Logistic regression was performed using the U.S. MSPB sampling weight variable.   
Reduced sample includes General Schedule employees only. 
* Significant at .05;  ** Significant at .01;  *** Significant at .001 
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Model Critique 
 Despite careful specification, the model has several weaknesses stemming from 
the type of data available for analysis.  First, this model doesn’t include any objective 
measures of performance (e.g., performance ratings or date of last promotion) which 
would allow me to examine whether pay for performance beliefs differ between poor and 
top performers.  Second, there isn’t any data on whether poor performers are punished 
through downgrades, withholding of bonus money, or dismissals, to determine the impact 
of negative reinforcement.  Third, the model lacks important budgetary information 
concerning the size and adequacy of funds set aside for performance awards in each 
agency.  Fourth, this model examines perceptions at a fixed point in time which cannot 
completely address causal relationships among concepts.  Longitudinal design of future 
studies could help clarify these causal relationships more fully.  Fifth, survey data is 
subject to bias and response error, which makes the inclusion of objective data all the 
more important for validation purposes.  Adding objective data in the future could 
significantly improve my ability to identify all of the factors likely to influence pay for 
performance beliefs.   
 Another limitation of this study involves missing data on items that could affect 
pay for performance beliefs especially after implementation of a new performance-based 
pay system.  When pay for performance programs fail to meet employee expectations, 
initial belief in pay for performance can dissolve rapidly.  Employee support for 
performance-based pay is likely to decrease if there is a big enough difference between 
the amount of rewards actually received and the amount expected.  Satisfaction with 
performance ratings, pay increases, and pay levels – before and after implementation – 
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can help promote and maintain pay for performance beliefs at higher levels.  Future 
studies should include data regarding the size and impact of pay for performance 
outcomes as well as satisfaction with those outcomes.   
Conclusion 
 This study examined five factors that may influence pay for performance beliefs 
among federal workers.  Multivariate logit analyses found four of those factors – 
perceptions of the performance evaluation system, fair treatment regarding personnel 
decisions, supervisory fairness in pay for performance decisions, and organizational 
culture – did manifest statistically significant relationships with pay for performance 
beliefs.  In short, federal employees are significantly more likely to believe in the promise 
of pay for performance if they consider their performance evaluation system to be fair 
and accurate, feel they are treated fairly on all personnel matters, believe their immediate 
supervisor makes pay for performance decisions fairly, and have positive perceptions of 
their organizational culture.   
 These results stress the importance of employee perceptions which should not be 
overlooked or underestimated in their power to influence pay for performance beliefs and 
ultimately motivate job performance.  Federal agencies need to recognize that 
government employees are strongly motivated by perceptions of fairness.  Consistent 
with organizational justice research, employee attitudes are clearly affected by the 
perceived fairness of pay for performance decisions as well as the decision-making 
process surrounding pay for performance.  While designing fair and accurate systems to 
evaluate and reward good performance is essential, it is equally important to remember 
that supervisors – not systems – are responsible for evaluating performance and 
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allocating rewards.  The significance of perceived supervisory fairness regarding pay for 
performance decisions adds a new dimension to this element that was lacking in previous 
research.  Since performance-based pay systems rely so heavily on supervisory discretion 
over subjective performance appraisals to determine an individual’s salary, this 
simultaneously increases the chance for bias and favoritism to occur making perceived 
supervisory fairness more important than ever.   
 This study also highlights the difficult role of management in gaining employee 
acceptance of pay for performance.  Managers must resist the temptation to make 
unrealistic promises to employees in the hopes of motivating better performance.  While 
such promises may have the desired motivational effects in the short term, broken 
promises are bound to have a serious negative impact on employee attitudes and 
performance that will outlast any short term benefits gained.  In short, managers should 
be realistic in their efforts to win over employees and not promise more than they can 
deliver.   
 Last, the significance of organizational culture cannot be overstated.  Agencies 
cannot expect employees to believe in pay for performance if the organizational culture 
does not fully support that philosophy.  For pay for performance strategies to be effective, 
it’s imperative that the actual and perceived relationship between pay and performance be 
in alignment (Heneman & Werner, 2005).  Although progress has been made in strategic 
human capital management since its designation as a high-risk area by U.S. GAO in 
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2001,2 federal agencies continue to struggle with the challenge of establishing 
performance-based, results-oriented organizational cultures (U.S. GAO, 2005b).   
 The good news is that all of these elements can be influenced externally by the 
organization.  Through careful design, implementation, and management of pay for 
performance systems, agencies can increase the likelihood of employees believing in pay 
for performance promises by strengthening the perceived and actual link between pay and 
performance; increasing perceived fairness of performance evaluations, personnel 
decisions, and pay for performance decisions and procedures; and creating an 
organizational culture that demonstrates performance really matters.  Armed with this 
knowledge, public managers have a better idea where to focus their attention in order to 
generate an atmosphere where pay for performance can thrive.   
                                                 
 
 
2 See U.S. GAO’s “High-Risk Series: An Update” dated January 2001 under Report No. GAO-01-263. 
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CHAPTER 3 
PAY FOR PERFORMANCE READINESS 
 
 Public organizations are constantly changing in an effort to improve performance 
(Ingraham, 2003; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992).  While the government succeeds at 
implementing organizational change more often than people think (Rainey, 2009), 
sometimes they fail to achieve the desired results.  After 30 years of pay for performance 
experimentation, scholars agree that the federal government has failed to deliver what 
was promised (Ingraham, 1993; Kellough & Lu, 1993; Lawler, 2000a; Perry, 1986, 2003; 
Perry, Petrakis, & Miller, 1989; Rainey & Kellough, 2000).  In my investigation of why 
government pay for performance efforts failed, I chose to follow a different path than 
those who came before me (Milkovich & Wigdor, 1991; Pearce & Perry, 1983; Perry, 
1986).  Instead of focusing on the content of change initiatives (i.e., pay for performance) 
as the source of the problem, I focus on the preconditions required for success.  The 
concept of readiness for change aptly describes those prerequisites.  Therefore, in keeping 
with other scholars, I propose that a lack of readiness for change is one major reason why 
organizational change efforts fail (Armenakis, Harris, & Mossholder, 1993).   
 What does readiness for change mean?  A single definition of readiness has yet to 
be adopted (Holt, Armenakis, Harris, & Feild, 2007).  According to Armenakis, Harris, 
and Mossholder (1993), a state of readiness describes employee beliefs, attitudes, and 
intentions regarding organizational change.  Specifically, readiness is the cognitive 
precursor to employee behaviors that either support or resist organizational change efforts 
(Armenakis et al., 1993).  Another definition of readiness encompasses employee beliefs 
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about the appropriateness of, support for, and value of the proposed change (Armenakis, 
Harris, & Feild, 1999).  For the purpose of this study and consistent with previous 
research, readiness is defined as employee beliefs and attitudes that support 
organizational change in the form of pay for performance.   
 This definition of readiness highlights a key issue involved in planning and 
preparing for organizational change – namely, the need to create a solid base of support 
for change (Berman, 2004, 2006).  “Performance improvement is an intervention, a 
change in existing rules, relationships, or expectations.  Managers should not be surprised 
to find that while some people and organizations welcome the possibility of 
improvement, others are reluctant to embrace change” (Berman, 2006, p. 43).  In light of 
this realization, Berman (2006, p. 44) suggests a “critical mass of people” supporting 
organizational change is necessary to generate enough forward momentum to ensure 
successful implementation from start to finish.  Without a committed group of followers 
at all levels of the organization, proposed changes may be “destined to die for lack of 
support” (Berman, 2004, p. 169). 
  Readiness is cited as one of the most important factors affecting employee support 
for change initiatives (Armenakis et al., 1999; Armenakis et al., 1993).  Focusing on 
readiness prior to implementation can increase the likelihood of successful 
implementation and minimize employee resistance to the change event (Armenakis et al., 
1993).  Implementation of organizational changes may not lead to desired outcomes 
simply because employees are not yet ready for change (Jones, Jimmieson, & Griffiths, 
2005).  Scholars recommend that organizations achieve a state of readiness before 
attempting to implement change initiatives (Armenakis & Harris, 2002; Armenakis et al., 
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1993).  Toward that end, policymakers and practitioners need a diagnostic tool that 
allows them to gauge readiness for change prior to policy implementation 
(Bouckenooghe, Devos, & Van den Broeck, 2009).   
 Although researchers from other disciplines recognize the crucial role of readiness 
in successful change implementation (Armenakis & Harris, 2002; Armenakis et al., 1999; 
Armenakis et al., 1993; Bouckenooghe et al., 2009; Cunningham et al., 2002; Eby, 
Adams, Russell, & Gaby, 2000; Fox, Ellison, & Keith, 1988; Holt, Armenakis, Feild, & 
Harris, 2007; Holt, Armenakis, Harris, et al., 2007; Jones et al., 2005), the concept has 
been overlooked by public administration scholars and policymakers.  Therefore, the 
main purpose of this study is to fill a gap in the public administration literature by 
introducing readiness as an important pre-implementation concept that greatly impacts 
the success or failure of organizational change.  First, I review the literature for factors 
that influence successful organizational change and the creation of readiness for change.  
I proceed with a review of the conditions required for pay for performance success.  
Taken together, I use criteria for success identified by the literature to develop a 
scorecard that measures pay for performance readiness in the federal government.  Next, 
I construct a scoring system which allows me to directly compare agency readiness to 
implement pay for performance.  Using data from the Merit Principles Survey of 2005, I 
analyze the pay for performance perceptions of federal employees to detect attitudinal 
variations by subject matter and agency of employment.  Then, I assess the overall 
readiness of the federal government and rank each federal agency in terms of their 
readiness to implement pay for performance.  Finally, I discuss the implications of my 
findings for implementing pay for performance successfully on a governmentwide basis.  
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Factors Influencing Successful Organizational Change 
 In an era when change has become an integral part of daily government 
operations, it’s paramount that public agencies are able to implement change initiatives 
successfully.  Many factors contribute to whether organizational changes succeed or fail.  
Holt, Armenakis, Harris, and Feild (2007) state that organizations must progress through 
three stages for successful implementation of organizational change: readiness, adoption, 
and institutionalization (cf. Lewin, 1947).  Readiness is the first stage, which “occurs 
when the environment, structure, and organizational members’ attitudes are such that 
employees are receptive to a forthcoming change” (Holt, Armenakis, Harris, et al., 2007, 
p.  290).  Adoption is the second stage, whereby employees temporarily adjust their 
attitudes and behaviors in compliance with the change initiative.  Institutionalization is 
the third and final stage, which occurs when the change becomes a permanent fixture 
within the organization.  Although many other scholars have developed multi-phase 
models for implementing organizational change (e.g., Armenakis et al., 1999; Galpin, 
1996; Judson, 1991; Kotter, 1995), my research focuses on the readiness phase of this 
particular model.    
 A vast body of work in organizational theory contains many different 
perspectives, models, and issues related to organizational change (Rainey, 2009).  In 
reviews of the organizational change literature (Armenakis & Bedeian, 1999; Fernandez 
& Rainey, 2006), scholars identified several factors that contribute to the successful 
implementation of organizational change: adequate resources to support the change 
process; the crucial role of managers in making organizational change happen; internal 
and external support for and commitment to change; effective communication of the 
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change; widespread participation in the change process; employee trust in management at 
all levels; and a supportive organizational culture and climate.  Many of the same 
strategies for implementing organizational change are applicable to the creation of 
readiness for change.    
 Creating a state of readiness for change has been the subject of several studies.  
One study of employee perceptions of organizational readiness for change found that 
individual, work unit, and job attitudes, along with contextual factors such as flexible 
policies and procedures, adequate resources, and trust in management, were all important 
antecedents of readiness for change (Eby et al., 2000).  Another study found that 
supportive work relationships, effective communication, adequate training, financial 
incentives, and employee participation in change efforts all contribute to the formulation 
of positive attitudes towards change (Vakola & Nikolaou, 2005).  Overall, Holt, 
Armenakis, Harris, and Feild (2007) suggest that the content, process, and context of 
organizational change, along with characteristics of the individuals involved in the 
change, collectively influence readiness for change.    
Pay for Performance Criteria for Success 
 Ensuring that favorable conditions exist before starting policy implementation is 
vital to the success of pay for performance programs (Heneman & Werner, 2005; 
Ingraham, 1993).  Before implementing pay for performance, U.S. MSPB (2006) 
recommends that agencies conduct a self-assessment to determine whether there is a 
sufficient foundation to support pay for performance.  A strong pay for performance 
foundation should include the following elements: 
• adequate funding to produce sizeable rewards; 
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• sufficient managerial authority to reward high performance; 
• employees who are highly motivated by money; 
• supportive beliefs and expectations; 
• a fair and accurate performance evaluation system; 
• fair treatment in all personnel matters; 
• perceived fairness in performance evaluation, reward allocation, and supervisory 
decisions; 
• high quality supervision with accountability for fair treatment and effective 
handling of poor performers; 
• a high degree of trust between supervisors and employees; and 
• an organizational culture that supports pay for performance. 
While this is by no means an exhaustive list of pay for performance requirements, it is a 
good place to start. 
Adequate Funding 
 When considering pay for performance, the decision-making process should begin 
with funding.  Organizations must have sufficient resources to give pay for performance a 
chance to succeed (Eisenberg & Ingraham, 1993; Milkovich & Wigdor, 1991; Underhill 
& Oman, 2007; U.S. GAO, 1990a; U.S. MSPB, 2006).  One government review of public 
sector pay for performance systems revealed that “adequate funding is critical to meeting 
the system’s objectives and for achieving credibility among covered employees”  
(U.S. GAO, 1990a, p. 4).  Organizations should have “enough money to provide the 
necessary incentives on a predictable basis” (Eisenberg & Ingraham, 1993, p. 127).   
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 Funding is especially important when creating effective performance awards 
because size really does matter.  Pay increases will only motivate employees if the 
amount is large enough to make a difference (Lawler, 1981b).  Government experts agree 
that the amount of bonus pay being offered as an incentive must be substantial enough to 
make improved performance worth the extra effort (National Academy of Public 
Administration [NAPA], 2004a; U.S. GAO, 1990a; U.S. MSPB, 2006).  Lawler (1990) 
recommends the size of monetary awards be set at a minimum rate of 5 percent of cash 
compensation “for it to make any difference at all” (p. 203).  However, the government 
typically establishes budgetary limits far below that.  Under the previous federal merit 
pay system, the maximum performance award was limited to 2 percent of the employee’s 
base salary and an agency’s total payout for performance awards was limited to a 
maximum of 1.5 percent of its aggregate PMRS salaries (U.S. GAO, 1990a).  Under 
these circumstances, it’s not surprising that a review of PMRS found widespread 
agreement among employees that “awards were too small to act as motivators”  
(U.S. GAO, 1990a, p. 11). 
 Since government agencies don’t control their financial resources, it is imperative 
that they obtain and maintain legislative support to ensure adequate funding of payouts 
on a consistent basis throughout pay for performance implementation (Lawler, 1981b).  
Congressional support for sizeable and continuous funding is difficult enough to obtain in 
the best of times, let alone during periods of economic crisis (Ingraham, 1993; Kellough 
& Lu, 1993).  History has shown that politicians who favor the adoption of pay for 
performance often fail to support the budgetary requirements to make it work (Lovrich, 
1987; Mani, 2002; Ryan, 2003).  Consequently, pay for performance systems in the 
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United States have been “chronically underfunded by legislative bodies” at every level of 
government (Kellough & Nigro, 2002, p. 157), making insufficient funding one of the 
leading causes of failure for government pay for performance programs (Condrey & 
Kellough, 1993; Ingraham, 1993; Kellough & Lu, 1993; Kellough & Selden, 1997; 
Milkovich & Wigdor, 1991; Perry, 1986, 1988-89, 1991, 2003; Rainey & Kellough, 
2000; U.S. GAO, 1990a).   
Sufficient Managerial Authority 
 Along with adequate funding, managers must have sufficient authority to reward 
high performers (Ingraham, 1993; U.S. MSPB, 2006, 2007).  A pay for performance 
system “requires that agencies allow supervisors to exercise some degree of discretion 
and judgment in evaluating and rewarding employee performance” (U.S. MSPB, 2006,  
p. xiii).  Although federal managers have the legal authority to reward high performers 
with cash awards and pay increases, the current civil service system under Title 5 is 
criticized for constraining managerial discretion and limiting flexibility (Ingraham, 1993; 
U.S. OPM, 1998).  Evidence from the private sector suggests that favorable conditions 
for effective pay for performance programs must include giving managers enough 
authority and discretionary power to adequately recognize and reward the best performers 
and demote or fire the worst performers (Ingraham, 1993).  In short, agencies trying to 
motivate employees through the use of recognition and rewards “need to ensure that 
resources are available to make the recognition valuable to the employee and that 
supervisors have the authority to make full use of those resources” (U.S. MSPB, 2007,   
p. 66). 
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Motivated by Money 
 When considering pay for performance, a critical starting point is to determine 
what type of rewards employees’ value most.  Money is considered an ideal incentive 
because of its universal appeal – everyone values it to some degree (Locke, 2001).  The 
success of pay for performance depends largely on whether monetary rewards (extrinsic) 
are highly valued by employees over other types of rewards (intrinsic), such as personal 
pride or satisfaction in work (Pearce & Perry, 1983).  The motivational impact of pay for 
performance depends on how much an employee values the type of reward as well as the 
size of the reward being offered (Lawler, 2000a).  This means that pay for performance 
isn’t a good motivational fit for every employee, because “not everyone values financial 
rewards enough to make them a significant motivator of performance” (Lawler, 2000b,  
p. 153).   
 One problem with the current pay for performance trend in government is that it 
overemphasizes extrinsic incentives (Rainey, 2003) and underestimates the importance of 
intrinsic public service motivators (Perry & Wise, 1990).  Pay for performance works 
best when employees value money the most.  This presents a problem because public 
sector employees appear to be more intrinsically motivated than private sector employees 
(Boyne, 2002; Crewson, 1997; Karl & Sutton, 1998; Kilpatrick et al., 1964; Perry & 
Porter, 1982; Rainey, 1982; Wittmer, 1991; Wright, 2001).  Instead of money being the 
most important motivating factor, individuals who place greater value on intrinsic 
rewards are more motivated by work that is interesting, challenging, useful to society, 
and self-directive, as well as work providing opportunities for service, decision making, 
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personal growth, creativity, and collegial recognition (Herzberg et al., 1959; Kaufman & 
Fetters, 1980; Nord et al., 1988; Pinder, 1998; Walker et al., 1982).   
 In Paul Light’s (1999) profile of “The New Public Service,” he found college 
graduates were searching for interesting and challenging work more than large 
paychecks.  In his words: “Young Americans are not saying ‘Show me the money’ so 
much as ‘Show me the work’ ” (Light, 1999, p. 3).  Although the appeal of a steady 
government paycheck is bound to increase during periods of high unemployment and 
extreme job instability, the motivational power of pay for performance and its chances for 
success could be severely diminished if public employees prefer intrinsic over extrinsic 
rewards.  A recent study found that intrinsically motivated federal employees were 
significantly less likely to agree that their performance appraisal system motivated better 
performance, even after controlling for a variety of demographic and organizational 
factors (Oh & Lewis, 2009).   
Pay for Performance Beliefs and Expectations 
 Employee beliefs and perceptions are critical to the success of pay for 
performance (Perry, Engbers, & Jun, 2009).  The most important motivational element 
required under pay for performance is the employees’ belief that improved performance 
leads to more pay.  Without this fundamental belief, pay for performance cannot motivate 
behavior.  However, merely adopting a performance-based pay plan does not ensure that 
employees will believe pay and performance are connected.  Heneman and Werner 
(2005) argue that the perceived and actual relationships between pay and performance are 
equally important and must be aligned to make pay for performance work effectively.   
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 While an effective pay for performance system can potentially create “a highly 
motivated workforce in which employees see a close relationship between how well they 
perform and how much they are paid” (Lawler, 2000b, p. 149), an ineffective system – 
poorly planned, designed, implemented, and funded – can produce a wide range of 
unintended negative consequences.  Researchers have found that poor perceptions of 
performance-based pay systems were associated with low levels of organizational trust 
(Condrey & Brudney, 1992), mistrust of performance rating systems (Kellough & Selden, 
1997), and a lack of leadership credibility (Gabris & Ihrke, 2000).  Employee perceptions 
matter because “negative perceptions – even when unwarranted – can seriously 
undermine morale, organizational performance, and the credibility and effectiveness of 
even well-intentioned, well-conceived management initiatives” (U.S. MSPB, 2008a,  
p. 52).  Moreover, scholars recognize the importance of employee perceptions because 
the ultimate success of pay for performance reforms depends largely on the employees’ 
level of confidence in it and their willingness to support it (Kellough & Nigro, 2002).   
Performance Evaluation System 
 To get the best results with pay for performance, all key elements of performance 
must be measured fairly and accurately (Condrey & Kellough, 1993; Kellough & Lu, 
1993; Pearce & Perry, 1983; U.S. MSPB, 2006).  The most effective performance 
evaluation systems clearly delineate performance expectations, provide periodic feedback 
on how well employees are meeting expectations, and make meaningful distinctions 
between levels of performance (U.S. GAO, 1990a, 2005a; U.S. MSPB, 2006).  According 
to Lawler (2000b, p. 151), “performance measures and standards need to be sufficiently 
objective and credible so that employees feel they are being measured fairly.”  Most 
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successful pay for performance programs have occurred in work contexts where 
performance was measured objectively (Rynes et al., 2005).  Unfortunately, government 
work is more difficult to measure objectively than private sector work because it tends to 
be more knowledge-based and service-oriented, and it lacks the bottom line of a profit 
margin (Lane, 1994; Wisdom & Patzig, 1987).   
 In the absence of objective measures, government agencies rely on managerial 
judgment in the form of subjective performance appraisals which employees often 
perceive as invalid and unfair (Lawler, 1981a).  Lack of objective performance data 
makes reliance on managerial discretion problematic.  While pay for performance 
requires that managers have the authority to influence an individual’s salary, increasing 
managerial discretion over subjective performance appraisals simultaneously increases 
the chance for favoritism, bias, and political intrusion (Kellough & Lu, 1993).  
Performance-based personnel systems must find the right balance between granting 
managers discretion in how they do their jobs and protecting employees against abuse 
(Kettl, Ingraham, Sanders, & Horner, 1996).   
 The federal government’s previous experience with merit pay identifies 
inadequate financial rewards and invalid performance appraisals as the two biggest 
obstacles to successful pay for performance implementation (Kellough & Lu, 1993; 
Perry, 2003).  While inadequate resources and invalid performance appraisals present 
problems by themselves, they become more problematic when combined under a pay for 
performance system due to their negative impact on the link between pay and 
performance.  Without enough money to reward all deserving employees, the number of 
employees who can receive a high performance rating (and corresponding bonus pay) is 
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limited under a forced distribution of ratings regardless of the employees’ actual 
performance (Eisenberg & Ingraham, 1993; Kellough & Lu, 1993; U.S. MSPB, 2006), 
thus breaking the connection between pay and performance.  Under these combined 
circumstances of inadequate reward money and compulsion to use a forced distribution of 
ratings (i.e., quota system), some deserving top performers do not receive high ratings 
and large rewards because the supervisor is not allowed to issue enough outstanding 
ratings with substantial bonus money attached. 
Perceived Fairness 
 The success of any pay for performance system depends not only on whether the 
system is designed fairly but equally on whether employees view the system as fair 
(Eskew & Heneman, 1996; Lawler, 1981b, 2000b; Pearce & Perry, 1983).  Employees 
must believe that the pay for performance system is “valid, fair, and nonpolitical” (Perry 
et al., 2009, p. 45).  Without the perception of fair and valid performance measurement, 
there is little chance of establishing a connection between performance and rewards 
(Lawler, 2000b).   
 What causes people to perceive organizational decisions as fair?  Organizational 
justice theory recognizes three categories of perceived fairness: distributive, procedural, 
and interactional fairness (Colquitt, Greenberg, & Zapata-Phelan, 2005).  Distributive 
justice refers to the fairness of resource distributions or outcomes, such as pay, rewards, 
and promotions.  Employees perceive outcome fairness when they believe they receive 
the rewards they deserve for the work performed as compared to others (Adams, 1965; 
Gilliland & Langdon, 1998; Greenberg, 1987a, 1987b, 1990, 1996; Lawler, 1981b).   
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Procedural justice refers to the fairness of the procedures used to determine outcomes, 
such as the process of performance evaluation.  In the context of pay for performance, 
procedural fairness is achieved when employees feel the process of performance 
evaluation is fair.  Research has found that employee reactions to administrative 
decisions depend not only on the decision itself but also on the perceived fairness of the 
decision-making process (Folger & Greenberg, 1985; Greenberg, 1987a, 1987b, 1990, 
1996).  Both distributive and procedural justice are considered “vital elements that 
influence the success or failure of any pay-for-performance plan” (Gabris & Ihrke, 2000, 
p. 42).  Interactional justice refers to the interpersonal treatment a person receives from 
others, particularly organizational authorities such as leaders, managers, and supervisors 
(Bies, 2001; Bies & Moag, 1986; Colquitt et al., 2005).  Altogether, distributive, 
procedural, and interactional justice, represent three dimensions of organizational justice 
that describe distinct perceptions of fairness (Colquitt et al., 2005).   
 Perceptions of fairness are significant because they influence so many important 
attitudes and behaviors in the workplace (Gilliland & Langdon, 1998; Landy & Conte, 
2010).  Three types of perceived fairness are particularly relevant to pay for performance.  
First, employees who believe their performance is measured fairly and accurately and 
who express confidence in the appraisal process are more likely to believe better 
performance will lead to rewards (Frank, 2011, Chapter Two; Nigro, 1981; Pearce & 
Perry, 1983).  Studies have found that perceived effectiveness (Perry & Pearce, 1983) and 
perceived accuracy (Vest et al., 1995) of the performance appraisal system have a 
significant positive effect on pay for performance perceptions.   
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 Second, research indicates that perceptions of fair treatment can lead to increased 
trust in supervisors, organizational commitment, and job satisfaction (Cropanzano & 
Greenberg, 1997).  Employee views about fair treatment are also known to affect job 
performance, organizational citizenship, trust in the organization, and withdrawal 
behaviors such as absenteeism and turnover (Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 
2001).  One study found that federal employees are significantly more likely to believe in 
the promise of pay for performance if they feel they are treated fairly on all personnel 
matters (Frank, 2011, Chapter Two).   
 Third, how employees perceive their supervisors is crucial to perceptions of 
fairness on the job (Gilliland & Langdon, 1998).  Managers and first-line supervisors are 
responsible for treating all employees fairly and equitably when making decisions.  
Because of their interaction with employees and their direct participation in the pay for 
performance decision-making process, it’s imperative that supervisors are perceived by 
employees as evaluating performance and allocating rewards fairly.  If employees see 
their evaluating supervisors as honest, objective, unbiased, and trustworthy, they are 
more likely to perceive the performance appraisal system as fair and accurate and to 
accept a new compensation system as legitimate (Gabris & Ihrke, 2000).  Moreover, a 
recent study found that employees who think their supervisor makes pay for performance 
decisions fairly are significantly more likely to see a connection between pay and 
performance (Frank, 2011, Chapter Two).   
 In the past, problems with perceived unfairness have derailed many pay for 
performance programs at the state and federal government levels.  Kellough and Nigro 
(2002, p. 163) found the “widespread perception that the performance appraisal process 
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was not fairly administered” to be “one of the most troubling problems revealed” in their 
evaluation of the GeorgiaGain program.  Specifically, they found employees did not 
believe promises to reward high performance, perceived that “office politics” influenced 
performance ratings more than actual job performance, believed that management 
imposed quotas or limits on the number of high performance ratings allowed, and found 
employee confidence in the accuracy and fairness of the performance management 
system declined overall (Kellough & Nigro, 2002, pp. 153-156).  Similar employee 
complaints have been made in the federal government.  The perception of unfair 
performance ratings has consistently been reported as one of the biggest problems with 
performance-based federal pay (Perry, 1991, 2003; Underhill & Oman, 2007; U.S. GAO, 
1990a, 2008).   
High Quality Supervision 
 To succeed, pay for performance systems must be “implemented by well-trained 
managers in an organization with sound management practices and policies” (Mani, 
2002, p. 142).  Performance-based pay systems demand a “higher level of supervisory 
skill than traditional tenure-based pay systems” (U.S. MSPB, 2006, p. 6) because so 
many critical decisions regarding performance appraisals, pay raises, disciplinary actions, 
and promotions rely on supervisory judgment.  Any agency considering pay for 
performance should ensure that its supervisors are capable of evaluating employee 
performance and allocating rewards in a fair and reasonable manner, and willing to be 
held accountable for their decisions (U.S. MSPB, 2006).   
 One underlying management problem found at state and federal levels of 
government is that supervisors consistently demonstrate unwillingness to differentiate 
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between employee levels of performance which leads to insufficient differentiation in 
rewards allocation (Beer & Cannon, 2004; Ingraham, 1993; Lane, 1994; Pearce & Perry, 
1983; U.S. GAO, 2008; U.S. MSPB, 2006).  There is also evidence of problems with 
inflated ratings or rater leniency because front-line supervisors want to avoid conflict and 
maintain a good relationship with employees (Eisenberg & Ingraham, 1993; Lane, 1994; 
Lane & Wolf, 1990; U.S. GAO, 1990a; U.S. MSPB, 2006).  Overall, the failure of 
supervisors to distinguish between the best and worst performers can have serious 
consequences for a pay for performance program because it runs the risk of destroying 
what little confidence employees have in the performance evaluation system, creating 
mistrust between employees and management, and reducing the chance of having 
positive motivational results.  
 A high quality supervisor possesses excellent management and technical skills, 
provides timely and meaningful performance feedback, treats employees fairly, offers 
assistance to help struggling employees improve performance, and deals effectively with 
poor performers (U.S. MSPB, 2006, 2008).  The best supervisors are also committed to 
making meaningful distinctions among different levels of employee performance and 
rewarding employees appropriately based on their actual performance rather than 
nonperformance factors (U.S. GAO, 2003b, 2005a; U.S. MSPB, 2006; U.S. OPM, 2002).  
A successful pay for performance environment demands nothing less.   
 Despite the need for people with strong managerial skills, the federal government 
tends to select and reward supervisors based on technical rather than managerial abilities.  
According to the U.S. Office of Personnel Management, “supervisory selections are 
placing too much emphasis on technical expertise and paying too little attention to 
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interpersonal skills and managerial competencies” (U.S. OPM, 2001, p. 2).  Surveys 
indicate that most employees perceive that their federal supervisors performed the 
technical aspects of their jobs well but had ongoing problems with staffing, training, and 
performance management (U.S. MSPB, 1998).  It therefore comes as no surprise that 
federal employees consistently rated their supervisors as having good technical but poor 
management skills between 1983 and 2007 (U.S. MSPB, 2008a).   
 While effective supervision greatly contributes to organizational success, poor 
supervision can be equally detrimental and extremely costly (U.S. MSPB, 1989) – 
especially when it comes to dealing with poor performers.  When pay for performance 
works properly, top performers receive the greatest rewards, average performers receive 
substantially smaller rewards, and poor performers receive no rewards.  The purpose of 
making meaningful distinctions in performance ratings is to motivate the best performers 
to stay with the organization and maintain high performance, encourage average 
performers to work harder to achieve higher performance, and persuade poor performers 
to either improve their performance or leave the organization (Ingraham, 1993; U.S. 
MSPB, 2006).  By contrast, when poor performers receive the same rewards as top 
performers, pay for performance programs become dysfunctional by encouraging poor 
performance rather than discouraging it.  Obviously, there’s no incentive to behave 
differently unless there are different consequences associated with different performance 
levels (Skinner, 1969).  That’s why dealing with poor performers effectively is such a 
crucial aspect of pay for performance success (Lawler, 1981a; NAPA, 2004a; U.S. 
MSPB, 2006).   
 66
 The federal government has a poor track record of dealing with poor performers 
(U.S. GAO, 1990b, 2005a; U.S. MSPB, 1995; U.S. OPM, 1999).  Beside the long list of 
legitimate barriers to dealing with poor performers – such as a time-consuming and 
complex process, lack of training and confidence in the performance management 
system, a perceived lack of upper management support, and fear of employee grievances 
and lawsuits (U.S. GAO, 1990b, 2005a; U.S. OPM, 1999) – lies the simple fact that 
front-line supervisors generally dislike confrontation and are uncomfortable taking 
disciplinary or terminating actions against poor performers (Lawler, 1981a; U.S. GAO, 
2005a).  As a result, top performers end up receiving the same pay and rewards as poor 
performers, thus creating a sense of inequity (Adams, 1965) which tends to have a 
demoralizing and demotivating effect on the best performers (Thompson & Rainey, 
2003).  This explains why few federal workers expect to be rewarded for good 
performance or punished for poor performance (U.S. MSPB, 1982, 1995, 1999, 2003, 
2007, 2008).  
Trust in Decision-Makers 
 High levels of trust throughout the organization are necessary to create a 
favorable pay for performance environment (Brudney & Condrey, 1993; Condrey & 
Brudney, 1992; Ingraham, 1993; Kellough & Lu, 1993; Milkovich & Wigdor, 1991; U.S. 
MSPB, 2006).  It’s important that employees trust not only their immediate supervisors to 
rate their performance fairly and accurately (Fulk et al., 1985), but also top management 
officials to allocate sufficient funds to support performance-based pay increases and 
implement pay for performance plans fairly and consistently throughout the organization 
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(Vest et al., 2000).  High levels of trust are required for employees to accept pay for 
performance systems and be motivated by them (Lawler, 1971).   
 Trust is also important because of its relationship to other employee beliefs and 
pay for performance concepts.  Research suggests that the degree of trust in decision-
making can influence perceived fairness regarding performance evaluation and reward 
distribution, which in turn affects the motivational impact of any pay for performance 
system (Brudney & Condrey, 1993).  Scholars consider organizational trust to be crucial 
to the development of a pay for performance link (Lawler, 1981b, 1990; Nigro, 1982).  
Several studies found a significant positive relationship between pay for performance 
perceptions and employee trust in supervisors (Folger & Konovsky, 1989) as well as trust 
in top management (Vest et al., 2000).  Some found a significant relationship between 
pay for performance belief and trust in all decision-makers (St-Onge, 2000), while others 
found no significant relationship (Frank, 2011, Chapter Two).   
Organizational Culture 
 A supportive organizational culture is a prerequisite for implementing pay for 
performance.  Research and practice indicate that the success of pay for performance 
programs is “substantially influenced by the organizational context in which they are 
embedded” (Milkovich & Wigdor, 1991, p. 4).  Gabris and Ihrke (2000) discovered that 
positive employee attitudes towards a new performance-based pay system depended more 
on the cultural context within the organization than on any particular element within the 
pay system.  Due to its sizeable impact, Golembiewski (1986) recommends that attention 
be spent up-front on developing sufficient “cultural preparedness” before starting a new 
compensation system.   
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  Important elements of organizational culture identified in the public sector include 
valuing employee opinions, treating people with respect, sharing information freely, 
having a flexible workplace, and promoting a spirit of teamwork and cooperation 
(Brewer & Selden, 2000; DiIulio, 1994; Gore, 1993; Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; Rainey & 
Steinbauer, 1999).  Organizational performance is higher in federal agencies with 
cultures that empowered employees by valuing their input, taking their contributions 
seriously, and treating people with respect (Brewer & Selden, 2000).  Federal employees 
are significantly more likely to see a connection between pay and performance if they 
have positive perceptions of their organizational culture (Frank, 2011, Chapter Two).   
 One of the main features required by pay for performance is a culture in which 
employees at all levels of the organization are committed to achieving high performance 
(U.S. MSPB, 2006).  Unfortunately, the current federal personnel system under Title 5 is 
better known for promoting high attendance rather than motivating high performance.  
Because government agencies have such a long history of being process-oriented rather 
than results-oriented, changing their organizational culture will not be quick or easy to do 
(U.S. GAO, 2001b).  Decades of experience basing pay on seniority rather than 
performance constitutes one of the main factors working against the federal government’s 
pay for performance reform efforts (Heneman & Werner, 2005).   
 To summarize, agencies should review their readiness status on a number of 
prerequisite conditions prior to implementing a pay for performance system.  Special 
attention should be paid to the following areas: (1) adequate funding and (2) sufficient 
managerial authority needed to reward high performance; (3) the degree to which 
employees can be motivated by money; (4) the strength of the perceived link between pay 
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and performance; (5) employee attitudes towards pay for performance; (6) the existence 
of an effective and credible performance evaluation system; (7) perceptions of fair 
treatment about performance ratings and other personnel decisions; (8) perceived 
supervisory fairness in decision-making; (9) quality of supervision; (10) levels of trust 
throughout the organization; and (11) an organizational culture that emphasizes 
performance.  Is the federal government ready to implement pay for performance?   
Are some agencies more ready than others for pay for performance?  How will agency 
readiness impact the future of pay for performance reforms?  Fortunately, federal data is 
available to help answer these questions.   
Data and Methods 
 To assess the federal government’s readiness for pay for performance, I utilize 
survey data from the U.S. MSPB’s Merit Principles Survey conducted in 2005.  The 
Merit Principles Survey of 2005 asked a variety of questions regarding employee 
perceptions of their jobs, work environment, supervisors, and agencies, with special 
emphasis on pay for performance and reward issues.  This survey was administered to a 
random sample of 74,000 full-time permanent civilian employees across 24 executive 
branch federal agencies.  The sample was stratified by agency to ensure sufficient 
numbers of respondents from each federal agency to permit cross-agency comparisons.  
A total of 36,926 respondents completed this survey for a 50 percent response rate.  For 
the purpose of this study, I restricted the dataset to white-collar employees within the GS 
pay system which reduced the sample size to 25,536.  All statistics were weighted using 
U.S. MSPB’s sampling weights to make the data more representative of the overall 
white-collar federal workforce.   
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Assessing Readiness 
 To facilitate successful organizational change, it’s beneficial to assess an 
organization’s state of readiness for change prior to implementation of new policies or 
programs (Armenakis et al., 1993).  Both quantitative and qualitative research methods 
have been used to assess readiness for change, including questionnaire, interview, and 
observation methods (Armenakis, Harris, & Feild, 2001; Holt, Armenakis, Feild, et al., 
2007).  It’s common practice for researchers to assess employee attitudes towards 
organizational change initiatives using self-reported methods (Armenakis & Bedeian, 
1999).   
 Although readiness can be measured at different levels (e.g., organization, work 
group, or individual), most studies measure readiness at the individual level because 
organizational change is implemented through people (Holt, Armenakis, Harris, & Feild, 
2007).3  This individual focus recognizes the significant role of employees when 
implementing planned changes – specifically, individual attitudes that either support or 
resist change.  An individual level of analysis is consistent with a realization that a 
“critical mass” of employee support is needed for successful implementation of 
organizational change (Berman, 2004, 2006).  An individual focus also allows for a 
comparison of the differing states of readiness across organizations.   
                                                 
 
 
3 For a review of 32 instruments measuring readiness for change, see Holt, Armenakis, Harris, and Feild 
(2007). 
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A Scorecard Approach 
 To determine whether the federal government is ready to begin a new 
compensation system like pay for performance, leaders and managers need information 
concerning: (1) what criteria are required for successful implementation; (2) where the 
government stands in terms of meeting these criteria prior to implementation; and  
(3) how much improvement is still needed before proceeding with implementation.  
Scorecards have been widely used by the federal government since the 1990s (Breul & 
Kamensky, 2008; Rosenbloom, 2007).  A scorecard approach to readiness assessment 
was chosen to provide government officials the information they need to make an 
informed decision about pay for performance in a familiar format.  This scorecard also 
facilitates comparison throughout the government in order to identify which agencies 
performed better or worse according to the criteria and highlight areas needing the most 
improvement.  Using a criteria-based model with self-assessment data offers a useful and 
innovative tool for evaluating organizational change readiness in a way that should 
promote greater understanding of the topic at a time that is most relevant to decision-
makers.   
 The readiness scorecard is designed primarily as a self-assessment tool with 
emphasis on validity, relevance, and functionality.4   Validity pertains to the scorecard’s 
content which “should meet widely accepted standards of scientific practice” (Gormley & 
                                                 
 
 
4 Gormley and Weimer (1999, pp. 36-37) identify six criteria for assessing organizational report cards, 
including: validity and comprehensiveness pertaining to report card content, comprehensibility and 
relevance concerning the use of report cards, and reasonableness and functionality related to organizational 
responses to report cards.  These concepts were adapted for the purposes of this scorecard.  The reason for 
calling this a scorecard rather than a report card was because scorecards are self-assessment tools 
developed internally and for internal use, while report cards are external assessments developed by and for 
outsiders (Gormley & Weimer, 1999, p. 4).   
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Weimer, 1999, p. 36).  The criteria chosen for the scorecard’s content were drawn from 
peer-reviewed publications of empirical studies and theoretical research applicable to pay 
for performance.  Data coverage should be sufficient to make the content of this 
scorecard valid because all of the key criteria identified by the literature are included.  
However, it does not pretend to be comprehensive due to limitations of the data available.  
The scorecard emphasizes relevance because potential users – namely, federal agencies 
considering pay for performance – desperately need the information being provided.  
Last, the scorecard focuses on functionality because it attempts to convince federal 
agencies to react in a constructive and functional manner.   
Variable Description and Operationalization 
 The survey items included in this scorecard are from questions measured on a  
5-point Likert-type scale.  Most responses were coded as: 1 for “Strongly Disagree,”  
2 for “Disagree,” 3 for “Neither Agree nor Disagree,” 4 for “Agree,” and 5 for “Strongly 
Agree.”  Responses coded as 1 and 2 were combined to form a single category of 
disagreement, while responses coded as 4 and 5 were combined to form a single 
agreement category.  In some cases, other types of responses were used ranging from 
unimportant to important or listing degrees of fair treatment.  In each case, responses 
were categorized in a similar fashion to maintain consistency.   
 In some cases, the survey asked multiple questions on similar topics.  Using 
principal components factor analysis, I developed group measures by combining the 
questions that best represented my theoretical concepts.  The Cronbach’s alpha, which 
measures scale reliability from 0 to 1, is presented for each grouped variable.  This study 
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only includes variables with an alpha above .70, which is the threshold suggested by 
Nunnally (1978).   
 Questions chosen for inclusion in the scorecard represent criteria identified by the 
literature as being particularly crucial to pay for performance success and generally 
important to the success of organizational change efforts.  Eleven criteria for pay for 
performance success are measured by the scorecard: budget adequacy, sufficient 
managerial authority, motivated by money, pay for performance belief, pay for 
performance expectations, performance evaluation system, fair treatment on the job, 
supervisory fairness, quality of supervision, trust in decision-makers, and organizational 
culture.  The scorecard contains a total of 62 individual items.  Table 4 shows how each 
criteria for success were operationalized, provides the Cronbach’s alpha for each grouped 
variable, and the exact wording of each scorecard item.  Collectively, the scorecard’s 
rating of employee attitudes in these areas provides a valuable framework for assessing 
pay for performance readiness.   
 Two variables – budget adequacy and sufficient managerial authority – capture 
the federal managers’ perspective on whether funding and authority levels are sufficient 
to appropriately reward high performance using pay increases or awards.  Each criteria 
consists of a single item from 5-point Likert-type scales (strongly disagree to strongly 
agree).  Both items are flawed in the following ways.  First, neither item provides any 
objective or verifiable data to support the questionnaire responses.  Second, both areas of 
funding and managerial authority are typically targeted for improvement after pay for 
performance adoption.  Nevertheless, it’s important to measure both criteria before and 
after implementation using self-reported methods for several reasons.  Low scores before 
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pay for performance implementation indicate how much improvement is needed in these 
areas (i.e., an important readiness indicator).  After implementation, persistent low scores 
may indicate a different problem among managers who either aren’t aware that adequate 
funding and managerial authority are available to them or don’t believe that the funding 
and authority levels are adequate to implement pay for performance effectively.  
Consequently, these items remain in the scorecard for the purpose of assessing readiness 
and limitations are addressed in the scoring methodology by reporting but not counting 
these scores when determining the final government and agency ratings for readiness.   
 Motivated by money was assessed using two items from 5-point Likert-type scales 
(very unimportant to very important).  These items measure the importance of cash 
awards in the amounts of $100 and $1,000 respectively in motivating employees to do a 
good job.  This criteria is extremely important since pay for performance works best 
when employees are highly motivated by extrinsic rewards such as cash awards.   
 Pay for performance belief consists of a single item from a 5-point Likert-type 
scale (strongly disagree to strongly agree).  This item measures the personal belief that 
good performance will result in a cash award or pay increase.  Without this fundamental 
belief, the promise of pay for performance loses its motivational power. 
 Pay for performance expectations is a 7-item index (Cronbach’s alpha = .86) 
using 5-point Likert-type scales (strongly disagree to strongly agree).  This measure 
addresses employee opinions about what will happen if pay is based on performance, in 
terms of motivating people to work harder, increasing individual pay, helping the agency 
retain high performers, encouraging teamwork, and increasing morale.  On the negative 
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side, it also measures employee fears that pay for performance may result in unfair 
treatment of employees and increase employee vulnerability to political coercion. 
 Performance evaluation system is a 7-item index (Cronbach’s alpha = .89) using 
5-point Likert-type scales (strongly disagree to strongly agree).  It combines items 
measuring knowledge of performance expectations and the basis for performance ratings 
with the appropriateness of performance standards, accuracy and objectivity of 
performance evaluation measures, employee participation in setting standards and goals, 
and opportunities to earn a high performance rating.  The more employees perceive their 
performance evaluation system as a fair and valid measurement of job performance, the 
greater the chance for pay for performance success.   
 Two separate indexes measure perceived fairness in the federal workplace.  Fair 
treatment on the job consists of a 7-item index (Cronbach’s alpha = .87) using  
5-point Likert-type scales (no extent to very great extent).  It represents employee 
perceptions of fair treatment regarding career advancement, awards, training, 
performance appraisals, job assignments, discipline, and pay.  Supervisory fairness is a  
5-item index (Cronbach’s alpha = .85) using 5-point Likert-type scales (no extent to great 
extent).5  It describes employee attitudes regarding the fairness and effectiveness of 
supervisory behavior when rating job applicants, selecting people for vacancies or 
promotions, determining pay increases and awards, establishing individual pay levels 
within broad pay bands, and taking adverse actions.  Together, these criteria form a 
                                                 
 
 
5 For Supervisory Fairness (Question 32a-e), the Merit Principles Survey 2005 contained five response 
categories as follows: Don’t Know / Can’t Judge, No Extent, Minimal Extent, Moderate Extent, and Great 
Extent.  This was the only variable in the scorecard that included “Don’t Know/Can’t Judge” responses in 
the percentage totals.  
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powerful “fairness test” that agencies need to pass in order to have the best chance of 
implementing pay for performance successfully.   
 Quality of supervision is a 9-item index (Cronbach’s alpha = .95) using 5-point 
Likert-type scales (strongly disagree to strongly agree).  It measures whether employees 
believe their supervisors engage in a wide range of activities including: providing 
constructive and timely feedback about job performance; helping employees improve 
their skills and performance by providing coaching, training opportunities, or assistance; 
rating performance fairly and accurately and being held accountable for doing so; dealing 
effectively with poor performers; and responding constructively to workplace conflicts.  
It also asks employee opinions about whether their supervisor has good technical and 
management skills.  Collectively, these items provide a comprehensive view of 
supervisory quality.   
 Trust in decision-makers combines two indexes that measure whether employees 
trust their immediate supervisors and upper level managers to take actions relevant to pay 
for performance.  Based on theory and previous empirical research, trust is measured 
separately for each level of supervision.  At the first level, trust in immediate supervisor 
represents an 8-item index (Cronbach’s alpha = .96) using 5-point Likert-type scales 
(strongly disagree to strongly agree).  This measure addresses the immediate supervisor’s 
ability to fairly assess employee performance and contributions, support employees in 
pay and award discussions with upper management, listen fairly to employee concerns, 
apply discipline fairly, clearly communicate conduct expectations, act with integrity, 
refrain from favoritism, and keep people informed.  At the second level, trust in upper 
management is a 7-item index (Cronbach’s alpha = .96) using 5-point Likert-type scales 
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(strongly disagree to strongly agree).  It measures the ability of upper level managers to 
clearly communicate organizational performance expectations, fairly assess employee 
performance and contributions, listen fairly to employee concerns, apply discipline fairly, 
act with integrity, refrain from favoritism, and keep the organization informed.   
 Organizational culture is a 7-item index (Cronbach’s alpha = .88) using  
5-point Likert-type scales (strongly disagree to strongly agree).  It includes questions that 
are consistent with previous research using U.S. MSPB survey data (e.g., Brewer, 2005; 
Brewer & Selden, 2000).  It measures employee perceptions about being treated with 
respect in the workplace and whether employee opinions count at work, information is 
shared freely, a spirit of cooperation and teamwork exists, their work unit responds 
flexibly to changing conditions, recognition and rewards are based on performance, and 
their organization ensures that employees are appropriately paid and rewarded.   
 Last, I created a series of dichotomous variables to account for the agency in 
which the respondent works (agency of employment).  The following 24 executive branch 
agencies were included in this study:  Agriculture, Commerce, Defense (Air Force, 
Army, Navy, Other Defense), Education, Energy, Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), General Services Administration 
(GSA),  Health and Human Services (HHS), Homeland Security (DHS), Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD), Interior, Justice, Labor,  National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA), Office of Personnel Management (OPM), Social Security 
Administration (SSA), State, Transportation (DOT), Treasury, and Veterans Affairs 
(VA).   
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Traffic Light System 
 The scorecard uses a traffic light grading system where each score is designated a 
different color (green, yellow, or red).  This method was chosen because of its previous 
use in the federal government.  The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 
and the Bush administration’s President’s Management Agenda of 2001 both used traffic 
light scorecards to track the status and progress of each federal agency (Breul & 
Kamensky, 2008).  In general, green means that the agency has met all of the elements 
required for success; yellow means that the agency has achieved intermediate levels of 
success; and red means that the agency has failed in one or more areas required for 
success.  Adopting a grading system that is familiar to federal agencies makes the results 
easier to understand and interpret, while simultaneously increasing the potential for 
governmentwide use.   
Measuring Success 
 The scorecard utilizes a graduated scale.  This makes it increasingly difficult to 
advance to the next higher level.  Because the scorecard data represents a percentage of 
favorable responses, the highest possible score is 100 percent for each scorecard item.  
The overall scorecard consists of three zones divided as follows: 40 percentage points  
for the red “failure” zone; 35 percentage points for the yellow “caution” zone; and  
25 percentage points for the green “success” zone.  Having a large failure zone with a 
smaller success zone is not without precedent.  Under the academic grading system,  
0 to 59.9 represents a failing grade of F, while the higher grades of D through A have a 
smaller 10 point difference between them.     
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 In order to receive a green rating overall, an agency has to be in the green on all 
scorecard items with no yellows or reds allowed.  A yellow rating means an agency 
received all or some yellows with no reds allowed.  An overall rating of red consists of 
one or more items in the red zone that may be combined with yellows or greens in 
remaining areas.  The lowest individual item score determines the zone for the whole 
criteria, which is consistent with previous federal scoring systems such as the President’s 
Management Agenda (see U.S. Office of Management and Budget [OMB], 2001, 
document M-02-02 for details).  
 Agencies with the best chance for pay for performance success receive a green 
light to go ahead with implementation plans.  Green status is the hardest to achieve, 
requiring a 75 to 100 percent favorable response in all areas of the scorecard.  Agencies 
with some chance for success are given the yellow caution light which universally means 
to slow down because they are not quite ready for pay for performance.  Yellow status is 
fairly easy to achieve with a 40 to 74 percent favorable response in at least one area of the 
scorecard.  Last, agencies with little chance for pay for performance success are given the 
red light.  Agencies in the red zone should stop what they are doing immediately and 
reassess their position on pay for performance.  The red zone consists of a 0 to 39 percent 
favorable response in one or more areas of the scorecard, representing the lowest level of 
employee support for pay for performance.  A sensitivity analysis is conducted later to 
show how results would differ if zone percentages and rules for measuring success were 
changed.     
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Scorecard Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for the federal government as a whole in the 
form of percentage response rates for individual scorecard items.  Each survey question 
included in the scorecard is listed here, along with factor loadings and Cronbach’s alpha 
for indexed variables.  Overall criteria zones of green, yellow, or red are displayed next to 
the scorecard criteria, along with individual item scores and the corresponding green 
deficit scores.   
 The federal government failed to reach the green “success” zone on any of the 11 
criteria required for pay for performance success:  5 criteria made it into the yellow 
“caution” zone and 6 criteria landed in the red “failure” zone.  These criteria contained a 
total of 62 individual scorecard items.  Among them, only 2 individual scorecard items 
achieved green scores; 48 individual scorecard items achieved yellow scores; and 12 
individual scorecard items achieved red scores.   
Where is the Federal Government Scoring the Highest? 
 Green Scores.  Two individual scorecard items achieved green status: 82.1 
percent of federal employees agreed that they understood the basis for their most recent 
performance rating (performance evaluation system); and 76.5 percent of federal 
employees felt they were treated with respect at work (organizational culture).   
Where is the Federal Government Achieving Mediocre Scores? 
 Yellow Zones.  The federal government reached the yellow zone in 5 out of 11 
pay for performance criteria: budget adequacy, sufficient managerial authority, pay for 
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performance belief, performance evaluation system, and trust in decision-makers.  Across 
the entire scorecard, 48 out of 62 individual items received yellow scores.  This grade 
suggests that the federal government has achieved an intermediate level of success in 
each of these areas but requires further improvement to increase the chances of pay for 
performance success.   
 Management Perspective: Budget Adequacy and Sufficient Managerial Authority 
(Yellow Zone).  When supervisors were asked if they had adequate funds and sufficient 
managerial authority to reward high performance, less than half agreed.  Only 45.0 
percent of federal supervisors agreed that their organization has adequate funds to 
appropriately reward high performance, while 38.0 percent disagreed.  Even fewer 
supervisors (41.8 percent) agreed that they had enough authority to reward high 
performance, while a slightly higher percentage disagreed (42.7 percent).  These findings 
are consistent with a historical pattern of low funding and political support which tends to 
evaporate shortly after pay for performance implementation.  Although scores in these 
areas are expected to be lower before pay for performance implementation compared to 
afterwards, it’s important to measure readiness in these areas to see how much 
improvement is needed prior to introducing organizational change.   
 Pay for Performance Belief (Yellow Zone).  Only 41.5 percent of federal 
employees believed the government’s promise that good performance was likely to result 
in a cash award or pay increase, while 34.3 percent disagreed.  This illustrates a weak 
relationship between pay and performance in the eyes of federal employees which needs 
to be strengthened considerably to increase the chances of pay for performance success.  
In each of these criteria – budget adequacy, sufficient managerial authority, and pay for 
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performance belief – the percentage of favorable responses barely achieved yellow scores 
and could easily fall into the red zone in the future.   
 Performance Evaluation System (Yellow Zone).  Federal employees expressed 
positive comments about their performance evaluation system.  This criteria reached the 
yellow zone with 6 individual yellow scores and 1 green score.  Earning green status, 
82.1 percent of federal employees said they understood the basis for their most recent 
performance rating.  A majority of employees (between 51 and 69 percent) agreed that 
objective measures were used to evaluate performance, employees had sufficient 
opportunities to earn a high performance rating, standards used to appraise performance 
were appropriate, and employees understood what must be done to receive a high 
performance rating (yellow scores).  Nearly half of federal employees (49 percent) agreed 
that performance ratings accurately reflected job performance and employees participated 
in setting standards used to evaluate their job performance (yellow scores).   
 Trust in Decision-Makers (Yellow Zone).  Employee trust in decision-makers 
turned out to be the strongest criteria in the yellow zone with the highest levels of 
agreement.  In most areas, a majority of federal employees expressed considerable trust 
in immediate supervisors and upper management.  However, a pattern does emerge 
showing that federal employees placed greater trust in their immediate supervisors with 
higher agreement levels between 58.7 and 71.8 percent for all categories (8 yellow 
scores) and comparatively less trust in upper management with 42.4 to 58.6 percent 
agreement (7 yellow scores).  Specifically, immediate supervisors were trusted more than 
upper managers to fairly assess employee performance (by a difference of 21.3 
percentage points), listen fairly to employee concerns (by a difference of 19.9 percentage 
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points), refrain from favoritism (by a difference of 16.2 percentage points), apply 
discipline fairly (by a difference of 14.3 percentage points), and act with integrity  
(by a difference of 13.2 percentage points).  Overall, it’s ironic that federal employees 
expressed the highest level of trust in all decision-makers to act with integrity, while 
simultaneously trusting them the least to refrain from favoritism.   
Where is the Federal Government Failing? 
 Red Alert!  The federal government reached the red zone with favorable 
responses at 39 percent or below in 6 out of 11 pay for performance criteria: motivated by 
money, pay for performance expectations, fair treatment on the job, supervisory fairness, 
quality of supervision, and organizational culture.  Within these criteria, there were 12 
individual scorecard items that landed in the red zone.  Although the number of red 
scores is relatively low, this can be deceiving because the areas needing the most 
improvement may very well be among the most difficult to improve.  
  Motivated by Money (Red Zone).  Using money to motivate better job 
performance presents unique challenges for the federal government.  On the one hand, a 
large majority of employees (72.6 percent – yellow score) deemed a cash award of 
$1,000 to be important in motivating them to do a good job.  On the other hand, only one 
third of federal employees (35.8 percent – red score) rated a smaller cash award of $100 
as an important factor motivating good performance, while 29.2 percent rated it as 
unimportant.  This means that while most federal employees can be motivated by sizeable 
amounts of money to perform better (at least a $1,000 cash award), significantly fewer 
employees can be motivated by smaller amounts of money such as a $100 cash award.  
The really bad news is that stressful economic times tend to reduce the amount of money 
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available for performance bonuses, thereby making the least motivating $100 cash 
awards the most likely to occur and the highly motivating $1,000 cash awards the least 
likely to occur.   
 Even more discouraging for the successful implementation of pay for 
performance is the relative unimportance of money as a performance motivator compared 
to other types of incentives.  The Merit Principles Survey of 2005 asked federal 
employees: “How important are each of the following in motivating you to do a good 
job?” (Question 16).  Employees were given a list of twelve motivating factors and asked 
to rate their level of importance from 1 for “Very Unimportant,” 2 for “Unimportant,” 3 
for “Neither Important nor Unimportant,” 4 for “Important,” and 5 for “Very Important.”  
Their answers help to explain some of the difficulties the federal government has 
experienced since it began experimenting with pay for performance.  The percentage of 
federal employees who rated motivating factors as important (combining responses of 4 
for “Important” and 5 for “Very Important”) are shown in Table 3.   
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              Table 3.  What Motivates Federal Employees to Perform Better? 
     
Rank Percentage                Important Motivating Factors
     
 
1 98.2    Motivated by personal pride or satisfaction in work. 
 
2 92.2    Motivated by a desire to help work unit meet its goals. 
 
3 90.5    Motivated by a desire not to let coworkers down. 
 
4 90.4    Motivated by their duty as a public employee. 
 
5 83.9    Motivated by a desire not to let their supervisor down. 
 
6 83.3    Motivated by a desire for a good performance rating. 
 
7 72.6    Motivated by a cash award of $1,000. 
 
8 71.8    Motivated by increased chances for promotion. 
 
9 68.2    Motivated by recognition from coworkers. 
 
10 52.2    Motivated by a time off award of 8 hours. 
 
11 47.6    Motivated by non-cash recognition. 
 
12 35.8    Motivated by a cash award of $100. 
 
     
       NOTES:  Data source is the Merit Principles Survey of 2005. 
       Reduced sample includes General Schedule employees only. 
       Statistics were calculated using the U.S. MSPB sampling weight variable. 
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 Out of the 12 factors listed above, the top five factors were all intrinsic motivators 
with extremely high percentages of federal employees (83.9 to 98.2 percent) listing them 
as important.  The motivational importance of money achieved a ranking of 7th place for 
a $1,000 cash award and 12th or last place for a $100 cash award.  These results show 
what public service motivation theorists have been saying for years (Perry & Wise, 1990) 
– namely, that government employees are more strongly motivated by factors other than 
money.  The implications of this could be devastating to pay for performance programs 
trying to motivate better performance using monetary incentives alone.   
 Pay for Performance Expectations (Red Zone).  Employee opinions about pay for 
performance yielded mixed results.  Out of 7 individual scorecard items, 5 received 
yellow scores and 2 received red scores, thereby placing the entire criteria in the red 
zone.  Many employee opinions about pay for performance were favorable.  Between  
64 and 70 percent of federal employees agreed that basing pay on performance would 
help the agency retain high performers, motivate employees to work harder, and increase 
their pay (yellow scores).  About 45 percent agreed that basing pay on performance 
would also encourage teamwork and increase employee morale (yellow scores).   
 Other pay for performance expectations were decidedly more negative.  Federal 
employees feared that basing pay on performance would have serious negative 
consequences: only 32.1 percent did not think pay for performance would result in unfair 
treatment of employees, while 34.4 percent feared that it would lead to unfair treatment; 
and only 21.8 percent believed that pay for performance would not increase employee 
vulnerability to political coercion, whereas 44.7 percent feared that it would (red scores).  
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Negative pay for performance expectations exceeded positive expectations in these two 
areas.   
 Fair Treatment on the Job (Red Zone).  Federal employees believed they were 
treated fairly in most but not all areas of employment.  Five out of 7 items received 
yellow scores and 2 received red scores, placing the entire criteria in the red zone.  
Starting with the highest yellow scores, a majority of federal employees felt they were 
treated fairly to a great extent regarding performance appraisals (56.4 percent), 
disciplinary actions (54.0 percent), and job assignments (52.1 percent).  The lowest 
yellow scores were in the area of pay where 47.6 percent of federal employees felt they 
were treated fairly to a great extent, followed by training with a 40.6 percent fair 
treatment score.  In other areas of personnel management, the federal government did not 
score as high.   
 The federal government landed in the red zone in two areas of fair treatment: 
awards and career advancement.  Merely 39.4 percent of federal employees felt they were 
treated fairly to a great extent regarding awards, while 31.1 percent said they were treated 
fairly to little or no extent (red score).  Employees reported the lowest amount of fair 
treatment in the area of career advancement where only 37.0 percent of federal 
employees reported being treated fairly to a great extent and even more federal 
employees (39.1 percent) said they were treated fairly to little or no extent (red score).  
With perceptions of fair pay receiving less than majority support and fairness regarding 
awards and promotions scoring even lower, the federal government needs to improve 
significantly before implementing a pay for performance system that depends so heavily 
on fair treatment in these areas. 
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 Supervisory Fairness (Red Zone).  Supervisory fairness received the worst scores 
of any criteria in the scorecard, with all 5 individual scorecard items in the red.  One third 
of federal employees believed their supervisor would behave fairly to a great extent when 
rating job applicant qualifications (36.1 percent) and selecting people for vacancies or 
promotions (33.8 percent).  Employees rated supervisors even lower when considering 
activities directly related to pay for performance.  Less than 25 percent of federal 
employees thought their supervisor would behave in a fair and effective manner to a great 
extent when determining pay increases and awards (24.2 percent), establishing individual 
employee pay within broad pay bands (16.8 percent), and taking adverse actions (18.5 
percent).  In each of these three instances, negative perceptions of supervisory fairness 
exceeded positive perceptions by a wide margin (20 to 42 percent).  These results clearly 
illustrate that federal supervisors have failed to pass a crucial pay for performance 
“fairness test” in the eyes of employees.   
 Quality of Supervision (Red Zone).  The quality of federal supervision received 
moderate scores with one notable exception.  Eight out of 9 individual scorecard items 
earned yellow scores, while one item’s red score single-handedly placed the entire 
criteria in the red zone.  Among the yellow scores, a majority of federal employees 
believed that federal supervisors were rating employee performance fairly and accurately 
(62.7 percent), and providing constructive (57.6 percent) and timely (53.7 percent) 
feedback.  Less than half of federal employees agreed their supervisor was held 
accountable for rating employee performance fairly and accurately (48.1 percent), helped 
employees improve their skills and performance (47.3 percent), and responded 
constructively to workplace conflicts (46.3 percent).  Consistent with past surveys, more 
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federal employees rated their supervisors as having good technical skills (69.1 percent) 
compared to 13.4 percent fewer federal employees who rated their supervisors as having 
good management skills (55.7 percent).   
 Most importantly, federal employee ratings plummeted into the red zone when 
asked if their supervisor deals effectively with poor performers: 30.4 percent agreed,  
38.7 percent remained neutral, and 30.8 percent disagreed.  This problem alone can 
destroy any chance of pay for performance success.  Considering that effective handling 
of poor performers only received 22 percent agreement in the previous Merit Principles 
Survey of 2000 (U.S. MSPB, 2008a), an increase of 8 percent under the Merit Principles 
Survey of 2005 demonstrates that improvement is possible over time.  However, these 
figures have a long way to go before they can support a pay for performance program.   
 Organizational Culture (Red Zone).  Organizational culture received a wide 
variety of scores.  Out of 7 individual scorecard items, 1 received a green score,  
5 received yellow scores, and 1 received a red score putting the entire criteria in the red 
zone.  The highest percentage of federal employees (76.5 percent – green score) felt they 
were treated with respect at work.  In the yellow zone, a majority of federal employees 
agreed that their work unit responded flexibly to changing conditions (67.2 percent), a 
spirit of cooperation and teamwork existed in their work unit (65.0 percent), information 
was shared freely in their work unit (60.0 percent), and their opinions counted at work 
(54.5 percent).  Unfortunately, two of the lowest scores are in areas most critical to pay 
for performance success.  Less than half of federal employees (45.1 percent) agreed that 
recognition and rewards were based on performance, while 29.6 percent disagreed.   
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Finally, one key pay for performance element fell into the red zone when only 37.9 
percent of federal employees agreed that their organization took steps to ensure that 
employees were appropriately paid and rewarded, while slightly fewer (34.3 percent) 
believed otherwise.     
 Table 4.  Descriptive Statistics for the Federal Pay for Performance Scorecard 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                 
                Green 
Scorecard Item      Disagree Neither Agree  Score  Deficit
 
Budget Adequacy (Management Only):     YELLOW 
 
My organization has sufficient funds to appropriately      38.04     16.94   45.02  Yellow  - 29.98 
reward high performance.           
 
Sufficient Managerial Authority (Management Only):     YELLOW 
 
I have enough authority to reward high performance      42.70     15.47   41.83  Yellow  - 33.17 
through pay increases or awards.   
______________________________________________________________________________________________________
                 
                Green 
Scorecard Item            Unimportant Neither        Important  Score  Deficit
                  
Motivated by Money:     RED 
 
How important is a cash award of $100       29.21     34.97  35.82  Red  - 39.18 
in motivating you to do a good job?  
 
How important is a cash award of $1,000        8.73     18.65  72.62  Yellow  -   2.38 
in motivating you to do a good job?        
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 4 (continued) 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                 
                Green 
Scorecard Item      Disagree Neither Agree  Score  Deficit
 
Pay for Performance Belief:     YELLOW 
 
If I perform well, it is likely I will receive       34.34     24.10   41.56  Yellow  - 33.44 
a cash award or pay increase.   
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 4 (continued) 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                Green 
Scorecard Item      Disagree Neither Agree  Score  Deficit
 
Pay for Performance Expectations:     RED 
 
In my opinion, basing pay on performance: 
  
a.   Motivates employees to work harder.      12.66     17.52  69.82  Yellow  -   5.18 
 
b.   Would increase my pay.          7.77     21.54  70.69  Yellow  -   4.31 
 
c.   Would help my agency retain high performers.     14.30     20.86  64.84  Yellow  - 10.16 
 
d.   Encourages teamwork.        26.72     28.02  45.26  Yellow  - 29.74 
 
e.   Would not result in unfair treatment of employees.*    34.43     33.43  32.14  Red  - 42.86 
 
f.   Increases employee morale.       25.90     28.70  45.40  Yellow  - 29.60 
 
g. Would not increase employee vulnerability to      44.69     33.48  21.83  Red  - 53.17 
 political coercion.*                      
               
* Question wording reversed for positive effect.                   
 
 
FACTOR ANALYSIS:  Factor loadings are between .54 and .87 and Cronbach’s alpha = .86.  
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 4 (continued) 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                Green 
Scorecard Item      Disagree Neither Agree  Score  Deficit
 
Performance Evaluation System:     YELLOW 
 
In my work unit, performance ratings accurately      25.42     25.25  49.33  Yellow  - 25.67 
reflect job performance.      
 
I understand the basis for my most recent        7.85     10.06  82.09  Green   None 
performance rating.       
 
The standards used to appraise my performance      16.13     17.59  66.28  Yellow  -   8.72 
are appropriate.       
 
I participate in setting standards and goals used      30.24     20.20  49.56  Yellow  - 25.44 
to evaluate my job performance.    
 
I understand what I must do to receive a       15.05     15.50  69.45  Yellow  -   5.55 
high performance rating.     
 
I have sufficient opportunities to earn a       19.20     20.13  60.67  Yellow  - 14.33 
high performance rating.    
 
Objective measures are used to evaluate       25.26     23.46  51.28  Yellow  - 23.72 
my performance.          
 
 
FACTOR ANALYSIS:  Factor loadings are between .73 and .85 and Cronbach’s alpha = .89.  
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 4 (continued) 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
         Little or Some  Great    Green 
Scorecard Item                 No Extent Extent  Extent  Score  Deficit
 
Fair Treatment on the Job:     RED 
 
In the past 2 years, to what extent do you believe  
you have been treated fairly regarding the following?  
 
a.   Career advancement.        39.08     23.89  37.03  Red  - 37.97 
 
b.   Awards.           31.10      29.47  39.43  Red  - 35.57 
 
c.   Training.           28.00     31.40  40.60  Yellow  - 34.40 
 
d.   Performance appraisals.         17.58     25.98  56.44  Yellow  - 18.56 
 
e.   Job assignments.          21.20     26.72  52.08  Yellow  - 22.92 
 
f.   Discipline.           24.10     21.86  54.04  Yellow  - 20.96 
 
g.  Pay.            22.13     30.30  47.57  Yellow  - 27.43 
                         
 
FACTOR ANALYSIS:  Factor loadings are between .67 and .79 and Cronbach’s alpha = .87.   
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 4 (continued) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                 Minimal or        Moderate Great    Green 
Scorecard Item               No Extent*  Extent  Extent  Score  Deficit
 
Supervisory Fairness:     RED 
 
To what extent do you think your supervisor will exercise 
the following authorities in a fair and effective manner? 
 
a. Rating the qualifications of job applicants.      29.13     34.79  36.07  Red  - 38.93 
 
b. Selecting people for vacancies or promotions    32.67     33.54  33.79  Red  - 41.21 
 based on their qualifications.      
 
c. Determining pay increases and awards.       44.33     31.27  24.39  Red  - 50.61 
 
d. Setting individual employees’ pay     58.66     24.58  16.76  Red  - 58.24 
 within broad pay bands.      
 
e.   Taking adverse actions such as      56.21     25.32  18.47  Red  - 56.53 
 suspensions and removals.            
 
 
FACTOR ANALYSIS:  Factor loadings are between .73 and .86 and Cronbach’s alpha = .85.   
 
* Minimal or no extent category includes “don’t know/can’t judge” responses for this question only. 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 4 (continued) 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                Green 
Scorecard Item      Disagree Neither Agree  Score  Deficit
 
Quality of Supervision:     RED 
 
My supervisor provides constructive feedback      21.13     21.27  57.60  Yellow  - 17.40 
on my job performance.        
 
My supervisor provides timely feedback       22.27     24.01  53.72  Yellow  - 21.28 
on my job performance.        
 
My supervisor provides coaching,        27.61     25.13  47.26  Yellow  - 27.74 
training opportunities, or other assistance to  
help me improve my skills and performance.  
 
My supervisor rates my performance fairly and accurately.    12.91     24.42  62.67  Yellow  - 12.33 
 
My supervisor is held accountable for rating      18.80     33.11  48.09  Yellow  - 26.91 
employee performance fairly and accurately.  
 
My supervisor deals effectively with poor performers.     30.80     38.75  30.45  Red  - 44.55 
 
My supervisor responds constructively to workplace conflicts.    24.36     29.32  46.32  Yellow  - 28.68 
 
My supervisor has good technical skills.       12.37     18.56  69.07  Yellow  -   5.93 
 
My supervisor has good management skills.        22.90     21.44  55.66  Yellow  - 19.34 
                
FACTOR ANALYSIS:  Factor loadings are between .73 and .89 and Cronbach’s alpha = .95.   
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 4 (continued) 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                Green 
Scorecard Item      Disagree Neither Agree  Score  Deficit
 
TRUST IN DECISION-MAKERS:     YELLOW  
 
A.  Trust in Immediate Supervisor:     Yellow 
 
I trust my supervisor to do the following: 
 
a. Fairly assess my performance and contributions.     12.91     15.70  71.39  Yellow  -   3.61 
 
b. Support me in pay and award discussions     18.78     22.33  58.89  Yellow  - 16.11 
 with upper management.     
 
c. Listen fairly to my concerns.       13.81     14.81  71.38  Yellow  -   3.62 
 
d. Apply discipline fairly and only when justified.     16.12     19.69  64.19  Yellow  - 10.81 
 
e. Clearly communicate conduct expectations.     15.42     17.67  66.91  Yellow  -   8.09 
 
f. Act with integrity.        11.58     16.65  71.77  Yellow  -   3.23 
 
g. Refrain from favoritism.       22.48     18.87  58.65  Yellow  - 16.35 
 
h. Keep me informed.        20.64     18.21  61.15  Yellow  - 13.85 
          
 
FACTOR ANALYSIS:  Factor loadings are between .87 and .92 and Cronbach’s alpha = .96.  
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 4 (continued) 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                Green 
Scorecard Item      Disagree Neither Agree  Score  Deficit
 
B.  Trust in Upper Management:     Yellow 
 
I trust managers above my immediate supervisor to: 
 
a. Clearly communicate organizational performance     21.19     22.81  56.00  Yellow  - 19.00 
 expectations.        
 
b. Fairly assess my performance and contributions.     23.14     26.75  50.11  Yellow  - 24.89 
 
c. Listen fairly to my concerns.       22.73     25.82  51.45  Yellow  - 23.55 
 
d. Apply discipline fairly and only when justified.     20.70     29.45  49.85  Yellow  - 25.15 
 
e. Act with integrity.        17.11     24.32  58.57  Yellow  - 16.43 
 
f. Refrain from favoritism.       30.07     27.49  42.44  Yellow  - 32.56 
 
g. Keep the organization informed.       23.64     24.95  51.41  Yellow  - 23.59 
              
 
FACTOR ANALYSIS:  Factor loadings are between .88 and .92 and Cronbach’s alpha = .96.   
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 4 (continued) 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                Green 
Scorecard Item      Disagree Neither Agree  Score  Deficit
 
Organizational Culture:     RED 
 
I am treated with respect at work.       10.93     12.55  76.52  Green   None 
 
My opinions count at work.        21.31     24.15  54.54  Yellow  - 20.46 
 
Information is shared freely in my work unit.      22.27     17.74  59.99  Yellow  - 15.01 
 
A spirit of cooperation and teamwork exists in my work unit.    18.89     16.11  65.00  Yellow  - 10.00 
 
My work unit responds flexibly to changing conditions.     13.87     18.89  67.24  Yellow  -   7.76 
 
Recognition and rewards are based on performance.       29.61     25.31  45.08  Yellow  - 29.92 
 
My organization takes steps to ensure that       34.31     27.78  37.91  Red  - 37.09 
employees are appropriately paid and rewarded.   
              
FACTOR ANALYSIS:  Factor loadings are between .66 and .83 and Cronbach’s alpha = .88.   
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
           TOTAL GREEN DEFICIT:        -1,425.17 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note.  Agreement response categories were combined as follows:  Disagree = Disagree and Strongly Disagree; Neither = Neither Agree 
Nor Disagree; and Agree = Agree and Strongly Agree.  Descriptive statistics were calculated using the U.S. MSPB sampling weight 
variable and figures are shown in percentages.  Reduced sample includes General Schedule employees only. 
 
Traffic Light System with Graduated Zones:  Green = 75.00 to 100.00 percent favorable response;  
Yellow = 40.00 to 74.99 percent favorable response; Red = 0.00 to 39.99 percent favorable response. 
 Agency Scores 
 Table 5 presents pay for performance criteria for success along with the 
corresponding criteria zones for all federal agencies.  Among the 24 federal agencies 
surveyed, none reached the green zone on any of the pay for performance criteria for 
success.  Yellow was the highest criteria zone achieved by any agency.  All but one 
agency received a mixture of yellow and red criteria zones.   
 Six agencies received more yellow than red criteria zones.  The Department of 
Commerce received the most yellow with fewest red criteria zones (8 yellow, 3 red).  Not 
far behind were four other agencies (Army, Education, FDIC, and NASA) who achieved 
yellow zones in 7 out of 11 criteria, with 4 criteria in the red zone.  One agency (EPA) 
earned a bare majority of yellow over red criteria zones (6 yellow, 5 red).   
 Seventeen agencies received more red than yellow criteria zones.  Among them, 
five agencies (Air Force, GSA, HHS, HUD, and State) received 6 red and 5 yellow 
criteria zones, which matched the total federal government zones in number but not in 
area of scoring.  Four agencies (Navy, DOD Other, Transportation, and Treasury) earned 
7 red and 4 yellow criteria zones.  Seven agencies (Agriculture, Energy, Interior, Labor, 
OPM, SSA, and VA) received 8 red and 3 yellow criteria zones, followed by one agency 
(Justice) who earned 9 red and 2 yellow criteria zones.  Coming in last, one agency 
received nothing but red criteria zones.  The Department of Homeland Security was the 
only agency that scored completely in the red zone on all pay for performance criteria for 
success. 
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Criteria Zones by Agency 
 Looking across Table 5, the criteria zones reveal the strongest and weakest pay 
for performance areas.  No criteria received all yellow zones.  Five criteria received a 
majority of yellow zones.  The performance evaluation system received the most yellow 
criteria zones (19 yellow, 5 red).  Within this criteria, five agencies (Homeland Security, 
HUD, Labor, OPM, and SSA) reached the red zone because less than 40 percent of 
federal employees agreed that employees participate in setting standards and goals used 
to evaluate job performance.  Budget adequacy and trust in decision-makers received the 
next highest number of yellow criteria zones (18 yellow, 6 red).  In the area of trust, six 
agencies (DOD Other, Energy, EPA, Homeland Security, SSA, and Treasury) reported a 
lack of trust in upper managers to refrain from favoritism to be problematic enough for 
individual scores to fall into the red zone.  Sufficient managerial authority and pay for 
performance belief followed closely behind with 15 yellow and 9 red criteria zones.   
No federal agency received an overall red rating solely because of low scores in the areas 
of budget adequacy and sufficient managerial authority.   
 The remaining 6 criteria received all or mostly red zones.  Starting with the best 
of the worst areas, organizational culture received 10 yellow and 14 red criteria zones, 
followed by fair treatment on the job with 7 yellow and 17 red criteria zones.  Motivated 
by money received predominantly red criteria zones (4 yellow, 20 red) which makes one 
question the wisdom of focusing so heavily on monetary incentives in the first place.  
Finally, three criteria – pay for performance expectations, supervisory fairness, and 
quality of supervision – received the worst possible scores with red zones across all 24 
federal agencies, suggesting areas in need of the most improvement.   
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Getting to Green 
 Getting into the green zone is the most difficult level to achieve, requiring a 
minimum favorable response of 75 percent on all scorecard items.  When an agency 
finally reaches the green zone, it means it has achieved the highest standards for success 
as defined by the scorecard.  But what about agencies that aren’t in the green yet?  Where 
do they stand comparatively in terms of pay for performance readiness? 
 Although criteria zones are extremely useful in identifying patterns across 
agencies and highlighting problem areas needing improvement, they don’t tell the whole 
story.  Because the scores contained within each criteria cover a range of responses, all 
criteria zones are not of equal value.  For example, an agency receiving a yellow score 
with a 40 percent favorable response is less ready for pay for performance than an agency 
receiving the same yellow score with a 74 percent favorable response on any scorecard 
item.  However, that difference in readiness isn’t apparent from the individual yellow 
score or yellow criteria zone alone.  The green deficit calculation was created to complete 
the picture and allow for direct agency comparisons of readiness levels. 
 What does the green deficit score mean?  The green deficit calculates the distance 
between the favorable response and the green zone of 75 percent for each scorecard item.  
The green deficit shows how far each agency must improve before reaching the highest 
scorecard zone.  It helps to determine comparatively which agencies need the most 
improvement in order to have the best chance for pay for performance success. 
 Table 5 presents the total green deficit for the entire scorecard with rankings for 
each federal agency.  Out of 24 federal agencies surveyed, NASA ranked the highest in 
1st place for their pay for performance readiness with a total green deficit of -988.74.  
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This score puts NASA 436.43 percentage points closer to the green zone than the overall 
federal government which has a total green deficit of -1,425.17.  Agencies that have 
already implemented pay for performance to some degree are not highly ranked by this 
scorecard.6  The FDIC implemented a revised pay for performance program in 2003  
(U.S. OPM, 2005) and ranked in 4th place on the pay for performance readiness 
scorecard.  The Treasury Department overall ranked in 8th place on the pay for 
performance readiness scorecard which includes the IRS whose pay for performance 
system began in 2001.   
 Other agencies with pay for performance systems scored considerably worse.  
Although the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has utilized a pay for performance 
system since 1996, the Department of Transportation (DOT) ranked among the worst 
prepared for pay for performance in 23rd place on this scorecard.  The newest additions to 
the pay for performance club include the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security 
who both received authorization to develop their own pay for performance systems in 
2002 under the Homeland Security Act.  The Department of Defense scored higher than 
Homeland Security on the pay for performance readiness scorecard.  Within the 
Department of Defense, some groups ranked much higher than others: the Air Force 
landed in 6th place, the Army followed in 9th place, the Navy was next in 16th place, and 
DOD Other was in 17th place.   
                                                 
 
 
6 For a list of performance-based alternative pay systems within the federal government, see the U.S. Office 
of Personnel Management report on “Alternative Personnel Systems in Practice and A Guide to the Future” 
dated October 2005. 
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 Of all the federal agencies surveyed, the Department of Homeland Security 
ranked last on this scorecard in 24th place as the agency least ready for pay for 
performance.  Moreover, their lack of pay for performance readiness is considerably 
worse than other agencies surveyed.  While NASA is only -988.74 percentage points 
away from getting the green light to proceed with pay for performance, Homeland 
Security is -1,857.02 percentage points away from the green zone (a difference of  
-868.28 percentage points) – despite having a pay for performance system already in 
place.  Furthermore, Homeland Security’s green deficit score is 431.85 percentage points 
worse than the green deficit for the entire federal government.  With the Defense 
Department’s National Security Personnel System already on the verge of total collapse, 
these scorecard results predict the next pay for performance program to fall will be at 
Homeland Security. 
                       Table 5.  Pay for Performance Readiness Scores by Federal Agency 
 
 Criteria for Success Federal Government  
 Budget Adequacy Yellow  
 Sufficient Managerial Authority Yellow  
 Motivated by Money Red  
 Pay for Performance Belief Yellow  
 Pay for Performance Expectations Red  
 Performance Evaluation System Yellow  
 Fair Treatment on the Job Red  
 Supervisory Fairness Red  
 Quality of Supervision Red  
 Trust in Decision-Makers Yellow  
 Organizational Culture Red  
 Green Deficit Scores: -1,425.17  
 Agency Rankings: N/A  
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Table 5 (continued) 
 
Criteria for Success Agriculture Commerce DEFENSE: Air Force 
DEFENSE: 
Army 
DEFENSE: 
Navy 
DEFENSE: 
DOD Other 
Budget Adequacy       Red Yellow Yellow Yellow Yellow Yellow
Sufficient Managerial Authority       Yellow Yellow Red Yellow Yellow Yellow
Motivated by Money Red Yellow Red Red Red Red 
Pay for Performance Belief Red Yellow Yellow Yellow Red Yellow 
Pay for Performance Expectations Red Red Red Red Red Red 
Performance Evaluation System       Yellow Yellow Yellow Yellow Yellow Yellow
Fair Treatment on the Job Red Yellow Red Yellow Red Red 
Supervisory Fairness Red Red     Red Red Red Red
Quality of Supervision Red      Red Red Red Red Red
Trust in Decision-Makers Yellow Yellow Yellow Yellow Yellow Red 
Organizational Culture       Red Yellow Yellow Yellow Red Red
Green Deficit Scores: -1,416.74      -1,223.53 -1,304.78 -1,380.67 -1,440.01 -1,442.87
Agency Rankings: 14      3 6 9 16 17
 
 108
Table 5 (continued) 
 
Criteria for Success Education Energy EPA FDIC GSA HHS 
Budget Adequacy       Yellow Yellow Yellow Yellow Yellow Yellow
Sufficient Managerial Authority Yellow      Red Yellow Yellow Red Yellow
Motivated by Money Red Red Red Red Yellow Red 
Pay for Performance Belief Yellow Yellow Yellow Yellow Red Yellow 
Pay for Performance Expectations Red Red Red Red Red Red 
Performance Evaluation System       Yellow Yellow Yellow Yellow Yellow Yellow
Fair Treatment on the Job Yellow      Red Yellow Yellow Red Red
Supervisory Fairness Red Red     Red Red Red Red
Quality of Supervision Red      Red Red Red Red Red
Trust in Decision-Makers Yellow Red Red Yellow Yellow Yellow 
Organizational Culture       Yellow Red Yellow Yellow Yellow Red
Green Deficit Scores: -1,274.48      -1,509.63 -1,426.00 -1,270.06 -1,406.59 -1,382.55
Agency Rankings: 5      21 15 4 13 10
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Table 5 (continued) 
 
Criteria for Success Homeland Security HUD Interior Justice Labor NASA 
Budget Adequacy Red Yellow     Red Red Yellow Yellow
Sufficient Managerial Authority Red      Yellow Yellow Red Red Yellow
Motivated by Money Red      Red Red Red Red Red
Pay for Performance Belief Red      Yellow Red Red Yellow Yellow
Pay for Performance Expectations Red Red Red Red Red Red 
Performance Evaluation System Red Red Yellow Yellow Red Yellow 
Fair Treatment on the Job Red Red Red Red Red Yellow 
Supervisory Fairness Red Red     Red Red Red Red
Quality of Supervision Red      Red Red Red Red Red
Trust in Decision-Makers       Red Yellow Yellow Yellow Yellow Yellow
Organizational Culture       Red Yellow Red Red Red Yellow
Green Deficit Scores: -1,857.02 -1,471.43 -1,509.33 -1,402.03 -1,500.19 - 988.74 
Agency Rankings: 24      18 20 12 19 1
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Table 5 (continued) 
 
Criteria for Success OPM SSA State DOT Treasury VA 
Budget Adequacy Red Yellow     Yellow Yellow Yellow Red
Sufficient Managerial Authority Red      Red Yellow Yellow Yellow Red
Motivated by Money Yellow Red Red Red Red Yellow 
Pay for Performance Belief Yellow Yellow Red Red Yellow Red 
Pay for Performance Expectations Red Red Red Red Red Red 
Performance Evaluation System Red      Red Yellow Yellow Yellow Yellow
Fair Treatment on the Job Red Red Yellow Red Red Red 
Supervisory Fairness Red Red     Red Red Red Red
Quality of Supervision Red      Red Red Red Red Red
Trust in Decision-Makers Yellow Red Yellow Yellow Red Yellow 
Organizational Culture Red      Yellow Red Red Red Red
Green Deficit Scores: -1,337.41      -1,540.27 -1,151.89 -1,543.67 -1,363.11 -1,401.70
Agency Rankings: 7      22 2 23 8 11
 
 Scorecard Limitations 
 This scorecard is limited primarily by the data available for analysis.  Although 
survey data contains employee perceptions rather than objective or verifiable facts, 
agencies would do well to remember that these “perceptions are reality for those who 
hold them” (U.S. MSPB, 2007, p. 62).  Despite the fact that survey data is subject to bias 
and response error, it is the right kind of data to discern employee perceptions about pay 
for performance and readiness for organizational change that can have a significant 
impact on the probability of pay for performance success.   
 Within the Merit Principles Survey of 2005, missing data represents one of the 
main limitations.  The current survey only asks about the motivational impact of 
hypothetical cash awards in the amounts of $100 and $1,000 respectively.  In the future, 
it would be useful to know the exact dollar amount of actual performance awards issued 
and whether this amount was sufficient to motivate the same or higher levels of 
performance.  Additional data is needed to determine the possibility of motivating more 
employees with an amount of money that falls outside these boundaries or somewhere in 
between $100 and $1,000.  Adding objective data would also help to validate survey 
responses on budget adequacy.  In particular, the scorecard would benefit from actual 
budgetary data concerning the amount of funding available for performance awards to 
determine budget adequacy for each federal agency.   
 Timing is an important issue when assessing readiness for change.  Because 
readiness is a condition that varies over time, it needs to be measured frequently (Holt, 
Armenakis, Harris, et al., 2007).  The Merit Principles Survey of 2005 offers a snapshot 
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of readiness at a fixed point in time.  Additional assessments must be made at various 
points in time to measure changes in readiness prior to introducing change initiatives.   
 Another limitation stems from the fact that this scorecard is the first of its kind.  
No one has attempted to measure pay for performance readiness in this manner until now.  
Like trying to estimate the size of awards that will motivate better performance (Lawler, 
1990), identifying how much employee support is required for pay for performance 
success is not an exact science.  No study has determined the exact amount of employee 
support needed for pay for performance to achieve its objectives.  Moreover, there 
currently is no basis for determining exactly how much readiness is needed for 
organizational change to succeed (Holt, Armenakis, Harris, et al., 2007).   
 Hence, this scorecard constitutes an estimate of how much readiness is needed to 
give pay for performance a realistic chance for success.  The scorecard content and rules 
of measuring readiness should not be viewed as an absolute set of standards but rather as 
a template or guide that agencies can use to gauge their own level of readiness for 
change.  Additional empirical testing and agreement on what is an acceptable level of 
readiness are both needed to advance this research to the next level.  Practical 
applications of this scorecard may yield results that support, falsify, or prescribe making 
adjustments to the scorecard content and measurement parameters.  This is to be expected 
with any new model.  Because of its newness and originality, this scorecard will 
undoubtedly be subject to a great deal of scrutiny by academic scholars and government 
experts alike who may disagree with everything from the use of survey data to the 
scorecard approach, parameters, and design choices.  One can only hope that such intense 
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scrutiny will ultimately benefit public policy by raising the level of debate and shaping 
the future of pay for performance decision-making. 
Agency Reactions to Scorecard Results 
 One drawback of this and any scorecard is the uncertainty of not knowing how 
agencies will react to it.  Although the purpose of this scorecard is to provide relevant 
information to help agencies decide if they are ready to implement pay for performance, 
there’s no guarantee that the information will be accepted or used in the decision-making 
process.  As Gormley and Weimer (1999, p. 13) explain: “Confronted by unpleasant 
revelations, an organization may respond by adopting practices aimed at self-
improvement … [or] … the organization may respond dysfunctionally in an effort to 
defuse the reputational threat without addressing the root causes of its performance 
problems.”  With the pay for performance readiness scorecard, a positive agency 
response is most likely to occur within agencies who received higher scores and who 
have not yet adopted pay for performance.  Alternatively, these scorecard results may 
trigger dysfunctional responses – such as, blaming the messenger, challenging the 
scorecard design, and manipulating the numbers (Gormley & Weimer, 1999) – especially 
among agencies who scored poorly and already have a pay for performance system in 
operation.   
Sensitivity Analysis 
 When constructing a new metric for program evaluation, it is important to test the 
sensitivity of the analysis to determine the extent to which particular assumptions control 
the outcome.  Are the measurement parameters correct?  Is a 75 percent favorable 
response the correct value to use when determining the best chance for pay for 
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performance success?  What if a lower number were used?  What if different rules were 
applied?  A sensitivity analysis investigates the possibility of getting different results by 
using different assumptions (Posavac & Carey, 2003).  Results from a sensitivity analysis 
can increase confidence in the model and its predictions by demonstrating how the 
model’s output responds to changing inputs (Saltelli, 2000).  In terms of this pay for 
performance readiness scorecard, if the final outcome is the same regardless of the 
scoring system, then the results gain credibility.   
Alternative Scoring Systems 
 A sensitivity analysis was conducted by comparing results from alternative 
scoring systems.  The federal government’s readiness for pay for performance was 
assessed according to the same criteria using two different scoring systems:  (1) a traffic 
light system using equal zones consisting of 0 to 32 percent (Red), 33 to 66 percent 
(Yellow), and 67 to 100 percent (Green); and (2) a pass/fail system where 0 to 50 percent 
represents the failure zone and 51 to 100 percent represents the passing zone.  The same 
rules were applied in each evaluation where the lowest favorable response on an 
individual scorecard item dictates the zone for the entire pay for performance criteria.   
 Results are shown in two tables.  Table 6 presents criteria results from the 
sensitivity analysis of the federal pay for performance readiness scorecard.  Table 7 
displays the individual problem areas (red/failing scores) that put the federal government 
into the red zone under each scoring system.  Combined, these tables show that 6 red 
scores were responsible for placing 3 pay for performance criteria in the red zone under 
all three scoring systems; 12 red scores were to blame for placing 6 pay for performance 
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criteria in the red zone under two scoring systems; and 28 failing scores were responsible 
for placing all pay for performance criteria in the failure zone under one scoring system.   
 Traffic Light System with Equal Zones.  Out of these three scoring systems, the 
traffic light system with equal zones generated the most positive results.  Using this 
scoring system, the federal government received more yellow than red zones (see  
Table 6).  Eight criteria were in the yellow zone including budget adequacy, sufficient 
managerial authority, motivated by money, pay for performance belief, performance 
evaluation system, fair treatment on the job, trust in decision-makers, and organizational 
culture, indicating that some chance of pay for performance success exists.  Only three 
criteria landed in the red zone where little chance of pay for performance success exists – 
namely, pay for performance expectations, supervisory fairness, and quality of 
supervision.  The federal government failed to reach the green zone on any criteria under 
this system. 
 Pass/Fail System.  The pass/fail system produced the worst possible results for 
the federal government.  Under the pass/fail system, the federal government received a 
failing score (below 51 percent) on at least one item within all criteria indicating little 
chance of pay for performance success (0 Pass, 11 Fail).  Out of 62 individual scorecard 
items, 34 items (54.8 percent) received passing scores and 28 items (45.2 percent) 
received failing scores.   
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Comparative Results 
 Based on the results shown in Table 6, none of the scoring systems rate the 
federal government as having the best chance of pay for performance success.  The 
federal government failed to reach the green zone on any criteria under either traffic light 
system using equal or graduated zones, and it didn’t reach the passing zone for any 
criteria under the pass/fail system.  All three systems agree that the federal government is 
not in the best position to make pay for performance succeed.   
 None of the three scoring systems placed the federal government entirely in the 
yellow zone either.  Both traffic light systems rated 5 pay for performance criteria in the 
yellow zone consistently (budget adequacy, sufficient managerial authority, pay for 
performance belief, performance evaluation system, and trust in decision-makers), while 
the same areas landed in the failure zone under the pass/fail system.  Three areas 
(motivated by money, fair treatment on the job, and organizational culture) were rated 
yellow only by the traffic light system using equal zones, while the other two scoring 
systems placed those areas in the red/failure zone.  Three pay for performance criteria 
(pay for performance expectations, supervisory fairness, and quality of supervision) were 
in the red/failure zone under all three scoring systems. 
 118 
            Table 6.  Sensitivity Analysis Results for Federal Pay for Performance Readiness 
 
 
Pay for Performance              
Criteria for Success 
Equal           
Zones 
Graduated 
Zones 
Pass / Fail    
System 
 Budget Adequacy YELLOW YELLOW FAIL 
 Sufficient Managerial Authority    YELLOW YELLOW FAIL
 Motivated by Money YELLOW RED FAIL 
 Pay for Performance Belief YELLOW YELLOW FAIL 
 Pay for Performance Expectations RED RED FAIL 
 Performance Evaluation System    YELLOW YELLOW FAIL
 Fair Treatment on the Job YELLOW RED FAIL 
 Supervisory Fairness RED RED FAIL 
 Quality of Supervision RED RED FAIL 
 Trust in Decision-Makers YELLOW YELLOW FAIL 
 Organizational Culture YELLOW RED FAIL 
                  Graduated Zones:  RED = 0 to 39.99; YELLOW = 40 to 74.99; GREEN = 75 to 100.  
                  Equal Zones:  RED = 0 to 32.99; YELLOW = 33 to 66.99; GREEN = 67 to 100.  
                  Pass / Fail System:  FAIL < 51 percent,  PASS = 51 percent or greater. 
   
  
  
 Individual Problem Areas 
 Table 7 reveals that 6 individual scorecard items receiving red scores were 
responsible for placing 3 pay for performance criteria in the red zone (pay for 
performance expectations, supervisory fairness, and quality of supervision) under all 
three scoring systems.  Employees were not convinced that pay for performance wouldn’t 
lead to unfair treatment and increased vulnerability to political coercion in the workplace 
(pay for performance expectations).  Employees lacked confidence that their supervisors 
would behave in a fair and effective manner to a great extent when determining pay 
increases and awards, establishing individual employee pay within broad pay bands, and 
taking adverse actions (supervisory fairness).  And employees did not believe their 
supervisors dealt effectively with poor performers (quality of supervision).  Each of these 
individual scorecard items represent deal breakers that pose the greatest threat to pay for 
performance success. 
 Six additional scorecard items received red/failing scores under two out of three 
scoring systems, placing 3 more pay for performance criteria in the red zone (motivated 
by money, fair treatment on the job, and organizational culture) under the traffic light 
system using graduated zones and the pass/fail system.  Employees rated the possibility 
of receiving a $100 cash award as least important in motivating them to do a good job 
(motivated by money).  Many employees did not believe they had been treated fairly to a 
great extent regarding career advancement and awards (fair treatment on the job).  
Employees did not think their supervisor would behave in a fair and effective manner to a 
great extent when rating job applicant qualifications and selecting people for vacancies or 
promotions (supervisory fairness).  Not enough employees thought their organization 
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took steps to ensure that employees were appropriately paid and rewarded 
(organizational culture).  These individual scorecard items represent important obstacles 
to pay for performance success that must be overcome.   
 Sixteen additional scorecard items received failing scores under the pass/fail 
system only, placing all remaining pay for performance criteria in the red/failure zone.  
Only a minority percentage of managers felt they had adequate funds or sufficient 
authority to reward high performance (budget adequacy and sufficient managerial 
authority).  Not enough employees believed that they would receive a cash award or pay 
increase for good performance (pay for performance belief), basing pay on performance 
would encourage teamwork or increase morale (pay for performance expectations), or 
that performance ratings accurately reflected job performance and that employees 
participated in setting standards used to evaluate job performance (performance 
evaluation system).  Less than 51 percent of employees felt they were treated fairly to a 
great extent regarding training and pay (fair treatment on the job).  A majority of 
employees did not believe their supervisor would help them improve their skills and 
performance, be held accountable for rating employee performance fairly and accurately, 
and respond constructively to workplace conflicts (quality of supervision).  Upper 
management was not trusted by a majority of employees to fairly assess employee 
performance, apply discipline fairly, or refrain from favoritism (trust in decision-makers).  
Not enough employees felt recognition and rewards were based on performance 
(organizational culture).  Because these individual scorecard items failed to receive a 
majority of favorable responses, they deserve special attention to prevent them from 
becoming major barriers to pay for performance success.   
 Table 7.  Sensitivity Analysis Comparison of Pay for Performance Problem Areas 
 
Pay for Performance Criteria Problem Areas (Red/Failure Zones) Equal Zones 
Graduated 
Zones 
Pass/Fail  
System 
Budget Adequacy Managers believe their organization has sufficient funds Yellow Yellow FAIL 
  to appropriately reward high performance.       
          
Sufficient Managerial Authority Managers believe they have enough authority to reward  Yellow Yellow FAIL 
  high performance through pay increases or awards.       
          
Motivated by Money Importance of a $100 cash award in motivating Yellow RED FAIL 
  employees to do a good job.       
          
Pay for Performance Belief Employee belief that they will receive a cash award or Yellow Yellow FAIL 
  pay increase for good performance.       
          
Pay for Performance 
Expectations Employee belief that basing pay on performance  Yellow Yellow FAIL 
  encourages teamwork.       
          
Pay for Performance 
Expectations Employee belief that basing pay on performance  RED RED FAIL
  would not result in unfair treatment of employees.       
          
Pay for Performance 
Expectations Employee belief that basing pay on performance  Yellow Yellow FAIL 
  increases employee morale.       
          
Pay for Performance 
Expectations Employee belief that basing pay on performance would RED RED FAIL
  not increase employee vulnerability to political coercion.       
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Table 7 (continued) 
 
Pay for Performance Criteria Problem Areas (Red/Failure Zones) Equal Zones 
Graduated 
Zones 
Pass/Fail  
System 
Performance Evaluation System Performance ratings accurately reflect job performance. Yellow Yellow FAIL 
          
Performance Evaluation System Employee participation in setting standards and goals Yellow Yellow FAIL 
  used to evaluate job performance.       
          
Fair Treatment on the Job Extent to which employees believe they have been Yellow RED FAIL 
  treated fairly regarding career advancement?       
          
Fair Treatment on the Job Extent to which employees believe they have been Yellow RED FAIL 
  treated fairly regarding awards?       
          
Fair Treatment on the Job Extent to which employees believe they have been Yellow Yellow FAIL 
  treated fairly regarding training?       
          
Fair Treatment on the Job Extent to which employees believe they have been Yellow Yellow FAIL 
  treated fairly regarding pay?       
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Table 7 (continued) 
 
Pay for Performance 
Criteria Problem Areas (Red/Failure Zones) 
Equal 
Zones 
Graduated 
Zones 
Pass/Fail  
System 
Supervisory Fairness Extent to which employees think their supervisor will  Yellow RED FAIL 
  rate job applicant qualifications in a fair and effective       
  manner.        
          
Supervisory Fairness Extent to which employees think their supervisor will Yellow RED FAIL 
  select people for vacancies or promotions based on their       
  qualifications in a fair and effective manner.       
          
Supervisory Fairness Extent to which employees think their supervisor will RED RED FAIL
  determine pay increases and awards in a fair and       
  effective manner.       
          
Supervisory Fairness Extent to which employees think their supervisor will  RED RED FAIL
  establish individual employee pay within broad pay bands       
  in a fair and effective manner.       
          
Supervisory Fairness Extent to which employees think their supervisor will  RED RED FAIL
  take adverse actions in a fair and effective manner.       
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Table 7 (continued) 
 
Pay for Performance 
Criteria Problem Areas (Red/Failure Zones) 
Equal 
Zones 
Graduated 
Zones 
Pass/Fail  
System 
Quality of Supervision My supervisor provides coaching, training opportunities,  Yellow Yellow FAIL 
  or other assistance to help me improve my        
  skills and performance.       
          
Quality of Supervision My supervisor is held accountable for rating employee Yellow Yellow FAIL 
  performance fairly and accurately.       
          
Quality of Supervision My supervisor deals effectively with poor performers. RED RED FAIL
          
Quality of Supervision My supervisor responds constructively to workplace Yellow Yellow FAIL 
  conflicts.       
          
Trust in Upper Management I trust managers above my immediate supervisor to Yellow Yellow FAIL 
  fairly assess my performance and contributions.       
          
Trust in Upper Management I trust managers above my immediate supervisor to Yellow Yellow FAIL 
  apply discipline fairly and only when justified.       
          
Trust in Upper Management I trust managers above my immediate supervisor to Yellow Yellow FAIL 
  refrain from favoritism.       
          
Organizational Culture Recognition and rewards are based on performance. Yellow Yellow FAIL 
          
Organizational Culture My organization takes steps to ensure that employees Yellow RED FAIL 
  are appropriately paid and rewarded.       
          
 
 
 Implications of Sensitivity Analysis 
 What do these scores mean?  The traffic light system using equal zones indicates 
that the federal government has three serious problem areas to resolve and eight areas in 
need of additional improvement before proceeding with pay for performance.  The traffic 
light system using graduated zones suggests that the federal government has six serious 
problem areas to resolve along with five areas needing improvement.  Last, the pass/fail 
system issues a fatal blow to the federal government’s pay for performance plans 
revealing little chance of success in any of the required elements.  Since results from the 
traffic light system using graduated zones are supported by two out of three scoring 
systems, this approach appears to be a reasonable choice as it represents the middle 
ground in terms of scores.  Regardless of which scoring system is used, the overall results 
from this sensitivity analysis suggest a state of pay for performance readiness has not yet 
been achieved in the federal government.  Only the degree of unreadiness varies with 
changes in the scoring system.  The message remains the same.   
What Would It Take to Get One Agency into the Green? 
 Another way to evaluate the reasonableness of a scoring system is to consider 
what it would take for a single agency to be designated in the green zone using the 
current data.  NASA was used as the test case for this experiment since it received the 
highest scorecard ranking with the most favorable scores.  This time, instead of changing 
the favorable responses required for each zone, I used the original traffic light system 
with graduated zones and identified how many scorecard rules had to be changed (i.e., 
broken) for NASA to receive green status overall.   
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 Under the new rules, pay for performance criteria are scored as follows.  A green 
criteria zone consists of at least 1 green score and no more than 1 red score allowed.  A 
yellow criteria zone contains a majority of yellow scores and no more than 1 red score 
allowed.  A red criteria zone means there are 2 or more red scores for multi-item criteria.  
This system of scoring essentially allows green and yellow scores to cancel out the 
effects of a single red score, so the highest score received on any individual item 
determines the zone for the whole criteria.   
 In terms of overall agency ratings, the new rules follow a similar pattern.  A green 
agency rating consists of 5 or more green criteria zones and no more than 1 red criteria 
zone allowed.  A yellow agency rating contains at least 8 yellow criteria zones and no 
more than 1 red criteria zone.  A red agency rating consists of 2 or more red criteria 
zones.  Criteria zones for budget adequacy and sufficient managerial authority are 
reported but not counted towards the agency rating for reasons mentioned previously.    
 Using the traffic light system with graduated zones under new rules, NASA 
emerged as the only federal agency with a green rating.  Under the new scoring system, 
NASA received 5 green criteria zones (pay for performance expectations, performance 
evaluation system, quality of supervision, trust in decision-makers, and organizational 
culture), 5 yellow criteria zones (budget adequacy, sufficient managerial authority, 
motivated by money, pay for performance belief, and fair treatment on the job), and 1 red 
criteria zone (supervisory fairness).  The Department of Homeland Security remained in 
last place with 4 yellow and 7 red criteria zones.  The most disturbing finding, however, 
is the agency that almost reached green status under these new scoring rules.  Within the 
Department of Defense, the Air Force received 4 green criteria, 4 yellow criteria, and  
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2 red criteria that count (1 red that doesn’t count under sufficient managerial authority).  
According to the new rules, the Air Force is only 1 green criteria away from being totally 
in the green.  Since the Defense Department’s pay for performance program has already 
failed, this result demonstrates the need for stricter scoring rules to be enforced.   
Is the Federal Government Ready for Pay for Performance? 
 Judging from the results of this study, the federal government isn’t ready to adopt 
pay for performance.  Equally important is the finding that the degree of pay for 
performance readiness varies greatly by federal agency.  While some federal agencies are 
more ready than others, none are sufficiently prepared to embark on a successful path 
towards pay for performance.  Because agencies differ in so many ways including 
mission, leadership, resources, organizational culture, workforce demographics, and work 
environment, it is critical to acknowledge agency differences when making decisions 
about pay for performance.   
 The federal government should resist the urge to adopt pay for performance on a 
governmentwide basis and steer clear of the “one best way” of doing things approach 
which has hindered previous reform efforts (Hays & Kearney, 2003, pp. 12-13).  Instead, 
each federal agency should be allowed to decide for itself whether pay for performance is 
right for them.  To help them make an informed decision, agencies can use this scorecard 
as a first step towards evaluating their pay for performance readiness.  “Although paying 
for performance requires attention to an extensive list of serious issues, considering them 
in advance of implementation enables organizations to lay the groundwork for a 
successful performance-based compensation system” (U.S. MSPB, 2006, p. 34).  Once 
the decision has been made to adopt pay for performance, the level of agency variation 
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presented in this study suggests that pay for performance should be tailored to fit each 
agency’s mission and needs.  Just as pay for performance is not suited for every 
organization, a single pay for performance model will not fit everyone either.  Only by 
customizing to meet agency needs, knowing what is required in advance, and laying a 
proper foundation beforehand, will pay for performance ever have a fighting chance for 
success.   
Conclusion 
 The federal government is undergoing dramatic changes in how it manages 
human resources.  Transforming the federal civil service from a seniority-based pay 
system with a process-oriented culture into a performance-based pay system with a 
results-oriented culture is a monumental undertaking that won’t be quick or easy to 
accomplish.  The manner in which pay for performance is handled during this time – 
particularly, decisions about whether to adopt it on a governmentwide basis or an 
individual agency basis, how best to prepare for and implement it, and how fast to 
proceed with changes throughout the process – will largely determine its success or 
failure.   
 One major lesson to be learned from this study is that pay for performance 
requires a lot more than just legislation and appropriations to succeed.  Pay for 
performance needs a whole host of elements working together to sustain it.  Before 
rushing to adopt pay for performance on a governmentwide basis, each federal agency 
should first evaluate its readiness status to determine their realistic chances of pay for 
performance success.   
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 Does the agency have adequate resources, political support and sufficient 
managerial authority to reward high performance in a substantial and consistent manner?  
Is money highly valued as a motivational incentive for improved performance among 
federal employees?  Are employees supportive in their pay for performance beliefs, 
expectations, and attitudes?  Does the agency have a fair and accurate performance 
evaluation system that can support pay for performance?  Do employees believe they are 
treated fairly in all areas of employment?  Are employees confident that supervisory 
decisions regarding pay, awards, and promotions will be conducted in a fair and effective 
manner?  Does the agency have high quality supervisors who are willing and able to 
differentiate between levels of performance and allocate performance awards 
accordingly?  Are supervisors capable of dealing effectively with poor performers?   
Do employees have a high degree of trust in their decision-makers?  Does the agency 
have a supportive and performance-based organizational culture?  Results from this study 
show that the federal government doesn’t have the necessary foundation in place for pay 
for performance to succeed.  Agencies must recognize the inherent danger of moving 
forward with pay for performance without having all of the critical elements in place as a 
strategy which is capable of doing more harm than good.   
 This study highlights the importance of establishing a solid base of employee 
support prior to pay for performance implementation.  Gaining employee support should 
be considered a necessity rather than a luxury, because pay for performance cannot 
succeed without willing participants.  As scholars have noted: “While the failure of 
planned organizational change may be due to many factors, few are so critical as 
employees’ attitudes towards the change event” (Jones et al., 2005, p. 362).   
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 Results from this scorecard show that the prerequisite level of employee support 
is lacking throughout the federal government in every pay for performance criteria for 
success. 
• Less than half of federal supervisors say they have adequate funding and 
sufficient managerial authority to reward high performance. 
• Federal employees consider a $100 cash award as the least important factor 
motivating better performance (12th place) and increasing the cash award to 
$1,000 only improves its motivational ranking to 7th place. 
• In the race to garner employee belief in the promise of pay for performance, the 
government has only made believers out of 41.5 percent of federal employees, 
while a third remain nonbelievers, and the rest are still on the fence. 
• Employee concerns about unfair treatment persist across three pay for 
performance criteria: pay for performance expectations, fair treatment on the job, 
and supervisory fairness.  Between 34.4 and 44.7 percent of federal employees 
have fearful expectations that pay for performance will result in unfair treatment 
and will increase employee vulnerability to political coercion.  Perceived 
unfairness continues into fair treatment on the job where less than 40 percent of 
federal employees report being fairly treated regarding awards and career 
advancement.  Supervisory decision-making receives the worst levels of 
perceived unfairness as federal employees clearly lack confidence that their 
supervisors will treat them fairly in matters of pay, awards, adverse actions, and 
promotions. 
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• The federal government’s performance evaluation system receives high marks for 
explaining the rules to employees but lower marks for using objective 
performance measures, employee participation in setting performance standards, 
and having performance ratings that accurately reflect job performance. 
• When evaluated by employees, federal supervisors are viewed as technically 
qualified but lacking in managerial skills, better at providing feedback than 
helping employees improve performance, able to rate performance fairly and 
accurately though not held accountable for doing so, struggling to respond 
constructively to workplace conflicts, and failing to deal effectively with poor 
performers.   
• Between 42 and 71 percent of federal employees trust all decision-makers with 
immediate supervisors receiving higher levels of trust than upper management.  
However, employees remain concerned that decision-makers cannot be trusted to 
refrain from favoritism.   
• Federal employees report having an organizational culture where people are 
treated with respect, work units respond flexibly to changing conditions, a spirit 
of cooperation and teamwork exists, information is shared freely, and employee 
opinions count.  Still more work is needed to create a performance-based 
organizational culture within the federal government since less than half of 
federal employees (45.1 percent) believe recognition and rewards are based on 
performance and even fewer (37.9 percent) think their agency is committed to 
ensuring that employees are appropriately paid and rewarded. 
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 Too often, employee opinions are overlooked or undervalued when policy 
decisions are being made.  Such a mistake can be fatal to a pay for performance program.  
Federal agencies must adequately address employee opinions and areas of concern, while 
paying particular attention to persistent negative employee perceptions throughout the 
pay for performance process (U.S. GAO, 2008).  Only by listening to employee concerns 
and correcting problem areas before implementation can agencies hope to achieve the 
level of readiness and employee support that pay for performance demands.   
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CHAPTER 4 
PROMOTING GREATER PRODUCTIVITY 
 
 In 1978, President Jimmy Carter signed into law the Civil Service Reform Act in 
the hopes of achieving better government through better management (U.S. OPM, 1980).  
Out of nine merit principles established by the law to govern federal personnel 
management (Public Law No. 95-454, 92 Statute III), the fifth merit principle mandates 
the efficient and effective use of the federal workforce.  In 1982, the U.S. MSPB 
conducted a study of federal employee productivity to search for what they called “the 
elusive bottom line.”  More than 30 years later, scholars and government experts alike are 
still searching for answers to federal productivity questions.  
 Declining confidence in government and reduced budgets have increased 
demands for improved productivity (Berman et al., 2010, pp. 6-9).  Yet years of research 
have not found any “simple direct paths to productivity and performance in public 
organizations” (Holzer & Lee, 2004a, p.  2).  Some of the most common approaches to 
productivity improvement include capital investments, organizational restructuring, 
privatization, work methods improvements, and human resource development measures 
(Berman, 1998, 2006; Holzer, 1992; Holzer & Callahan, 1998; Holzer & Lee, 2004b; 
Swiss, 1991; U.S. GAO, 1978, 1987).  Although capital investments have been the 
greatest source of productivity improvements in both the public and private sectors 
(Swiss, 1991), they require substantial amounts of money.  In light of scarce government 
resources, many experts recommend focusing improvement efforts on better management 
 133
of human capital (Agor, 1997; Daley, 2006; McGregor, 1988; U.S. GAO, 1987, 2001a, 
2004b).   
 Emphasizing productivity through people is a common strategy which recognizes 
that people ultimately determine the level of productivity in any organization (Berman, 
1998, 2006; Guy, 2004; Holzer & Lee, 2004b; Peters & Waterman, 1982).  Enhancing 
productivity through people involves motivating employees by treating them with respect 
and encouraging greater participation in the workplace (Rainey, 2009).  Peters and 
Waterman (1982) found that the most successful organizations treat employees as the 
main source of productivity gains (p. 14).  They further note, “if you want productivity 
…, you must treat your workers as your most important asset” (Peters & Waterman, 
1982, p. 238).  Years later at the Wye River Conference (June 1999), public sector 
scholars and practitioners echoed the same sentiment by stressing the importance of 
“viewing federal employees as a human capital investment … as assets rather than as just 
necessary costs to be controlled” (Ingraham, Selden & Moynihan, 2000, p. 59).  
Government experts agreed, as demonstrated by U.S. GAO’s designation of “strategic 
human capital management” as a governmentwide high-risk area, recognizing its critical 
importance to an agency’s ability to achieve its mission (U.S. GAO, 2001a, p. 8).   
 While federal agencies are constantly searching for ways to promote productivity 
with existing resources, few studies have explored the determinants of productivity as 
seen through the eyes of government employees.  My research attempts to fill this gap by 
developing a model that predicts productivity levels in the federal workplace.  Drawing 
on government and academic studies, I identify key factors that are expected to motivate 
greater employee productivity.  Next, I analyze responses from the Merit Principles 
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Survey of 2000 to see if federal employees are getting what they need to be productive in 
the workplace.  Using multiple regression analysis, I determine which factors have the 
greatest impact on federal productivity.  Finally, I discuss the implications of my findings 
regarding the potential for productivity improvement throughout the federal government.   
Factors Affecting Productivity 
 Creating workplace conditions that promote productivity7 requires a combination 
of factors (Holzer & Lee, 2004b).  While certain elements require a commitment of 
resources (e.g., office equipment, sufficient employees, formal training, and monetary 
performance awards), others depend more on the relationship between management and 
workers and how well managers perform their duties in the eyes of employees.  This 
study examines possible determinants of federal productivity in areas that managers can 
influence.   
Adequate Resources and Training 
 Adequate resources are essential to the creation of a highly productive work 
environment (Guy, 1992b, 2004; Holzer & Lee, 2004b; Poister, 2003; Rainey, 2001).  
Resources such as sufficient employees, equipment, funding, and technology enable 
workers to achieve productivity goals (Guy, 2004).  While public managers cannot 
control the amount of funding or number of employees assigned to their organization, 
they can control how effectively those resources are utilized (U.S. MSPB, 2008b).   
                                                 
 
 
7 While the terms productivity and performance are often used interchangeably, this study defines 
productivity as an important performance criteria (Rainey, 2009) that combines efficiency, effectiveness, 
and economy (or cost-effectiveness) into a single dimension (Poister, 2003).   
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In spite of difficulties obtaining adequate resources in times of economic stress, “budget 
constraints should not be viewed as an insurmountable obstacle to needed human capital 
reform” (U.S. GAO, 2007, p. 2).  Instead, tighter budgets should encourage agencies to 
prioritize their needs and allocate their resources more carefully in order to achieve their 
missions (U.S. GAO, 2007).  Optimizing the use of existing resources (i.e., getting the 
most out of them) is necessary to achieve efficiency and productivity gains (Halachmi, 
2004; Lam, 2003). 
 Central to strategic human capital management is the view that people are “assets 
whose value to an organization can be enhanced through investment” (U.S. GAO, 2004a, 
p. 1).  Scholars and government experts recognize the importance of training and 
development to help employees become productive organizational members and help 
retain productive employees interested in acquiring new skills for career advancement 
(Berman et al., 2010; U.S. GAO, 2009).  Public agencies need to invest greater resources 
in training and development to ensure that employees have the knowledge, skills, and 
abilities needed to keep pace with the demands of a rapidly changing environment 
(Nigro, Nigro, & Kellough, 2007; U.S. GAO, 2004b).  Unfortunately, “public employers 
have a long history of failing … to make sustained investments in the training and 
development of their workforces” (Nigro et al., 2007, p. 325).  Despite budget 
limitations, employee training and development can still be accomplished using methods 
that do not require additional funding, such as on-the-job training, rotational assignments, 
coaching, and mentoring (Cayer, 2004; U.S. GAO, 2004a).   
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Work Motivation 
 Motivation is crucial to employee productivity and plays a central role in human 
resource management (Berman et al., 2010).  Motivation is defined as “the drive or 
energy that compels people to act, with energy and persistence, toward some goal” 
(Berman et al., 2010, p. 180).  Because productivity and motivation are closely linked, 
“when people lack motivation, productivity suffers” (Berman, 1998, p. 40).  By contrast, 
“when people have motivation, they work with energy, enthusiasm, and initiative” 
(Berman et al., 2010, p. 181).  The challenge for managers is to find ways that motivate 
employees to be more productive.   
 While no single, unifying theory of work motivation accounts for all the behavior 
found in the workplace, a variety of theories are relevant to productivity (Pinder, 1998, 
2008).  According to Herzberg and associates (Herzberg, 1966; Herzberg et al., 1959), 
higher levels of motivation result from jobs that offer interesting work, give employees a 
sense of responsibility over their work, provide opportunities and recognition for 
achievement, and foster feelings of growth through advancement (Pinder, 1998).  
Motivation factors such as responsibility, achievement, recognition, advancement, 
personal growth, and intrinsic value of the work itself collectively motivate employees to 
improve productivity (Herzberg et al., 1959).  Similarly, Hackman and Oldham’s (1980) 
job characteristics theory states that jobs providing a sense of meaning, usefulness, 
interesting work through varied activities, personal responsibility for work, greater 
autonomy or flexibility in performing work, significance of work contributions, and 
knowledge of the results of work efforts, will intrinsically motivate employees (Miner, 
2005; Pinder, 2008).   
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Employee Engagement 
 The study of employee engagement has recently flourished among business, 
government, and academic scholars (Daley, 2008; Erickson, 2004; Gubman, 2004; 
Harter, Schmidt, & Hayes, 2002; Jamrog, 2004; Kowske, Lundby, & Rasch, 2009; Perrin, 
2003; Schneider, Macey, Barbera, & Martin, 2009; Trahant, 2007; U.S. MSPB, 2008b, 
2009).  Employee engagement is defined as “a heightened connection between employees 
and their work, their organization, or the people they work for or with” (U.S. MSPB, 
2008b, p. i).  Engaged employees feel their work is interesting and meaningful, take pride 
in their work and workplace, think their organization’s mission is important, have 
opportunities to perform well at work, believe their contributions are valued, and are 
highly motivated to perform at their best (U.S. MSPB, 2008b, 2009).  Research 
consistently shows higher levels of employee engagement are linked to favorable 
organizational outcomes such as increased productivity and reduced turnover (Harter et 
al., 2002; Perrin, 2003; U.S. MSPB, 2008b).  One government study found engaged 
employees used less sick leave, worked in agencies that produced better program results, 
and were less intent on leaving their current agency (U.S. MSPB, 2008b).  In a relatively 
short time, employee engagement has “emerged as one of the most vital concepts 
underlying workforce motivation and productivity” (Gubman, 2004, p. 42).   
Rewards 
 Rewards are an integral part of public sector productivity and improvement 
efforts (Holzer & Lee, 2004b).  The motivating principles underlying effective reward 
systems are based on three work motivation theories: expectancy (Vroom, 1964), equity 
(Adams, 1965), and reinforcement (Skinner, 1953, 1969).  Vroom’s expectancy theory 
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(1964) suggests that individuals will be motivated to perform better if they believe 
improved performance is possible and that it will lead to valued rewards.   
This means that a clear connection between behavior and rewards must be established in 
order to achieve the desired outcome (Lawler, 2000b, 2003; Rynes et al., 2005; Swiss, 
2005).  According to equity theory (Adams, 1965), employees assess their own work 
efforts and rewards compared to others and adjust their work behavior to reduce any 
perceived inequities in the workplace.  Hence, reward systems must be implemented 
fairly and viewed as fair by employees in order to motivate the desired behavior 
(Berman, 1998; Berman et al., 2010; Lawler, 2000b, 2003; Swiss, 2005).  Reinforcement 
theory (Skinner, 1953, 1969) suggests that behavior is a function of its consequences 
which means behavior tends to be repeated if it leads to a positive outcome and avoided if 
it leads to a negative outcome.  For this reason, it’s vital that reward systems consistently 
deliver the rewards (and sanctions) that are promised (Swiss, 2005).   
 To stimulate greater productivity, a reward system should offer different types of 
incentives in order to satisfy an increasingly diverse workforce (Lawler, 2000b).  One 
key principle of motivation is that people are motivated by different wants, needs, and 
preferences and those needs vary over time (Berman, 2006; Berman et al., 2010; Cayer, 
2004).  In order to attract, motivate, and retain a diverse workforce, employers should 
give workers a choice in the type of rewards they receive (Lawler, 2000a).  The best 
approach to take where incentives are concerned is to offer a wide range of options to 
accommodate as many people as possible and increase the potential range of motivational 
impact (Berman et al., 2010; Cayer, 2004).   
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 Money is a powerful motivating tool in the workplace (Bartol & Locke, 2000; 
Berman et al., 2010; Gerhart & Rynes, 2003; Lawler, 1971, 2000a; Locke et al., 1980; 
Jenkins et al., 1998; Perry, 2003).  Organizations have traditionally used financial 
incentives to improve performance and productivity (Perry, Mesch, & Paarlberg, 2006).  
But money isn’t the only thing that motivates employees.  People are motivated by a 
variety of factors that include both monetary and nonmonetary incentives (Lawler, 
2000b).  Berman (2006, p. 129) lists 29 “alternative rewards” that don’t involve pay 
raises, bonuses, or promotions (e.g., choice of job assignment, conference travel, new 
office furniture, or time-off).  Because public managers have less control over their 
budgets and more restrictive personnel practices, they should take full advantage of 
nonmonetary rewards (Berman, 2006; U.S. MSPB, 2006).   
Quality of Work Life 
 Improving the quality of work life through family-friendly programs is one 
common method used to enhance work motivation (Rainey, 2009).  Organizations have 
begun expanding their reward systems beyond traditional financial incentives to include 
“learning and development, challenging and satisfying work, work-life balance, and a 
supportive work environment” in the hopes of attracting, developing, and retaining a 
high-quality workforce (U.S. OPM, 2002, p.  6).  Scholars and government experts 
recommend the use of family-friendly programs – namely, flexible work hours, child and 
elder care services, teleworking, and family leave programs – to help employees achieve 
greater work-life balance and help employers attract and retain valuable workers (Berman 
et al., 2010; Guy & Newman, 2005; Landy & Conte, 2010; Nigro et al., 2007; Roberts, 
2004; U.S. GAO, 2003a; U.S. OPM, 2000, 2002).  Studies show that family-friendly 
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program availability is related to improvements in productivity (Eaton, 2003; Facer & 
Wadsworth, 2008; Lynch, Eisenberger, & Armeli, 1999), performance (Gajendran & 
Harrison, 2007; Lynch et al., 1999), organizational commitment (Eaton, 2003), and work-
family conflict (Facer & Wadsworth, 2008; Gajendran & Harrison, 2007; Shockley & 
Allen, 2007).  Managing a diverse public workforce and offering family-friendly work 
arrangements “have become important factors in recruitment and retention strategies, as 
well as being significant considerations in efforts to increase productivity” (Nigro et al., 
2007, p. 15). 
Performance Management 
 Management practices have the capacity to motivate employees, influence 
productivity, and impact overall performance (Brewer, 2005; Cayer, 2004; Hall, 1994; 
Holzer & Lee, 2004b; Nigro et al., 2007; Rainey, 2009; U.S. MSPB, 2008a).  Supervisors 
are critical to productivity (U.S. MSPB, 2008a) and play an important role in determining 
individual and organizational performance (Brewer, 2005, 2006; Cayer, 2004).  
“Supervisory management is an important determinant of high performance in federal 
agencies” (Brewer, 2006, p. 35).  Several competencies are essential to effective 
supervision including: managing and allocating resources; providing opportunities for 
training and career development; establishing good working relationships with 
employees; keeping employees informed about matters affecting their work; planning, 
assigning, and prioritizing work; providing technical expertise; evaluating performance 
fairly and accurately; providing constructive feedback about job performance; 
recognizing and rewarding top performers; and taking appropriate steps to deal with poor 
performers (Berman, 2006; Cayer, 2004; Guy, 1992a, 2004; Landy & Conte, 2010).  
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Because public managers face additional challenges in the workplace, they “must work 
smarter to ensure productivity … [by] … establishing and nurturing productive work 
environments” (Guy, 1992b, p. 321).   
 Despite the importance of supervisory management, “effective supervision … 
remains elusive” in the public sector (U.S. MSPB, 2008a, p. ii).  The federal 
government’s human capital crisis has been developing for years and received much 
attention (Brewer, 2005, 2006; Lane & Wolf, 1990; Lewis, 1991; Liebowitz, 2004;  
U.S. GAO, 2000, 2002; U.S. MSPB, 2003; Volcker, 1989).  Experts recognize poor 
supervisory performance as being part of the problem, making the federal human capital 
crisis even worse (Brewer, 2006; Light, 2002; NAPA, 2003; U.S. MSPB, 2003, 2008a; 
U.S. OPM, 2001; Volcker, 2003).  Federal employees consistently report their 
supervisors as having good technical skills but poor management skills, with only 
marginal improvement in ratings of supervisory management over the last 20 years  
(U.S. MSPB, 2008a).  Poor supervision is costly as it leads to decreased productivity and 
job performance, lower morale and work quality, greater absenteeism and turnover, 
difficulties retaining the best employees, and more grievances and conflicts in the 
workplace (NAPA, 2003, 2004b; U.S. MSPB, 1989; U.S. OPM, 2001).   
 Federal supervisors do an especially bad job of handling poor performers  
(U.S. MSPB, 1999; U.S. OPM, 1999).  The federal government has a poor track record of 
dealing (or failing to deal effectively) with poor performers (Lee, Cayer, & Lan, 2006; 
U.S. GAO, 1990b, 2005a; U.S. MSPB, 1995, 1999, 2008a; U.S. OPM, 1999).  One 
disturbing finding was that federal managers perceive that doing nothing about poor 
performance imposes little cost (U.S. MSPB, 1995).  However, both theory and practice 
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suggest otherwise.  Giving the same pay and rewards to top and poor performers creates a 
sense of inequity (Adams, 1965), which tends to demoralize and demotivate the best 
performers (Thompson & Rainey, 2003).  Moreover, there’s little incentive for 
employees to work more productively unless there are different consequences associated 
with different productivity levels (Skinner, 1969).  Failure to deal effectively with even a 
small percentage of poor performers “can have a disproportionately large and negative 
effect on an organization” (U.S. MSPB, 1999, p. 7).   
Perceived Fairness 
 Fair treatment is an important concept in work motivation theory and research 
(Pinder, 2008).  “People like to be treated fairly in their exchanges with one another and 
develop norms concerning what is fair and what is unfair treatment” (Pinder, 2008, p. 
311).  Perceptions of fairness influence many key attitudes and behaviors in the 
workplace (Gilliland & Langdon, 1998; Landy & Conte, 2010; Pinder, 2008).  Fair 
treatment can lead to increased trust in supervisors, organizational commitment, and job 
satisfaction (Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997).  Employee views about fair treatment also 
affect job performance, organizational citizenship, trust in the organization, and 
withdrawal behaviors such as absenteeism and turnover (Colquitt et al., 2001).   
 Employee reactions to organizational decisions depend not only on the outcome 
of the decision (i.e., receiving a reward or promotion), but also on the perceived fairness 
of the decision-making process (Folger & Greenberg, 1985; Greenberg, 1987a, 1987b, 
1990, 1996) and on the interpersonal treatment employees receive throughout the process 
(Bies, 2001; Bies & Moeg, 1986; Colquitt et al., 2005).  A perception of unfair treatment 
occurs when decisions violate a workers’ sense of distributive, procedural, or 
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interactional justice (Colquitt et al., 2005).  Thus, from a justice perspective, employees 
who feel they aren’t treated fairly in the workplace have little reason to be more 
productive.   
Organizational Culture 
 Organizational culture8 plays a key role in determining productivity (Holzer & 
Lee, 2004b; Ott & Baksh, 2005).  Culture refers to the shared beliefs, values, norms, and 
assumptions held by organizational members (Berman, 2003; Ott, 1989; Schein, 2004), 
and is known to influence employee behavior in the workplace (Kaufman, 1960; Schein, 
1992).  A productive work environment motivates and challenges employees to perform 
at their best (Guy, 2004).  Important elements of organizational culture identified in the 
public sector include valuing employee opinions, treating people with respect, sharing 
information freely, having a flexible workplace, and promoting a spirit of teamwork and 
cooperation (Brewer, 2005, 2006; Brewer & Selden, 2000; DiIulio, 1994; Gore, 1993; 
Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; Rainey & Steinbauer, 1999).  Organizational performance is 
higher in federal agencies with cultures that empower employees by valuing their input, 
taking their contributions seriously, and treating people with respect (Brewer & Selden, 
2000).  For years, scholars and government experts have commented on the need for and 
lack of organizational cultures within the federal government that promote high 
performance and accountability for results (Kettl et al., 1996; U.S. GAO, 2001b, 2003b, 
2005b; Volcker, 1989).  Overall, “productivity is enhanced when the work environment 
                                                 
 
 
8 There is an ongoing debate about whether organizational culture and climate are different concepts.  See 
Landy & Conte (2010) and Pinder (2008) for a discussion on this subject.  For the purpose of this 
dissertation, I assume they are the same. 
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is supportive and nurturing, where employees feel they are valued and respected as an 
individual, and where their contributions are appreciated” (U.S. MSPB, 1993, p. xii).   
 To summarize, federal productivity is expected to be influenced by a number of 
factors that are all within management’s realm of control.  The literature suggests several 
links between work motivation factors and productivity which will be tested empirically 
in the next section.  Specifically, this study investigates the following six hypotheses: 
 Hypothesis 1:  Having adequate resources, sufficient employees, and  
    necessary training to do a job well will promote greater productivity.   
 
 Hypothesis 2:  A higher degree of employee engagement in their  
    work is associated with higher levels of productivity. 
 
 Hypothesis 3:  Offering employees a variety of rewards for better 
    performance and enhancing their quality of work life through 
    family-friendly programs will lead to increased productivity. 
 
 Hypothesis 4:  Effective performance management – in terms of  
    supervisory competence, performance evaluation, and handling of 
    poor performers – will have a positive effect on productivity.   
 
 Hypothesis 5:  Employee perceptions of fair treatment on the job 
    regarding promotions, awards, training, performance appraisals,  
    discipline, and job assignments, will have a positive impact on  
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    productivity. 
 
 Hypothesis 6:  Having a supportive organizational culture –  
    characterized by sharing information freely, valuing employee  
    opinions, a spirit of cooperation and teamwork, flexibility in  
    accomplishing work, treating people with respect, employee  
    participation in planning work, merit-based recognition and rewards, 
    and satisfaction with recognition – will promote greater productivity. 
 
Which factors significantly help or hinder federal productivity?  Are all of these factors 
equally important or do some matter more than others?  What areas need the greatest 
improvement?  A look at the Merit Principles Survey of 2000 will help provide answers 
to these questions.   
Data and Methods 
 The U.S. MSPB’s Merit Principles Survey, conducted in spring 2000, asked 
federal employees a variety of questions about their jobs, supervisors, work motivation, 
performance management, rewards, quality of work life, turnover intentions, work 
environment, and productivity levels.  Using a stratified random sample, U.S. MSPB 
surveyed 17,250 full-time permanent civilian employees from the federal workforce of 
over 1.5 million employees in 22 executive branch agencies (excluding the U.S. Postal 
Service and various intelligence agencies).  A total of 6,958 respondents completed this 
survey for a 43 percent response rate.  I restricted the sample to white-collar employees in 
the GS pay system and members of the Senior Executive Service, which decreased the 
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sample size to 5,958.9  Missing values lowered the usable sample to 3,911.10  All 
statistics were weighted using U.S. MSPB’s sampling weights to make the data more 
representative of the overall white-collar federal workforce. 
Dependent Variable 
 The Merit Principles Survey of 2000 provides several measures of productivity.  
Question 59 asked federal employees to rate the overall productivity of themselves, their 
work units, and their organizations on a 10-point scale.  Answers ranged from 1 for “Not 
at all Productive” to 10 for “Extremely Productive.”  I created an indexed variable that 
combines all three dimensions of self, work unit, and organizational productivity to 
construct an overall perception of productivity (range = 3 to 30; mean = 23.64).  The 
resulting index has factor loadings between .77 and .90 and yields a Cronbach’s alpha 
reliability coefficient of .76. 
Independent Variables 
 With the exception of individual attributes, most of the independent variables are 
from questions measured on 5-point Likert-type scales, with responses coded as 1 for 
"Strongly Disagree,"  2 for "Disagree,"  3 for "Neither Agree Nor Disagree,"  4 for 
"Agree," and  5 for "Strongly Agree."  For some independent variables, the survey asked 
several questions on similar topics, allowing for the development of more reliable 
measures of the concepts than would be possible using single questions.  To develop 
                                                 
 
 
9 My reduced sample eliminated 850 respondents including 683 blue-collar employees in the “wage grade” 
pay category and 167 employees in “other” pay categories.   
10 For all indexed independent variables, missing values were replaced with the mean for that index.  
Observations were not included if the respondent failed to answer two or more questions within an indexed 
variable. 
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these measures, I grouped the questions that best captured my theoretical concepts and 
then used principal components factor analysis to be sure all questions were measuring 
similar concepts.  The Cronbach’s alpha, which measures scale reliability from 0 to 1, is 
presented for each indexed variable.  This study only includes indexed variables with a 
minimum alpha of .70 which is the threshold suggested by Nunnally (1978).  Grouping of 
variables is consistent with previous research using U.S. MSPB survey data (e.g., Brewer, 
2005, 2006; Brewer & Selden, 2000).  Table 8 shows how the variables are 
operationalized and provides descriptive statistics for each. 
 Resources and training are measured by three questions that assess whether 
employees have the resources, sufficient number of employees, and training they need to 
do their job well.  Six individual items are used to evaluate employee engagement by 
measuring interesting and meaningful work, pride in the workplace, clear expectations of 
job requirements, skill utilization, and mission contribution.  All questions used 5-point 
Likert-type scales with responses ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree, except 
for mission importance which was rated on a scale from 1 to 10 (no extent to very great 
extent).  Items were included separately to distinguish their individual contributions to 
productivity.11   
 Two indexes were created to measure rewards and quality of work life.  Rewards 
linked to better performance is a 4-item index (alpha = .77) that measures the connection 
between rewards and performance.  On a scale of 1 to 5 (very unlikely to very likely), 
employees indicated how likely they were to receive various types of rewards – including 
                                                 
 
 
11 Multiple regression analysis using an indexed variable for employee engagement yielded similar results.  
The decision to include the variables separately was solely to determine their relative importance.   
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more pay, a time-off reward, a non-pay reward, and informal recognition – if they 
performed better.  Family-friendly programs is a 12-item index (alpha = .70) that 
measures the availability of various programs, such as flexible or compressed work 
schedules, part-time work, teleworking, and child care.  On a scale of 0 to 1, responses 
were coded as 0 for “Not Available” and 1 for “Available.” 
 Three indexes were created to measure performance management in the federal 
workplace.  Supervisory competence (alpha = .93) combines six questions about the 
supervisor’s management and technical skills, regard for subordinate’s welfare, feedback 
on job performance, career development support, and employee satisfaction with their 
supervisor.  Performance evaluation (alpha = .81) combines four items that assess 
whether performance standards are fair and linked to organizational goals, whether the 
performance appraisal system helps increase communications between employees and 
their supervisors, and whether the appraisal system motivates employees to do a better 
job.  Handling poor performers is a 4-item index (alpha = .90) that measures the 
supervisor’s effectiveness in dealing with poor performance and misconduct in the 
workplace.  All questions used a 5-point Likert-type scale with responses ranging from 
strongly disagree to strongly agree.   
 Fair treatment on the job consists of a 6-item index (alpha = .86) that measures 
how fairly employees have been treated in the areas of promotions, awards, training, 
performance appraisals, discipline, and job assignments.  Questions used a 5-point Likert-
type scale with responses ranging from no extent to very great extent.   
 Organizational culture is an 8-item index (alpha = .88) that measures employee 
perceptions about their work environment in terms of sharing information freely, valuing 
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employee opinions, having a spirit of cooperation and teamwork, providing flexibility in 
performing work, being treated with respect, participating in long-range planning, basing 
recognition and rewards on merit, and satisfaction with recognition received.  Questions 
used a 5-point Likert-type scale with responses ranging from strongly disagree to strongly 
agree.   
 I also control for a variety of individual attributes that may affect employee 
perceptions of federal productivity and interact with other independent variables.  
Respondent’s age, length of federal service, and education are all measured in years.  
Employee pay grades range from 1 to 16 with GS employees coded as GS-1 to GS-15 
and members of the Senior Executive Service (SES) coded as grade 16.  Dummy 
variables were created to measure the remaining attributes.  Gender was coded as 1 for 
males and 0 for females.  Race was coded as 1 for whites and 0 for minorities.  
Supervisory status was coded as 1 for supervisors and 0 for nonsupervisors.   
Regression Model 
 To test my hypotheses, I used ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and 
ordered logistic regression on my productivity index (range = 3 to 30).  Multiple 
regression analysis is appropriate when the dependent variable is continuous and OLS 
assumptions are met, while ordered logit analysis is suitable for ordinal dependent 
variables.  However, previous research suggests that OLS regression can also be used 
when an ordinal dependent variable approaches continuity (e.g., Alonso & Lewis, 2001; 
Brewer, 2005; Brewer & Selden, 2000; Dolan, 2000; Langbein & Lewis, 1998; Lewis, 
1997, 1999, 2001; Lewis & Allee, 1992; Moynihan & Pandey, 2005, 2007a, 2007b; Pitts, 
2009).  Since the results from my ordered logit analysis (not shown) revealed no 
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meaningful changes and regression diagnostics indicated no significant methodological 
issues,12 I focused my discussion on the OLS regression model because those results are 
more easily interpreted.   
Empirical Findings 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 8 presents descriptive statistics in the form of percentage response rates for 
most individual questions.  In addition, the range, weighted mean, standard deviation, and 
factor analysis results are included for each indexed variable.  Descriptive statistics allow 
managers to see how the federal workplace is viewed by employees.  These statistics 
offer a direct comparison between what the literature says employees need to be 
productive and what federal employees say they receive from their work environment.  
Wherever sizeable gaps appear, managers should target those areas as needing the most 
improvement. 
 Overall perceptions of federal productivity were fairly high among the white-
collar GS and SES employees in my study.  On a 10-point scale, productivity ratings all 
had means above 7 out of 10.  Federal employees rated their own productivity levels the 
highest (8.45 mean), followed by that of their work unit (7.90 mean), and their 
organization (7.34 mean).  Although ratings were above average, there is still room for 
productivity improvement.   
                                                 
 
 
12 Bivariate regressions and a correlation matrix showed no evidence of problematic multicollinearity 
among independent variables.   
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 The literature suggests that workers need resources and training to be productive.  
Yet employee assessments of their adequacy were mixed in these areas.  While a majority 
of federal employees say they have the resources (62.2 percent) and training (55.1 
percent) they need to do the job well, nearly one third feel that resources and training are 
lacking.  Moreover, half of federal employees feel their work unit lacks a sufficient 
number of people to do its job, while only 38.8 percent report having enough people.   
 It is theorized that employees need to be fully engaged in their work to maximize 
productivity.  If this is true, then the federal government appears to be well-positioned to 
encourage productivity.  A majority of federal employees rate their work above average 
on all six engagement factors including interesting work (66.0 percent), meaningful work 
(77.6 percent), recommending government (50.9 percent), clear expectations (81.5 
percent), skill utilization (63.3 percent), and mission contribution (7.65 mean on a 10-
point scale).   
 Research indicates that workers need to see a connection between performance 
and rewards to be motivated by incentives.  However, most federal employees report the 
link between various rewards and better performance to be virtually nonexistent.  In 
exchange for better performance, 58.8 percent of federal employees report that informal 
recognition is the most likely result.  By contrast, over half of federal employees state it is 
unlikely that they will receive more tangible rewards – in the form of more pay, time off, 
or a non-pay reward – if they perform better. 
 Studies on quality of work life emphasize the importance of giving employees 
more control over their work environment in order to help them achieve a healthy work-
life balance.  Between 61 and 89 percent of federal employees report having access to 
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flexible and compressed work schedules, sick leave for family care, leave sharing, and 
employee assistance programs.  However, a majority of federal employees (67 to 91 
percent) report not having access to other family-friendly programs, such as teleworking, 
job sharing, part-time employment, child and elder care, and commuter fare subsidies.   
 Research suggests that workers need competent supervisors with strong 
management and communication skills to be productive.  However, federal employees 
rate their immediate supervisors poorly in these areas.  A majority of federal employees 
feel their supervisor has good technical skills (61.3 percent) and looks out for the 
personal welfare of employees (56.3 percent), while less than half think their supervisor 
has good management skills (48.2 percent), keeps people informed about job 
performance (47.1), and encourages employee career development (41.8 percent).  
Overall, 58.8 percent of employees report being satisfied with their supervisor.   
 According to equity and justice theory, workers need a fair and accurate 
performance evaluation system to be productive.  While half of federal employees agree 
that performance standards are fair (54.7 percent) and linked to organizational goals (52.1 
percent), a majority do not believe that performance appraisals increase communications 
about the job with their supervisor (51.4 percent), and the largest majority report that the 
performance appraisal system fails to motivate better job performance (57.4 percent).   
 Scholars and government experts argue that poor performance must be dealt with 
effectively in order to motivate greater productivity.  Unfortunately, half of federal 
employees report that supervisors fail to deal effectively with poor performers (49.6 
percent), fail to take corrective actions when employees don’t meet performance 
standards (50.4 percent), and fail to take appropriate steps to deal with a poor performer 
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who cannot or will not improve (53.3 percent).  In addition, one third of federal 
employees are equally divided on whether their supervisor deals effectively with 
misconduct on the job, with 35.2 percent agreeing and 35.4 percent disagreeing.   
 The literature suggests that workers need to feel they are treated fairly in order to 
be productive.  Yet several areas are identified as being problematic.  Employees report 
the highest degree of fair treatment (between 50 to 56 percent) in the areas of 
performance appraisals, job assignments, and discipline, while lower levels of fairness 
(between 38 to 40 percent) are perceived in the areas of training, awards, and promotions.  
Negatively speaking, these figures identify many employees who feel they are unfairly 
treated regarding promotions (42.2 percent), awards (33.4 percent), training (26.9 
percent), job assignments and discipline (about 22 percent), and performance appraisals 
(18.0 percent).   
 Theory and research support the premise that workers are most productive when 
surrounded by a positive organizational culture.  This is partly evident by a majority of 
federal employees who agree that information is shared freely, employee opinions seem 
to count, a spirit of cooperation and teamwork exists, employees have greater flexibility 
in accomplishing work, and people are treated with respect.  However, 50.1 percent of 
federal employees say they are not allowed to participate in long-range planning for their 
work unit, 45.2 percent state that recognition and rewards are not based on merit, and 
42.4 percent are dissatisfied with the amount of recognition received for their work. 
 Table 8.  Descriptive Statistics for Federal Productivity 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES:         
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Perceived Overall Productivity      Range       Mean       Std. Dev.
(index range = 3 to 30; mean = 23.64; s.d. = 4.17) 
 
On a 10-point scale, how would you rate the overall productivity of:  
  
a.   Yourself        1 to 10        8.45  1.39  
 
b.   Your work unit       1 to 10        7.90  1.62 
 
c.   Your organization       1 to 10        7.34  1.98 
 
FACTOR ANALYSIS:  Factor loadings are between .77 and .90 with a Cronbach’s alpha of .76. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES:         
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Resources & Training              Disagree           Neither            Agree
 
I have the resources to do my job well.     26.0         11.8  62.2 
 
My work unit has a sufficient number of employees to do its job.  49.9         10.7  38.8 
 
I receive the training I need to perform my job.    27.0         17.9  55.1 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 8 (continued) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES:         
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Employee Engagement              Disagree           Neither            Agree
 
I am often bored with my job (reversed).     18.7         15.3  66.0 
The work I do is meaningful to me.      10.0         12.4  77.6 
I would recommend the Government as a place to work.   24.6         24.5  50.9 
I know what is expected of me on the job.       9.7           8.8  81.5 
My present job makes good use of my skills and abilities.   24.9         11.8  63.3 
 
Mission Contribution:        Range         Mean              Std. Dev.
To what extent do you feel the work you personally perform 
contributes to the accomplishment of your agency’s mission?  1 to 10           7.65  2.21 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Rewards Linked to Better Performance             Very or               Very or  
(index range 1 to 5; mean = 2.67; s.d. = 1.07)    somewhat unlikely     Neither    somewhat likely
 
If you perform better in your present job,  
how likely is it that you will: 
 
a.   Receive more pay       53.2         11.3  35.5 
b.   Receive a time-off award      63.6         13.2  23.2 
c.   Receive a non-pay reward      52.3         16.1  31.5 
d.   Receive informal recognition      28.8         12.4  58.8 
 
FACTOR ANALYSIS:  Factor loadings are between .75 and .84 with a Cronbach’s alpha of .77. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 8 (continued) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES:         
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Family-Friendly Programs              Not Available       Available
(index range = 0 to 1; mean = 0.43; s.d. = 0.19) 
 
Are the following programs available to you at work?        
         
a. Flexible work schedule       26.7   73.3 
b.   Compressed work schedule       38.1   61.9 
c.   Opportunity to work part-time      74.2   25.8 
d.   Opportunity for job sharing       89.8   10.2 
e.   Opportunity to telework away from main work site    80.2   19.8 
f.   Child care resource and referral services     76.5   23.5 
g.   Elder care resource and referral services     91.4     8.6 
h.   Onsite or nearby child care center      67.6   32.4 
i.   Sick leave for family care, bereavement, or adoption   11.0   89.0 
j.   Leave sharing         27.0   73.0 
k.   Commuter fare subsidies       79.8   20.2 
l.   Employee assistance programs      34.7   65.3 
 
FACTOR ANALYSIS:  Factor loadings are between .36 and .63 with a Cronbach’s alpha of .70. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 8 (continued) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES:         
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Employee Engagement              Disagree           Neither            Agree
(index range = 1 to 5; mean = 3.26; s.d. = 1.07) 
 
My supervisor has good management skills.     33.7         18.1  48.2 
 
My supervisor has good technical skills.     21.2         17.5  61.3 
 
My supervisor looks out for the personal welfare of work unit members. 25.7         18.0  56.3 
 
My supervisor keeps me informed about how well I am doing.  30.5         22.4  47.1 
 
My supervisor encourages my career development.    32.9         25.3  41.8 
 
Overall, I am satisfied with my supervisor.     23.0         18.2  58.8 
 
FACTOR ANALYSIS:  Factor loadings are between .78 and .93 with a Cronbach’s alpha of .93. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 8 (continued) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES:         
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Performance Evaluation              Disagree           Neither            Agree
(index range = 1 to 5; mean = 2.86; s.d. = 0.90) 
 
The standards used to evaluate my performance are fair.   23.5         24.4  52.1 
 
My performance standards are clearly linked to  
    my organization’s goals and objectives.     23.3         22.0  54.7 
 
The performance appraisal system has helped increase  
    communications about my job between my supervisor and me.  51.4         28.7  19.9 
 
The performance appraisal system motivates me to do a better job.  57.4         23.2  19.4 
 
FACTOR ANALYSIS:  Factor loadings are between .74 and .83 with a Cronbach’s alpha of .81. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 8 (continued) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES:         
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Handling Poor Performers              Disagree           Neither            Agree
(index range = 1 to 5; mean = 2.60; s.d. = 1.04) 
 
My supervisor deals effectively with poor performers.   49.6         28.2  22.2 
 
In my work unit, corrective actions are taken when  
    employees don’t meet performance standards.    50.4         23.5  26.0 
 
In my work unit, steps are taken to deal with a  
    poor performer who cannot or will not improve.    53.3        23.1  23.6 
 
My supervisor deals effectively with misconduct on the job.  35.4         29.4  35.2 
 
FACTOR ANALYSIS:  Factor loadings are between .83 and .89 with a Cronbach’s alpha of .90. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 8 (continued) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES:         
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Fair Treatment on the Job                      Little or       Some       Considerable or 
(index range = 1 to 5; mean = 3.22; s.d. = 0.95)                   no extent       extent    very great extent
 
In the past 2 years, to what extent do you believe 
you have been treated fairly regarding the following? 
 
a. Promotions        42.2         19.6  38.2 
 
b. Awards        33.4         26.8  39.8 
 
c. Training        26.9         32.6  40.5 
 
d. Annual performance appraisals     18.0         25.5  56.5 
 
e. Discipline        22.5         27.5  50.0 
 
f. Job assignments       22.1         23.4  54.5 
 
FACTOR ANALYSIS:  Factor loadings are between .67 and .80 with a Cronbach’s alpha of .86. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 161
 162
Table 8 (continued) 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES:         
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Organizational Culture              Disagree           Neither            Agree
(index range = 1 to 5; mean = 3.18; s.d. = 0.88) 
 
Information is shared freely in my work unit.     27.0         11.4  61.6 
 
At the place I work, my opinions seem to count.    26.6         16.8  56.6 
 
A spirit of cooperation and teamwork exists in my work unit.  26.9         17.1  56.0 
 
I have more flexibility in how I accomplish my work.   25.2         22.0  52.8 
 
I am treated with respect in my work unit.     14.7         12.7  72.6 
 
Employees participate in developing long-range plans in my work unit. 50.1         19.4  30.5 
 
Recognition and rewards are based on merit in my work unit.  45.2         19.9  34.9 
 
I am satisfied with the recognition I receive for my work.   42.4         19.7  37.9 
 
FACTOR ANALYSIS:  Factor loadings are between .62 and .83 with a Cronbach’s alpha of .88. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note.  Agreement response categories were combined as follows:  Disagree = Disagree and Strongly Disagree; Neither = Neither Agree 
Nor Disagree; and Agree = Agree and Strongly Agree.  Descriptive statistics were calculated using the U.S. MSPB sampling weight 
variable and figures are shown in percentages.  Reduced sample includes General Schedule and Senior Executive Service employees only. 
 Regression Results 
 Table 9 shows the results of a multiple regression analysis predicting federal 
productivity.  Most key variables included in this model are significant predictors of 
productivity at the .001 level.  When all of the variables are combined, the model 
explains 39 percent of the variation in productivity.  The data supports many of my 
hypotheses: four out of six hypotheses receive partial or full support and only two 
hypotheses are unsupported by these results.  After controlling for all other factors 
specified in the model, federal productivity is greatly influenced by resources and 
training, employee engagement, performance evaluation, handling of poor performers, 
and organizational culture, while rewards, quality of work life, and fair treatment on the 
job have no significant impact.13  Findings for each hypothesis are discussed below and 
beta weights14 (i.e., standardized coefficients) are examined to determine the relative 
importance of each individual factor significantly affecting productivity.   
 The data provide mixed support for Hypothesis 1.  Adequate resources and 
training have a positive and statistically significant effect on productivity (p = .001 and 
.01, respectively), while having a sufficient number of employees has no significant 
impact.  According to the beta weights, having adequate resources (.072) is the most 
influential item in this group with an impact that is 2.4 times greater than that of training 
                                                 
 
 
13 Since this study focuses on productivity factors that management can control, results for individual 
attributes (e.g., age, gender, education, federal service, race, and supervisory status) are displayed in Table 
2 but not discussed in the findings. 
14 Because unstandardized regression coefficients depend on the unit of measurement of the variables, they 
are unsuitable for determining the relative importance of individual variables within a model.  Beta weights 
standardize all variables to z scores with a mean of zero and a variance of one.  Thus, beta weights 
represent the number of standard deviations that the dependent variable will change when the independent 
variable changes by one standard deviation (or one unit), while holding all other variables constant.  This 
allows for a meaningful comparison of independent variables that are measured on very different scales. 
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(.030).  By contrast, the beta weight for having a sufficient number of employees is very 
weak (-.002) and fails to achieve statistical significance at the 95 percent confidence 
level.   
 Evidence supporting Hypothesis 2 is particularly strong, proving that a higher 
degree of employee engagement does lead to higher levels of productivity in the federal 
workplace.  Coefficients for all six engagement factors have the predicted sign with 
statistical significance between .01 and .001 and some of the highest beta weights in the 
model.  Performing work that contributes to the accomplishment of the agency’s mission 
(i.e., mission contribution) proves to be the most influential variable in the entire model.  
The beta weight shows that productivity increases by .254 standard deviations with every 
one-point increase in mission contribution, holding all other variables constant.  Within 
this group of engagement variables, the impact of mission contribution is 3.3 times 
stronger than having interesting (.077) or meaningful work (.075), 3.7 times stronger than 
recommending the government as a place to work (.069) or making good use of 
employee skills and abilities (.068), and 5.5 times stronger than knowing what’s expected 
on the job (.046).  Compared to other variables in the model, the impact of mission 
contribution on federal productivity is 1.6 times greater than handling of poor performers 
effectively (.155), 2.4 times greater than a supportive organizational culture (.105), 3.5 
times greater than adequate resources (.072), 6.8 times greater than performance 
evaluation (.037), and 8.4 times greater than having enough training (.030). 
 There is little support for Hypothesis 3 which shows that giving employees 
performance-based rewards and enhancing their quality of work life through family-
friendly programs does not lead to increased productivity.  The coefficient on rewards is 
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not statistically significant and the sign is in the opposite direction of what was expected.  
One plausible explanation is that the link between performance and rewards is too weak 
to have any discernable effect on productivity.  The coefficient for family-friendly 
programs is slightly more encouraging as it has the predicted sign but fails to achieve 
statistical significance.  In this case, it’s possible that the survey was ahead of its time 
since few family-friendly programs were available in the year 2000 when the survey was 
conducted.   
 Hypothesis 4 is partially supported by the data, suggesting that several areas of 
performance management influence greater productivity.  Performance evaluation and 
dealing effectively with poor performers both exert a positive and statistically significant 
effect on productivity (p = .01 and .001, respectively), while supervisory competence has 
no additional impact of significance.  The task of effectively handling of poor performers 
is the most influential performance management item and the second strongest predictor 
of federal productivity overall.  The beta weight shows that productivity increases by 
.155 standard deviations with every one-point increase in handling poor performers, 
holding all other variables constant.  Within the performance management group, the 
impact of handling poor performers is 4.2 times greater than that of performance 
evaluation (.037).  Unexpectedly, the beta weight for supervisory competence is very 
weak (-.007), has the wrong sign, and lacks statistical significance.  Compared to 
remaining variables in the model, the impact of handling poor performers effectively is 
1.5 times greater than having a supportive organizational culture (.105), 2.0 times greater 
than having interesting (.077) or meaningful work (.075), 2.2 times greater than 
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recommending government (.069) or skill utilization (.068), 3.3 times greater than having 
clear expectations (.046), and 5.2 times greater than having enough training (.030).  
 Hypothesis 5 fails to receive any support from this data, indicating that 
perceptions of fair treatment on the job do not significantly influence federal 
productivity.  The unstandardized coefficient for fair treatment (-.037) lacks statistical 
significance and has the opposite sign of what was expected.  Despite the insignificant 
impact of fair treatment in this productivity model, managers should nevertheless 
recognize the broader significance of perceived fairness in the workplace and continue 
efforts to create an environment where people feel they are treated fairly.   
 Last, the data provide strong support for Hypothesis 6, demonstrating that positive 
perceptions of organizational culture do promote greater productivity.  Altogether, the 
combination of sharing information freely, valuing employee opinions, exhibiting a spirit 
of cooperation and teamwork, granting flexibility in performing work, treating people 
with respect, allowing employee participation in planning work, providing merit-based 
recognition and rewards, and satisfying employees with recognition received for their 
work, has a positive and statistically significant effect on federal productivity (p = .001).  
According to the beta weight, productivity increases by .105 standard deviations with 
every one-point increase in organizational culture, holding all other variables constant.  In 
terms of its relative impact on productivity when compared to other variables in the 
model, having a supportive organizational culture is the third strongest predictor of 
federal productivity, making it 1.3 to 2.3 times stronger than employee engagement 
factors (excluding mission contribution), 1.5 times stronger than having adequate 
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resources (.072), 2.8 times stronger than performance evaluation (.037), and 3.5 times 
stronger than having enough training (.030). 
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Table 9.  Factors Affecting Federal Productivity 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                 Unstandardized                 Standard    Beta 
                             Coefficient    t Statistic    Error      Wgts 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
RESOURCES & TRAINING: 
 
  Adequate Resources .257*** 4.52 .057 .072 
 
  Sufficient Employees -.007 -0.17 .044 -.002 
 
  Enough Training .110* 1.97 .056 .030 
 
 
EMPLOYEE ENGAGEMENT: 
 
  Interesting Work .272*** 4.88 .056 .077 
 
  Meaningful Work .308*** 4.43 .070 .075 
 
  Recommend Government .244*** 4.49 .054 .069 
 
  Clear Expectations .202** 2.91 .069 .046 
 
  Skill Utilization .231*** 3.85 .060 .068 
 
  Mission Contribution .491*** 18.71 .026 .254 
 
 
REWARDS & QUALITY OF WORK LIFE: 
 
  Rewards Linked to Better Performance -.072 -1.10 .065 -.018 
 
  Family-Friendly Programs .411 1.41 .291 .019 
 
 
PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT: 
 
  Supervisory Competence -.029 -0.38 .076 -.007 
 
  Performance Evaluation .173* 2.00 .086 .037 
 
  Handling Poor Performers .640*** 9.16 .070 .155 
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Table 9 (continued) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
                                 Unstandardized                 Standard    Beta 
                             Coefficient    t Statistic    Error      Wgts 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
FAIRNESS: 
 
  Fair Treatment on the Job -.037 -0.46 .080 -.008 
 
 
CULTURE: 
 
  Organizational Culture .500*** 4.43 .113 .105 
 
 
INDIVIDUAL ATTRIBUTES: 
 
  Age -.017 -0.33 .050 -.005 
 
  Male -.903*** -7.78 .116 -.108 
 
  Education (years) -.017 -0.44 .039 -.007 
 
  Federal Service (years) .092** 2.46 .037 .038 
 
  White -.247 -1.90 .130 -.025 
 
  Grade Level -.169*** -6.64 .025 -.116 
 
  Supervisor .129 0.84 .154 .012 
 
 
  R2 .39 
 
  Observations              3911 
 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note.  Regression model was performed using the U.S. MSPB sampling weight variable.   
Reduced sample includes General Schedule and Senior Executive Service employees only. 
* Significant at .05;  ** Significant at .01;  *** Significant at .001 
 
 169
Conclusion 
 Findings from this study have clear implications for management.  If federal 
agencies really want to improve productivity, they must ask themselves the following 
questions.  Do employees have the resources and training they need to do the job well?  
Are managers doing all they can to fully engage employees in their work or are 
management practices causing employees to become disengaged at work?  Does the 
performance appraisal system motivate greater productivity?  Are managers handling 
poor performers effectively or are they demotivating employees by ignoring the problem?  
Have managers created a positive organizational culture that supports productivity or are 
they providing a culture where performance and productivity do not matter? 
 If managers want federal employees to perform at their best, they must support 
the employees’ desire and capacity to work more productively (Guy, 2004; Hall, 1994).  
Ultimately, management is responsible for creating the environmental conditions that 
either facilitate or frustrate employee productivity (Guy, 2004; Hall, 1994; Holzer & Lee, 
2004a).  Based on the results of this study, it is clear that federal managers aren’t giving 
employees everything they need to be productive in the workplace.  This finding is 
consistent with previous research which suggests that American workers want to be 
productive but are hindered by repressive organizational environments and restrictive 
management practices (Hall, 1994).   
 What does this productivity model tell us in a government era of “do more with 
less”?  This study directs managers to improve productivity by making the most of the 
human and financial resources available to them.  It also provides encouraging evidence 
that managers have multiple opportunities to influence productivity in ways not 
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previously considered.  Three of the strongest predictors of federal productivity are 
motivational factors that money cannot buy – namely, employee engagement, handling 
poor performers effectively, and organizational culture.   
 Employee engagement collectively emerges as the strongest predictor of federal 
productivity, with mission contribution representing the most important individual factor 
within this group.  But engagement requires constant attention.  Managers must 
continuously promote high levels of employee engagement by matching the right people 
with the right jobs in order to provide interesting and meaningful work and make better 
use of employee skills and abilities.  Above all, managers should give top priority to 
emphasizing the importance of employee contributions to agency mission achievement as 
this is the single most influential factor affecting federal productivity.   
 Poor performance represents a big obstacle to productivity and how poor 
performers are handled is the second strongest predictor of federal productivity.  
Supervisors who fail to deal effectively with poor performance are the main reason why 
this obstacle is so difficult to overcome.  Federal agencies must pay greater attention to 
the proper handling of poor performers which has a significant impact on employee 
productivity.  Frontline supervisors play a central role in performance management due to 
their “primary responsibility for communicating performance expectations, monitoring 
and evaluating employee performance, providing feedback and counseling, and creating 
consequences for excellent and poor performance” (U.S. MSPB, 2008a, p. 29).  While 
one might think that areas of good supervisory performance can potentially outweigh the 
effects of any poor supervisory performance, evidence suggests otherwise. U.S. MSPB 
(1982) found that “poor supervisory skills have an adverse effect on productivity, but 
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good supervisory skills have only a marginally positive affect” (p. 18).  Although dealing 
with poor performers is a daunting task which can result in emotional wear and tear on 
the supervisors involved (Daley, 2008), the importance of dealing effectively with poor 
performers cannot be overstated.  In the end, the long-term consequences of doing 
nothing about poor performers far outweigh any short-term costs of taking action.   
 This study confirms that organizational culture significantly affects federal 
productivity.  It’s imperative that federal agencies have an organizational culture that 
emphasizes performance and promotes productivity.  To achieve this, managers must 
create a supportive work environment where information is shared freely, employee 
opinions are valued, a spirit of cooperation and teamwork exists, employees are given 
greater flexibility in performing work, people are treated with respect, employees are 
given opportunities to participate in long-range work planning, recognition and rewards 
are based on merit, and people are satisfied with the recognition they receive for their 
work – all of which stimulate greater productivity in the federal workplace.   
 The results of this study are limited by the use of subjective data to measure 
productivity.  Ideally, scholars recommend the use of both objective and subjective 
measures whenever possible to capture all dimensions of organizational performance 
(Andrews, Boyne, & Walker, 2006).  Nevertheless, the use of subjective data alone is not 
without precedent.  The lack of objective data has prompted the use of subjective 
approaches in government studies of organizational effectiveness (Moynihan & Pandey, 
2005), organizational performance (Brewer, 2005), and productivity (Langbein & Lewis, 
1998).  Although survey data is subject to bias and response error, researchers have found 
high correlation between subjective and objective measures of performance (Boyne & 
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Walker, 2002).  One advantage of using self-reported assessments is that they provide 
vital information about employee attitudes, perceptions, and problems that define the 
federal workplace.  Analyzing federal survey data offers valuable insights into 
productivity which cannot be obtained through objective measures and whose value is not 
diminished by the lack of objective data.   
 In conclusion, while there is still much to learn about motivating productive 
behavior, it’s apparent that the full potential of employee productivity has yet to be 
realized in the federal government.  By harnessing the power of employee perceptions, 
this study highlights factors within management’s control that significantly impact 
employee productivity.  When comparing what employees need to be productive with 
what the federal government is giving them, a sizeable gap appears.  Exposing this gap as 
the true productivity problem, rather than placing the blame on federal employees, was a 
challenge worthy of pursuing in this study.  Closing the gap to create a more productive 
work environment for all employees is the challenge facing every public manager today.   
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 Performance improvement has been a recurring theme of government reforms for 
nearly 30 years.  So far, the U.S. Government has “downsized, restructured, reinvented, 
and contracted out government services and government organizations in the name of 
improved performance” (Ingraham, 2005, p. 390).  Achieving high performance is an 
important goal for government because citizens have a right to demand that their tax 
dollars be spent effectively and efficiently and have a legitimate expectation that 
government programs will achieve the desired results.  Performance is at the very heart of 
government accountability.  While everyone agrees that performance matters in 
government, they don’t always agree on the best way to improve it.  My research 
analyzes employee attitudes and perceptions of their work environment in order to 
provide valuable insights to managers seeking practical ways of motivating better 
performance and greater productivity in the federal workplace.   
 My first study offers knowledge about factors that influence pay for performance 
belief.  Prior research on pay for performance beliefs only considered a few explanatory 
variables (e.g., Folger & Konovsky, 1989; Perry & Pearce, 1983; St-Onge, 2000; Vest et 
al., 1995; Vest et al., 2000).  This study is among the first to construct and test a more 
comprehensive, theory-based model to explain what influences employee belief in pay 
for performance.   Initial findings suggest that belief in the link between pay and 
performance isn’t strong enough among federal employees to support the adoption of pay 
for performance.  Only 42 percent of employees agreed that better performance is likely 
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to lead to a cash award or pay increase, while 35 percent disagreed.  Logit results indicate 
that federal employees are significantly more likely to believe in the promise of pay for 
performance if they feel they are treated fairly on all personnel matters, have positive 
perceptions of their organizational culture, consider their performance evaluation system 
to be fair and accurate, and think their immediate supervisor makes pay for performance 
decisions fairly.  Judging by these results, the biggest obstacle to pay for performance 
belief is perceived unfairness which spreads across three significant areas (fair treatment 
on the job, performance evaluation system, and supervisory fairness in pay for 
performance decisions).  Improving perceived fairness among workers should be a top 
priority among managers desiring to increase their likelihood of pay for performance 
belief.   
 My second study teaches several valuable lessons about implementing pay for 
performance.  During my investigation of why government efforts have failed to 
successfully implement pay for performance, I discovered a new answer.  Failure 
occurred largely due to a lack of readiness for organizational change.  Although 
researchers from other disciplines recognize the importance of readiness in successfully 
implementing organizational change, the concept has been overlooked by public 
administration scholars and policymakers alike.  This study introduces readiness as an 
important pre-implementation concept that can greatly impact the success or failure of 
organizational change initiatives such as pay for performance.  As a result of examining 
30 years of pay for performance research, I identify 11 criteria (or prerequisites) required 
for pay for performance success.  I use my criteria for success to develop a scorecard that 
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measures pay for performance readiness in a manner that has never been attempted 
before.   
 According to my scorecard results, the federal government isn’t ready to 
implement pay for performance.  While some federal agencies are more ready than 
others, none have reached a level of readiness sufficient to ensure pay for performance 
success by my standards.  The main obstacles to pay for performance success in the 
federal government include: a workforce that is more motivated by intrinsic rewards than 
by money; perceived unfairness in three key areas (pay for performance expectations, fair 
treatment on the job, and supervisory fairness in pay for performance decisions); 
supervisors who are not dealing effectively with poor performers; and organizations that 
do not ensure that employees are appropriately paid and rewarded for performance.  
Because pay for performance requires a whole host of elements to be successful, the 
federal government should consider its overall readiness status and the readiness of each 
federal agency before rushing to adopt pay for performance on a governmentwide basis.  
It’s time for policymakers to recognize the need for readiness prior to implementing 
major organizational changes and realize the inherent danger of moving forward with pay 
for performance without having all of the critical elements in place as a strategy which is 
capable of doing more harm than good.   
 My third study illustrates ways that managers can promote greater productivity by 
focusing on their greatest asset – the employees.  Although federal agencies are 
constantly trying to promote productivity with existing resources, the human side of 
productivity has largely been ignored.  This study advocates improving productivity 
through human capital investment and better management of human resources.  Results 
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from my multiple regression analysis show that federal productivity is greatly influenced 
by employee engagement, the effective handling of poor performers, a positive 
organizational culture, adequate resources and training, and fair and accurate 
performance evaluation.  Employee engagement emerges as the strongest predictor of 
federal productivity, with mission contribution representing the most important individual 
factor in the group.  Overall, these findings show that federal managers aren’t giving 
employees everything they need to be their most productive in the workplace.  For 
productivity to improve, managers need to promote high levels of employee engagement, 
deal effectively with poor performers, create and maintain a positive organizational 
culture, provide adequate resources and training, and provide a fair and accurate 
performance evaluation system.   
 What does this research teach us about motivating better performance and greater 
productivity in the federal workplace?  From a management perspective, the overall 
message holds promise for the future.  Despite all of the barriers to improving 
performance, implementing pay for performance, and increasing productivity, managers 
have the power to influence many workplace motivators. 
• Managers should consistently demonstrate that performance matters when 
awarding bonuses, issuing promotions, conducting performance appraisals, and 
dealing with poor performers.   
• Managers should do everything they can to improve employee perceptions of 
fairness because they affect so many important workplace attitudes and behaviors 
and have the power to derail management reforms such as pay for performance.   
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• Managers should use a total rewards approach that incorporates both intrinsic and 
extrinsic rewards in order to satisfy the needs of as many employees as possible. 
• Managers should recognize that promising more pay for better performance may 
be the wrong approach to use with government employees who are more 
motivated by intrinsic rewards than by money. 
• Managers should realize that while linking pay to performance can potentially 
improve performance, there are specific requirements that must be met in advance 
in order to achieve the desired end results.  Moving too quickly to implement pay 
for performance can potentially do more harm than good. 
• Managers should take full advantage of the motivational power of employee 
engagement by placing the right people in the right jobs, providing interesting and 
meaningful work, making better use of employee skills and abilities, and above all 
emphasizing the importance of employee contributions to achieving the agency’s 
mission. 
 
In conclusion, while there is still much to learn about motivating work behavior, it is 
clear that the potential for better performance and greater productivity has yet to be 
reached in the federal government.  Utilizing survey data is one way to ensure that 
managers never run out of ideas on how to improve the federal government.   
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